[ExI] Fwd: Mental Phenomena

[Brent Allsop]

OK, here are a few of the more important things you are missing.  You said
I would say:

“Finally, there is the actual conscious experience, such as seeing the
redness of the strawberry.”  I would not say: “see the redness”.  There are
two ways to know about the same physical facts.  1. To objectively perceive
them through a cause and effect chain of different physical events.  You
don’t “ignore” the different physical qualities of all these intermediate
things, you just think of all these different things in a substrate
independent way, thinking or interpreting each of them as if they are only
representing “red” instead of modeling how they are physically nothing like
red.



The second way to know about physics is to directly subjectively experience
them.  The first is the “objective” way, requiring lots of interpretation,
which can be mistaken or a seeming.  The second is the direct subjective
way, which can’t be mistaken and there is no interpretation.  Physical
redness is just a physical quality which we can directly experience and are
objectively describing, when we abstractly describe glutamate reacting in a
synapse, possibly including the way you abstractly describe glutamate as
changing the shape of the receptor.



Next: “from here on I get a bit lost. It seems to me that you are saying
that since redness is a physical property of glutamate, it must have
physical effects, and therefore it is not possible changing it would leave
the qualia and behavior `unchanged.”

The thing that leads you astray, is you interpret what I’m trying to say as
if glutamate and redness are separate things.  You are clearly saying it
here in a way that separates these two.   They are not separate in any
way.  Objectively, you see the glycine firing, instead of glutamate,
resulting in you saying: That is not red.  Subjectively, you directly
experience this same physics as redness, or greenness, enabling you to say
what color they are.  The objective and subjective facts are all the same
thing causing you to say: “That is not red.”  Saying redness causes you to
say: “that is red” is the same thing as saying glutamate, (possibly
changing the shape of the receptor) causes you to say: “That is red”.



And you completely missed the second necessary half of what I model
consciousness as being.  This is strong evidence that you are completely
blind to this half.  And it is THIS half that reveals all the problems in
the neural substitution argument.  In my view, this is a necessary part of
having composite qualitative experience or consciousness which we
absolutely have.  When you do the neural substitution in the way you do, it
completely leaves out this necessary half of the functionality and this is
part of the cause of all the craziness and “hard problems” that don’t make
any sense.



Oh, and you also completely left out the fact that when doing the neural
substitution without this necessary half of the functionality, you can
prove that nothing, not even “functionality” nor “magic” can have a redness
quality, for the same reasons glutamate can’t have redness.  You just never
notice this, because no matter where I try to put redness to make you
happy, even if this is op amp functionality or magic, you change the
subject and redefine everything as if the redness is someplace else, in the
system.  You never model what it is that has the redness quality, even if
it is functionality.  Because, if you did, I could prove to you that it
can’t be that, for the same faulty logic causing you to think it can’t be
glutamate.



What I’m trying to say is IF you include anything that could have a redness
quality we can directly experience, and if you would include the second
half of the necessary part of consciousness, and if you adequately modeled
both of these parts in your neural substitution, not only would everything
be obvious about what is going on, it would become clear how various slight
of hands can be done with this kind of substitution, to make it appear that
the neural substitution is doing one thing, when in reality it could be
physically or subjectively very different.



I guess another part I’m not stressing enough (trying present things from
your point of view) is the prediction that no such neural substitution
would ever be remotely possible, except in only the most contrived and
absurd ways.  Once you got to a pixel neuron, presenting glutamate to the
binding system, enabling you to be directly aware of it with all the other
physical pixels and their physical qualities as one composite experience,
the only way to do a switch, in a way that would even remotely behave the
same, is if you, in one atomic switching operation, rebound everything,
including all memories and names of things that are red with whatever you
substitute redness with.  I’ve tried to describe exactly this, many times
in a neural substitution where the binding system is a single neuron –
resulting in exactly all the switching being made, in one atomic swap
between the real and the simulated.  In other words, when the binding
system was replaced, in one atomic switch, there would be dancing (between
red and green or absent) qualia.  The only way it would work is if you
replaced everything, all at once, and remove any knowledge from the system
including that the word redness, before the switch, was bound to redness,
while after it is now bound to greenness (or the word red).  To say nothing
of how hard it would be to get something that represented red things with
the word red, to behave as if it’s knowledge really was physical redness,
instead of an abstract word.



Does any of this seem like evidence as to where the problem is, as it seems
like evidence of the problem to me?



