[ExI] Fwd: Mental Phenomena

Thu Jan 23 13:28:39 UTC 2020

Hi Stathis:

“I think of consciousness as being the set of all qualia that one
experiences. How can that be qualia independent?”

OK, great.  That was what I was trying to point out, that consciousness IS
qualia dependent.  So we are in agreement with this.

“Why is this “qualia blindness”? We can clearly say that the op amp is
required for red qualia because if we remove it and leave an empty socket
the red qualia disappear. But many other devices, with different physical
properties, preserve the qualia.”

OK, great.  This will still illustrate the point I am trying to make since
you are still specifying what it is that could be  redness.  You are saying
that it is the op amp functionality that is the redness, not the physics
implementing the op amp functionality.  In this case, it would be much like
color (as opposed to colorness).  There are lots of different things that
can reflect red light.  So despite the fact that multiple things can
reflect red light, this is what red is. The physical facts of redness could
be similar as in this case you are proposing.  So, let’s see what happens
with op ampness being the redness quale.

So, you are just substituting op amness for glutamate as being what has the
redness quality.  So, you must treat this the same as you insist I must do
with glutamate.  You must show that op ampness can be substituted for
anything, proving op ampness can’t have qualia.  No matter what you
substitute for glutamate or op ampnes, it can’t have the redness quality
for the same reasons.  So if nothing can have redness, again, that is the
definition of qualia blindness.

“The point of the exercise is to assume that qualia ARE substrate
dependent, and show the problem that this assumption creates.”

As I’ve always been demonstrating, there are no problems when you assume
redness is fundamental  The only problem is a color problem, of which you
adequately describe how to discover by removing the op ampness
functionality, and the redness goes away.

But with the assumption that function is more fundamental, in addition to
all the other ‘hard mind problem problems” that result from assuming qualia
are substrate independent, there is this nasty additional contradiction
that I have shown above, that nothing can have a redness quality.

Again, consciousness is qualia dependent, as I pointed out you are agreeing
with.  And qualia must be something.  So, consciousness is dependent on
whatever that qualia is.  In other words, consciousness must be
qualia=substrate dependent, as you admitted.

And again.  If qualia are separate and only supervene on something
physical, we are not interested in the physics on which qualia supervene.
We are interested in objectively discovering the physics that are a redness
quale which is doing the supervening.

On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 2:39 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 at 08:00, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>> From: Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> Date: Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 1:55 PM
>> Subject: Re: [ExI] Mental Phenomena
>> To: Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>>
>>
>> Thank you for making a testable hypothetical prediction.
>>
>> When I got to the end of all this email, I finally realized this is all
>> as simple as the last 3 sections of this e-mail.
>> So if you want, you can just skip to those last 3 sections.
>>
>> This substitution argument is dependent on the initial assumption you are
>> trying to prove, that qualia are substrate independent.
>> We can use this falsifiable example you provide to reveal the problems
>> that result when starting with this assumption.
>>
>
> The point of the exercise is to assume that qualia ARE substrate
> dependent, and show the problem that this assumption creates.
>
> So now that you have proven that LM740 [TL071] doesn't have a redness
>> quality, one at a time, replace this LM740 [TL071] with every other
>> possible internal difference (including all of the following: different
>> gates, different matter, different internal functionality, different
>> networks of gates, some with silicone, some with neurons....)
>> You will notice that no matter what you include in all these different
>> internal physics, we can make the same claim, for the same reason.
>> That red qualia cannot be a specific property of the LM741 op amp, nor
>> can it be a property of anything else, including whatever higher up levels
>> there are, at which point redness finally does emerge.
>> This is the definition of qualia blindness, Making this assumption that
>> redness always only arises at some higher level than where you are doing
>> the substitution, makes it impossible for there to be redness at every
>> level, by definition.
>>
>
> Why is this “qualia blindness”? We can clearly say that the op amp is
> required for red qualia because if we remove it and leave an empty socket
> the red qualia disappear. But many other devices, with different physical
> properties, preserve the qualia.
>
> Therefor, you must rule out the initial assumption that qualia are
>> substrate independent (always at some higher level, independent of whatever
>> level you are doing the substitution.) because if you make this assumption,
>> qualia are not possible at any level.  And we know, more than we know
>> anything, that we are directly aware of our qualia.  So making the
>> assumption that we can't be directly aware of qualia, in a substrate
>> dependent way is just contradictory to what we know qualia to be.
>>
>
> We can find out exactly what parts of the system are required for the
> qualia by removing parts and seeing if the qualia are affected.
>
> Oh, and there must be a binding system that enables us to experience both
>> redness and grenness at the same time.
>> So, replace glutamate with LM740 [TL071] and assume that redness arises
>> from the particular configuration of transistors being used in the LM740
>> [TL071].
>> Since the set of configuration of transistors in the LM741 is different,
>> the different grenness could arise from this different configuration.
>>
>> You must also be able to bind these two systems together, so you can be
>> aware of the LM740[TL071]ness and the LM741ness, at the same time.
>> Then you can say my 740[TL071]ness is like your 741ness, both of which we
>> say implements the substrate independent function we call op amp.
>>
>
> That can only be the case if the electrical signals coming out of the two
> different op amps affect the rest of the robot differently.
>
> In other words, qualia are physical qualities, on which our knowledge is
>> represented.  So having a thought experiment for which that isn't possible,
>> isn't relevant to a consciousness which is implemented on qualia.
>>
>
> It is the electrical signals that cause the robot to move, not the qualia.
> This is an important point. If the different op amps, in addition to the
> electrical signals, secreted a substance, “red qualia” or “green qualia”,
> that affected the robot’s motors differently, then obviously the functional
> substitution would not work. But there is no such substance. Similarly with
> glutamate and glycine: the ONLY way they can affect the body is through
> their chemical interactions.
>
> You must agree that consciousness is qualia dependent, right?  In other
>> words, my redness could be like yoru grenness, both of which we call red.
>> It's just an absurdity to assume, from the get go, that consciousness is
>> qualia independent as this argument requires.
>> And that is the reason you get all these so called impossibly hard
>> problems and contradictions, when you make this assumption about
>> consciousness.
>>
>
> I’m not sure of what you are trying to say here. I think of consciousness
> as being the set of all qualia that one experiences. How can that be qualia
> independent?
>
> So does that work?, every time you ask "Is the behavior the same?"
>> I'll just fire back with: "Is consciousness not qualia independent"?
>>
>> And since qualia must be something, whatever that substrate is, qualia
>> are dependent on that substrate.
>>
>
> Why could they not be dependent on a variety of substrates with similar
> properties?
>
>> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
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