[ExI] Fwd: Mental Phenomena

[Brent Allsop]

Oh, wait.  I forgot an addition point about your view.
In addition to saying: "That can't be, because of what the neural
substitution argument demonstrates"
You amy also say:
"That isn't important, because of what the neural substitution argument
demonstrates."



On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 1:45 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Hi Stathis,
> How about we try this.
> I'm going to state your position, and all the points you keep making, as
> completely and concisely as I can.
> Then you can tell me if I'm missing anything important.
> Then, let's see if you can do the same back to me, with anything close to
> the same fidelity.  Describe, even briefly, my model of consciousness, and
> using that model, point out as many of the problems as you can, which I
> believe this view brings to light in your position.
>
> OK, let me know if I'm missing anything in the following:
>
> I don't recall any other arguments from you, other than the neural
> substitution argument.
> The Neural Substitution argument is as follows.
> You replace neurons in the brain, one at a time, with simulated versions.
> For all possible inputs to the real neuron, the simulated version of the
> neuron results in identical outputs to what the real neuron would do.
> In other words, from an input and output perspective, they are
> indistinguishable.
> For each individual neuron substitution you do, you switch back and forth
> between the real and simulated to verify there is no subjective change by
> switching to the simulated version.
> You don't progress to the next neuron till this is achieved, perfectly.
> Eventually you will get to the last real neuron.  When you switch back and
> forth, between the last real neuron, and simulated version of the same,
> still, the subject verifies that there is no subjective difference,
> The only conclusion that can be made from this, is that the subjective
> experience in the resulting final completely simulated version must be the
> same as in the real version.
> From that we can conclude subjective experience must be "functional" and
> can't be "material", otherwise you would have irrational "fading",
> "dancing" or "absent" qualia, on the way to the simulated version.
> As long as the "behavior" remains the same the subjectivity must also
> remain the same.
>
> Now it's your turn.  Can you describe my model of consciousness with an
> equivalent amount of fidelity?
> I believe my model of consciousness brings to light umpteen different
> problems in this substitution argument, all of which I'm sure I've
> described at least 2 or 3 times, in multiple different ways, over the years.
> How many of those different issues can you enumerate, using my model, and
> how well can you describe them?
>
> Feel free to point out the problems with each of these, as you describe
> them, but my prediction is that you won't have much more to say for any of
> them than: "That can't be, because of what the neural substitution argument
> demonstrates."
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:46 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 08:24, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “I appreciate the time you take in these communications and I am sorry
>>> that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting through to the
>>> other.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> After I sent that last long one to you, I was thinking I should have
>>> included a statement like this, with it.  So, thanks and right back at
>>> you.  James Carroll finally gave up on me LONG ago.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I’m thinking this pretty much captures your view in a way I can
>>> understand:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “IF glutamate is responsible for associated with redness qualia, and we
>>> replicate the objective behaviour of the glutamate (the qualia-blind
>>> behaviour, in your terminology) by some non-glutamate means, then the
>>> redness qualia will also be replicated. It's quite remarkable that we can
>>> say this, but it is true.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But I still struggle with the way you talk about many things.  You
>>> haven’t mentioned the substitution argument, but I’m assuming this is the
>>> only justification you have for making that last “but it is true.”
>>> Claim.?  No thoughts on nothing being able to be redness, for the same
>>> reasons?  Would you not agree that if experimentalist were never able to
>>> reproduce redness, without glutamate, it would falsify this claim?
>>>
>>
>> If the experimentalist could reproduce all the behaviour associated with
>> redness but not the redness, then that would mean qualia are meaningless.
>> The subject would have altered or absent qualia, but they would not notice
>> any difference, and communicate that everything was exactly the same. The
>> most important thing about qualia is that we know we have them and we know
>> if they change; if this is eliminated, what is there left?
>>
>> “If the op amp configuration is changed but other circuitry is also
>>> changed to compensate, the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so
>>> will the redness qualia.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You never seem to acknowledge any other behavior than external behavior
>>> (picking the strawberry).  You seem to be ignoring the fact that a qualia
>>> invert robot could have identical “behavior”, and the qualia is NOT the
>>> same.
>>>
>>
>> If this is possible, then for the reason above it makes qualia
>> meaningless. Behaviour does not mean just picking the strawberry, it means
>> every type of behaviour that the subject can display, such as talking in
>> detail about its experience of seeing strawberries. It will therefore have
>> different qualia but declare that the strawberries are exactly the same
>> shade of red as they were before the change. That would mean that your
>> qualia might have become inverted in the last five minutes but you haven’t
>> noticed. As far as you are concerned redness is still redness and greenness
>> is still greenness. Or you might have gone completely blind in the last
>> five minutes, but not noticed that you have no visual qualia at all any
>> more. If you do notice, you are trapped in a nightmare, unable to
>> communicate this information in any way. Does this make any sense?
