[ExI] Mental Phenomena
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Thu Feb 13 21:07:09 UTC 2020
Oops, I guess I did mess up a little here, but before you jump on this
slight error, thinking your view is in any way adequate, let me point out a
Of course "plugging ourselves into" an abstract only robot, tells us
nothing about any qualia it might or might not have.
That is because, by definition, the robot has no qualia, and there is
nothing it's knowledge is qualitatively like.
Of course, you can assert that such might still have qualia, but what use
is there in believing in things like Unicorns that cannot be objectively
observed and proven to exist like can be easily done with REAL qualia?
On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 12:36 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2020 at 11:43 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> Plugging ourselves into the robot would not give us this information.
> Finally!! It almost sounds like you are acknowledging the fact that we
> have a computational binding system. Thank you.
> The only problem is, you are making this claim that this will not enable
> us to eff the ineffable with zero justification (other than might be
> possible an inadequate qualia blind model).
> Again, It remains a fact that we can have computationally bound
> experiences composed of both red and green. It is a fact that we know both
> what that redness is like, and how it is different than greeness, as surely
> as Descartes knew that because he thinks, he necessarily exists. It is
> also a fact that since you can do it between two brain hemispheres, you can
> also do it between 4, proving your claim here factually incorrect.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the extropy-chat