[ExI] Fwd: Fwd: Mental Phenomena

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 19 Feb 2020 at 06:11, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Hi Stathis,
>
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 10:24 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> But this does not imply that qualia are substrate specific.
>>
>
> That is why I used the term qualiastrate or colorstrate, because I knew
> you would object to "substrate".  The fact of the matter is our knowledge
> has qualities or colors, and elemental redness in one brain is going to be
> like elemental redness in another brain, even if that other brain uses
> redness to represent green things in that other brain.  I know a synasthist
> who's letters of the alphabet have elemental redness and grenness
> qualities, these would be the same color qualities of knowledge.  I'm just
> assuming you guys will be OK with the idea that whatever these colors are,
> will eventually could be objectively observable and perfectly predictable
> (i.e. able to discover when someone is red/green qualia inverted).  That is
> what I'm referring to when I talk about colorstrate or qualiastrate.
>
> You, John, and everyone on this list continue to claim there is no way we
> could know what qualia were like in another brain.
> But using this type of neural ponytail, where you provide something like
> the 300 million neurons, computationally binding 4 hemispheres the way the
> corpus callosum computationally bind 2 hemispheres.  You would know what
> elemental subjective qualia could be like in another's brain, as sure as
> you know that "I think therefore I am" since you would be directly aware of
> the physics in another's brain (does not require interpretation) not just
> objectively observing them (requires interpretation).  That's what it means
> to say you would experience all of the experience (or at least as much of
> the experience as your partner wanted to share), not just half, when you
> hugged your partner.
>
> So why do you you or John or anyone continue to think that we can't know,
> given this #3 strongest form of effing the ineffable, along with the #1,
> week, and #2 stronger forms of effing the ineffable.?
>

It still does not mean that qualia are substrate specific if you could
connect yourself to another person’s brain and see what they see. Because
of our genetic similarities different people probably use similar
structures for similar functions, but in theory they might use different
ones. If you connected yourself to a different species, say a squid, it
probably would not work at all but if it did, and you had novel
experiences, I don’t think you would know what it is like to be a squid, or
the squid what it is like to be a human. It would result in the experiences
of a human-squid hybrid.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou
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