>>
>> “I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You always ignore the binding functionality.  For example, you mentioned
>>> multiple ways to study epiphenomenal qualia in that closing statement, but
>>> not once did you mention anything about using neural ponytails to do the
>>> strongest form of effing the ineffable to directly observe the physical
>>> qualia of others physical knowledge.  Do you not agree that your left
>>> hemisphere, knows absolutely, if your right hemisphere’s knowledge is
>>> inverted?  (for example, you use some special glasses and a camera system
>>> to make everything in the right field of vision red/green inverted from the
>>> information in your right hemisphere (from the left field of vision)?.  It
>>> seems to me that facts like this (and being necessarily possible to do the
>>> same thing for 4 brain hemispheres [Is this not a fact or not necessary if
>>> if qualia are epiphenomenal?]) should have some effect on these closing
>>> remarks of yours?
>>>
>>
>> Connecting brains together is not going to allow knowledge of qualia
>> differences if even the original brain cannot notice qualia differences.
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2020 at 1:37 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 28 Jan 2020 at 16:13, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hi Brent. I appreciate the time you take in these communications and I
>>>> am sorry that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting
>>>> through to the other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 27, 2020 at 4:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think glutamate is sufficient for redness because it's too
>>>>>> simple. You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is
>>>>>> just an example to facilitate discussion. But I agree that glutamate might
>>>>>> be sufficient as part of a component in a system. It cannot be necessary,
>>>>>> because once we work out what physical interactions the component is
>>>>>> involved in, we can substitute another component.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I always think you understand, especially when you say thing like: "
>>>>> You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is just an
>>>>> example to facilitate discussion."
>>>>> But then you prove that you still don't understand, with the rest.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let's back up a bit, and see if we can get this right.  Start by
>>>>> watching this video <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/> up
>>>>> to the "inverting pixel" section where it goes into a loop (1 pixel
>>>>> switching between red and green) till you press continue.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm talking about what is the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>>>> (or magic or spirit world stuff, or whatever) for that one pixel to have a
>>>>> redness quality.  And what are the changers, when only that one pixel
>>>>> changes.
>>>>> Implications being you can do this for every pixel you are consciously
>>>>> aware of, and that being proof that there must be something physical for
>>>>> everything you know, including every pixel of visual knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If the pixel changes subjectively, then it must change objectively
>>>> also. That is, there must be some test that can be done on the system which
>>>> will reveal that there has been a change: the subject cannot distinguish
>>>> between objects that are a different colour, or the subject says that the
>>>> strawberry looks different, or something. If there is no such objective
>>>> change, then there cannot be a subjective change. It is possible to change
>>>> many parts of the system and produce no objective change. It is like a
>>>> computer running a program: there are multiple different computers that
>>>> will run the program exactly the same and give the same user experience.
>>>> Thus it might be sufficient for a certain set of hardware to run Microsoft
>>>> Word, but we can't state what is necessary to run Microsoft Word: in a
>>>> thousand years time people may be running old computer programs on hardware
>>>> based on dark matter, or other technologies that we can't even imagine now.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> When we abstractly describe glutamate, we have no idea the colorness
>>>>> property of what we are objectively describing.  Everything we get,
>>>>> objectively, is necessary abstracted away from physical qualities and
>>>>> necessary substrate independent.  In other words, without a dictionary, you
>>>>> can't know the colorness property you are describing or objectively
>>>>> observing.  Subjective experience is very different.  Subjectively, we
>>>>> directly experience the physical quality of what our abstract descriptions
>>>>> are describing.  In order to connect the two, you need a mapping like both
>>>>> the objective word "glutamate" and the subjective word "redness" are labels
>>>>> for the same physical thing.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> By examining glutamate objectively, we cannot know what redness is
>>>> like. However, we do know that IF glutamate is responsible for associated
>>>> with redness qualia, and we replicate the objective behaviour of the
>>>> glutamate (the qualia-blind behaviour, in your terminology) by some
>>>> non-glutamate means, then the redness qualia will also be replicated. It's
>>>> quite remarkable that we can say this, but it is true.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> So, despite attempting to define glutamate that way, as you are doing
>>>>> here, you think of glutamate in a completely different way than I was
>>>>> attempting to describe.  You reveal this misinterpretation of what I'm
>>>>> trying to say with things like: "the component is involved in, we can
>>>>> substitute another component."  In other words you are assuming glutamate
>>>>> is just some "component" of whatever it is that has redness.  (Completely
>>>>> changing what it actually says).  Thankfully, in the past, after a
>>>>> gazillion requests, you finally provided the "op amp" example.  You pointed
