[ExI] Mental Phenomena
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Thu Feb 6 18:04:49 UTC 2020
This is all meaningless slight of hand, misdirecting people away from what
is important. There is no objectively observable "redness behavior" in
what you are describing. There must be some objectively observable redness
behavior which cannot be substituted for anything sufficiently objectively
observably different, without it changing from redness behavior.
What is that objectively observable redness behavior and how could God
objectively observe when it changed to grenness behavior?
On Thu, Feb 6, 2020 at 10:33 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 7 Feb 2020 at 02:40, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> Hi Stathis,
>> Can you see what you are doing? Any time I define this "stathis redness
>> behavior" sufficiently enough so it can be objectively observed, so it can
>> be objectively distinguished from "stathis grenness behavior", you can use
>> the substitution argument to prove it can't be that. What then, is the
>> stathis redness behavior? I claim it is just a slight of hand stathis
>> uses, so that any time you sufficiently define it, he just says it is some
>> other behavior. In other words, stathis can't define this impossible to
>> objectively define "stathis redness behavior". Brent redness behavior, can
>> be objectively defined, glutamate is an example. It could also be anything
>> else, maybe even some "function". But before it can be a "function" you
>> must be able to give an example of that function sufficiently, so it can be
>> objectively distinguishable between a grenness function, otherwise, it is
>> this stathis grenness function which isn't objectively detectable. And if
>> redness arises from this function, and if it changes to grenness when the
>> function changes to greeness. Then it is a physical fact that redness
>> arises from that function. And whatever that is, you can use the same
>> substitution argument to prove it isn't that. And if I can't call that,
>> whatever it is that is changing from the redness function, to the greenness
>> function a substrate, then what can I call it? Because no matter what you
>> call it, it is still the same thing, the behavior of redness. And if you
>> substitute it for something sufficiently different, it is no longer redness.
> Redness behaviour includes “I see red” while greenness behaviour includes
> “I see green”. A machine that says these things will continue saying them
> if any or all of its parts are substituted for different parts that
> interact with connecting parts in the same way. Can you explain how, even
> if you were God, you could get around this?
> QED, as I continue to say, there must be a problem in the way you are
>> doing a substitution, because we know, absolutely, that we have qualia, and
>> you can't substitute redness behavior, with some different behavior,
>> without it stopping being redness.
> I agree! But what I am saying is that you can substitute parts and the
> redness behaviour will not change, and neither will the qualia. There might
> not actually exist any suitable parts: it is a matter of logic that IF they
> existed THEN the behaviour and qualia would be the same. Hence, the qualia
> cannot be specific to some particular substrate or physics.
> On Thu, Feb 6, 2020 at 8:15 AM John Clark via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>> On Wed, Feb 5, 2020 at 6:05 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>> > *I'm trying to say something closer to qualia and qualia behavior
>>>> are the same thing. *
>>> I think that's a good guess and an excellent operational hypothesis, but
>>> we'll never prove it's true because, just like Evolution, the Scientific
>>> Method can not observe qualia, it can only observe behavior. Nevertheless I
>>> embrace that operational hypothesis and even elevate it to the level of an
>>> axiom despite the lack of a proof and despite my inability to detect qualia
>>> in anything other than in myself. And that's the only reason I don't think
>>> rocks experience qualia, and that's the only reason I think you do.
>>> *> If the behavior isn't changing, and qualia are changing*
>>> That is contradictory. If "qualia and qualia behavior are the same
>>> thing" and if "behavior isn't changing" then qualia isn't changing either.
>>> *> that changing qualia must be some place else.*
>>> And I don't know what you mean by that.
>>>> > *if you substitute all behavior (or function or magic or anything),
>>>> with something that is different, and the qualia never change, *
>>> Brent, the only way you have of knowing that "qualia never change" is
>>> by making use of a unproven operational hypothesis that makes use of
>>>> *> qualia are impossible, or at best not approachable via science.*
>>> I agree. But I know for a fact that qualia are NOT impossible because I
>>> know I have them, I can directly experience qualia in myself; therefore I
>>> must conclude that the second part of the above is true, qualia is "not
>>> approachable via science", or at least it's not without making use of an
>>> axiom that like all axioms remains unproven. Or to put it another way, I
>>> believe it's a brute fact that qualia is the way data feels when it is
>>> being processed intelligently.
>>> John K Clark
>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> Stathis Papaioannou
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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