>>>>> out that you can replace all the neurons performing the op amp
>>>>> functionality with neurons that can perform the same functionality, and it
>>>>> would still result in redness.  You think I disagree with this, but I
>>>>> don't.  You are just changing the conversion away from what I"m trying to
>>>>> talk about.  If glutamate is just a component of rendes, then you must
>>>>> substitute glutamate for whatever it is glutamate is a component of that
>>>>> performs the necessary and sufficient functionality that is redness for
>>>>> that one pixel, THAT is what I'm talking about, and you continue to change
>>>>> the subject.  If that is true, I'm not talking about glutamate at all, as
>>>>> you continue to think I am.  Glutamate is just a stand in word for whatever
>>>>> is the necessary and sufficient set of physics (or functionality.  For your
>>>>> sake, let's assume an addition op amp has the redness quality, and when
>>>>> that pixel switches from redness to grenness, the op amp functionality
>>>>> changes from addition to subtraction.  I can completely agree with you that
>>>>> you could implement both an addition and a subtraction op amp in either
>>>>> neurons, or silicone, or anything else, but I"m not talking about
>>>>> components of redness, I'm talking about redness.  In this case it is the
>>>>> the addition op amp functionality which can be implemented with either
>>>>> silicon or neurons.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You seem to be agreeing with me that if the op amp is involved in
>>>> redness qualia, and it is changed for a functionally identical op amp in a
>>>> different substrate, then the redness qualia will be preserved. If the op
>>>> amp configuration is changed, say from inverting to non-inverting, while
>>>> leaving everything else the same, the behaviour of the system will change
>>>> and the redness qualia may also change. On the other hand, if the op amp
>>>> configuration is changed but other circuitry is also changed to compensate,
>>>> the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so will the redness
>>>> qualia. This demonstrates that there can be no particular physical property
>>>> of the op amp that is necessary and sufficient for redness qualia.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> The binding system is part of the required functionality.  The binding
>>>>> system makes you aware of the pixel that is changing from an addition op
>>>>> amp, to a subtraction op amp (bound with all the other pixels of color of
>>>>> yet different op amps that are not changing, while this one pixel does
>>>>> change.)  Anything else you present to that binding system, for that pixel,
>>>>> the system must immediately be aware of the change, just as when you see
>>>>> that pixel change from addition op amp ness to subtraction op amp ness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 26, 2020 at 3:55 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Glutamate may be involved when red qualia are experienced, but this
>>>>>>>> cannot be a unique property of glutamate, because if glutamate's physical
>>>>>>>> effect in the brain,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It almost sounds like you think you have found a way arround my
>>>>>>> "proof" that if it can't be glutamate, it can't be anything.  Since you now
>>>>>>> seem to be on board (a change?) with glutamate at least being sufficient
>>>>>>> for redness, but not necessary?  Is this new?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> changing the shape of glutamate receptors to which it binds, were
>>>>>>>> replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia would continue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How is this not just saying redness isn't physically real, it is
>>>>>>> just magic.  There must be a very discoverable set of objectively
>>>>>>> observable physics, that can result in a redness experience.  This is just
>>>>>>> up to nature.  Either it is within that set or it isn't.  We don't get to
>>>>>>> specify when we do and do not want redness to arise so it will fit our
>>>>>>> possible faulty thinking.  Do you agree that even if there is some
>>>>>>> "software functionality"  (trying to imagine what a "non physical
>>>>>>> functionality" might be), it is up to physics (or God?) as to whether
>>>>>>> redness will "arize' from that, right?  In other words, in all possible
>>>>>>> cases, redness is a real physical quality?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I honestly can't see why you think that if the glutamate is replaced
>>>>>> by another mechanism and everything works the same, that means qualia are
>>>>>> magic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Again, you are thinking completely incorrectly about what I think, as
>>>>> I indicated above.  If it is the entire mechanism that has the redness
>>>>> quality, and glutamate is only a "component" of that mechanism.  In that
>>>>> case, you need to replace glutamate, with the entire mechanism, or whatever
>>>>> it is that is the necessary and sufficient set of functionality required
>>>>> for you to directly experience it as a pixel of redness.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Also, changing the shape of the glutamate receptor can't uniquely be
>>>>>>>> the determinant of red qualia because if the physical effect in the brain
>>>>>>>> of (one type of) glutamate receptor, opening sodium ion channels when
>>>>>>>> glutamate binds, were replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia
>>>>>>>> would continue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've repeatedly tried to show the error I think I see in this logic
>>>>>>> (you are clearly thinking as if glutamate isn't the redness, that redness
>>>>>>> is something higher up in the system) but you just continue to even
>>>>>>> acknowledge what I'm trying to say, let alone point out some mistake in my
>>>>>>> logic.  You just keep saying this same old (clearly mistaken to me)
>>>>>>> argument over and over again.  There must be something that is the
>>>>>>> redness.  If this physically changes in any way, it will be physically
>>>>>>> different than redness.  The system only works if it is physical redness.
>>>>>>> If the system can't tell when the redness has physical changed, resulting
>>>>>>> in the entire system being aware that it has changed, physics, it isn't
>>>>>>> functioning correctly.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Glutamate changes the shape of receptors that it binds to due to the
>>>>>> electrostatic force, and this is how it causes other physical effects in
>>>>>> the body, such as muscle movement. Therefore, if the shape of the receptors
>>>>>> can be changed by some other means than glutamate, the other effects in the
>>>>>> body will be the same. Your error is to assume that glutamate has some
>>>>>> other physical effect, "redness", that can cause muscle movement, such as
>>>>>> the muscle movement associated with saying "I see red". But there is no
>>>>>> extra such effect; changing the shape of receptors that it binds to due to
>>>>>> the electrostatic force is 100% of the relevant physical effect of every
>>>>>> glutamate molecule in every human that has ever lived.
>>>>>>
>>>>> More proof that you are completely misunderstanding what I"m trying to
>>>>> say.   Again, in the case you are talking about, glutamate is only a
>>>>> "component".  In that case I'm not talking about a "component" of redness,
>>>>> I'm talking about whatever is the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>>>> that has the redness quality we directly experience for that one pixel.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This analysis can be continued for the whole brain, replacing every
>>>>>>>> part with a different part, but preserving all the qualia and
>>>>>>>> consciousness. It cannot be any one component, or any one physical process,
>>>>>>>> that is identified with qualia.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Again, as I've said, and demonstrated (remember the checkmate?) IF
>>>>>>> this is true, then the result is that nothing can have redness, for the
>>>>>>> same reason.  It seems like you are completely ignoring that, and just
>>>>>>> going back and replaying the old steps that lead to the checkmate, without
>>>>>>> changing anything, yet expecting different results?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I misunderstood the "checkmate". Was it that qualia are
>>>>>> epiphenomenal? I don't consider that "checkmate".
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> OH, yea.  That was my bad.  James Carroll, who is also a functionalist
>>>>> (the guy that joined the conversation on Quora the other day, he liking
>>>>> your "functionalists" responses, and hem adding additional functionalist
>>>>> responses.)
>>>>>
>>>>> My recollection is that he would repeatedly say the neural
>>>>> substitution argument proves that if it is glutamate that has the redness
>>>>> quality, then redness must be "epiphenomenal", which we both agreed meant
>>>>> redness would not be approachable via science, and we both agreed that
>>>>> would be game over or something neither one of us could accept.  Kind of
>>>>> ironic, in a way.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, it was a big surprize to me to hear you say you believe qualia are
>>>>> epiphenomenal.  But anyway, that doesn't matter.  What I was talking about,
>>>>> was the second argument I was making that would also be a "check mate",
>>>>> especially in your case.  (in James' case, I think I have a double check
>>>>> mate, but let's ignore that for now.)
>>>>>
>>>>> So, back to the op amp being the necessary and sufficient set of
>>>>> functionality to experience a redness quality (including when you can
>>>>> achieve the same addition op amp with various diverse sets of
>>>>> "components")  So, now, we need to replace glutamate, with this op amp (or
>>>>> whatever it is, including magic) that is the necessary and sufficient set
>>>>> of physics that have the redness quality you can experience for that one
>>>>> pixel.  For the same reason you are claiming it can't be glutamate, you
>>>>> must also make the same claim for addition op amps.  They can't have
>>>>> redness, absolutely nothing, even magic, can have redness, and you can
>>>>> prove that for anything that you try to substitute glutamate with.
>>>>>
>>>>> With that I'm thinking:  And we all know, more than anything, that we
>>>>> can experience redness.  So if your so called "proof" "proves" we can't,
>>>>> there is something wrong with your proof.
>>>>> That seems to me to be Checkmate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does that help at all?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
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