On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 3:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Fri, 31 Jan 2020 at 08:29, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Oh, wait.  I forgot an addition point about your view.
>> In addition to saying: "That can't be, because of what the neural
>> substitution argument demonstrates"
>> You amy also say:
>> "That isn't important, because of what the neural substitution argument
>> demonstrates."
>>
>
> Yes, I admit I have probably said that, which I would be expected to do if
> indeed I thought you were making a point that was not relevant to the
> argument, but I should explain why exactly I believe it is not relevant.
>
> On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 1:45 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>> How about we try this.
>>> I'm going to state your position, and all the points you keep making, as
>>> completely and concisely as I can.
>>> Then you can tell me if I'm missing anything important.
>>> Then, let's see if you can do the same back to me, with anything close
>>> to the same fidelity.  Describe, even briefly, my model of consciousness,
>>> and using that model, point out as many of the problems as you can, which I
>>> believe this view brings to light in your position.
>>>
>>> OK, let me know if I'm missing anything in the following:
>>>
>>> I don't recall any other arguments from you, other than the neural
>>> substitution argument.
>>> The Neural Substitution argument is as follows.
>>> You replace neurons in the brain, one at a time, with simulated versions.
>>> For all possible inputs to the real neuron, the simulated version of the
>>> neuron results in identical outputs to what the real neuron would do.
>>> In other words, from an input and output perspective, they are
>>> indistinguishable.
>>> For each individual neuron substitution you do, you switch back and
>>> forth between the real and simulated to verify there is no subjective
>>> change by switching to the simulated version.
>>> You don't progress to the next neuron till this is achieved, perfectly.
>>> Eventually you will get to the last real neuron.  When you switch back
>>> and forth, between the last real neuron, and simulated version of the same,
>>> still, the subject verifies that there is no subjective difference,
>>> The only conclusion that can be made from this, is that the subjective
>>> experience in the resulting final completely simulated version must be the
>>> same as in the real version.
>>> From that we can conclude subjective experience must be "functional" and
>>> can't be "material", otherwise you would have irrational "fading",
>>> "dancing" or "absent" qualia, on the way to the simulated version.
>>> As long as the "behavior" remains the same the subjectivity must also
>>> remain the same.
>>>
>>> Now it's your turn.  Can you describe my model of consciousness with an
>>> equivalent amount of fidelity?
>>> I believe my model of consciousness brings to light umpteen different
>>> problems in this substitution argument, all of which I'm sure I've
>>> described at least 2 or 3 times, in multiple different ways, over the years.
>>> How many of those different issues can you enumerate, using my model,
>>> and how well can you describe them?
>>>
>>> Feel free to point out the problems with each of these, as you describe
>>> them, but my prediction is that you won't have much more to say for any of
>>> them than: "That can't be, because of what the neural substitution argument
>>> demonstrates."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:46 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 29 Jan 2020 at 08:24, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> “I appreciate the time you take in these communications and I am
>>>>> sorry that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting through
>>>>> to the other.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> After I sent that last long one to you, I was thinking I should have
>>>>> included a statement like this, with it.  So, thanks and right back at
>>>>> you.  James Carroll finally gave up on me LONG ago.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I’m thinking this pretty much captures your view in a way I can
>>>>> understand:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> “IF glutamate is responsible for associated with redness qualia, and
>>>>> we replicate the objective behaviour of the glutamate (the qualia-blind
>>>>> behaviour, in your terminology) by some non-glutamate means, then the
>>>>> redness qualia will also be replicated. It's quite remarkable that we can
>>>>> say this, but it is true.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But I still struggle with the way you talk about many things.  You
>>>>> haven’t mentioned the substitution argument, but I’m assuming this is the
>>>>> only justification you have for making that last “but it is true.”
>>>>> Claim.?  No thoughts on nothing being able to be redness, for the same
>>>>> reasons?  Would you not agree that if experimentalist were never able to
>>>>> reproduce redness, without glutamate, it would falsify this claim?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If the experimentalist could reproduce all the behaviour associated
>>>> with redness but not the redness, then that would mean qualia are
>>>> meaningless. The subject would have altered or absent qualia, but they
>>>> would not notice any difference, and communicate that everything was
>>>> exactly the same. The most important thing about qualia is that we know we
>>>> have them and we know if they change; if this is eliminated, what is there
>>>> left?
>>>>
>>>> “If the op amp configuration is changed but other circuitry is also
>>>>> changed to compensate, the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so
>>>>> will the redness qualia.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You never seem to acknowledge any other behavior than external
>>>>> behavior (picking the strawberry).  You seem to be ignoring the fact that a
>>>>> qualia invert robot could have identical “behavior”, and the qualia is NOT
>>>>> the same.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If this is possible, then for the reason above it makes qualia
>>>> meaningless. Behaviour does not mean just picking the strawberry, it means
>>>> every type of behaviour that the subject can display, such as talking in
>>>> detail about its experience of seeing strawberries. It will therefore have
>>>> different qualia but declare that the strawberries are exactly the same
>>>> shade of red as they were before the change. That would mean that your
>>>> qualia might have become inverted in the last five minutes but you haven’t
>>>> noticed. As far as you are concerned redness is still redness and greenness
>>>> is still greenness. Or you might have gone completely blind in the last
>>>> five minutes, but not noticed that you have no visual qualia at all any
>>>> more. If you do notice, you are trapped in a nightmare, unable to
>>>> communicate this information in any way. Does this make any sense?
>>>>
>>>> “I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.”
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You always ignore the binding functionality.  For example, you
>>>>> mentioned multiple ways to study epiphenomenal qualia in that closing
>>>>> statement, but not once did you mention anything about using neural
>>>>> ponytails to do the strongest form of effing the ineffable to directly
>>>>> observe the physical qualia of others physical knowledge.  Do you not agree
>>>>> that your left hemisphere, knows absolutely, if your right hemisphere’s
>>>>> knowledge is inverted?  (for example, you use some special glasses and a
>>>>> camera system to make everything in the right field of vision red/green
>>>>> inverted from the information in your right hemisphere (from the left field
>>>>> of vision)?.  It seems to me that facts like this (and being necessarily
>>>>> possible to do the same thing for 4 brain hemispheres [Is this not a fact
>>>>> or not necessary if if qualia are epiphenomenal?]) should have some effect
>>>>> on these closing remarks of yours?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Connecting brains together is not going to allow knowledge of qualia
>>>> differences if even the original brain cannot notice qualia differences.
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Jan 28, 2020 at 1:37 AM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, 28 Jan 2020 at 16:13, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Brent. I appreciate the time you take in these communications and
>>>>>> I am sorry that we both seem to be repeating ourselves without getting
>>>>>> through to the other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 27, 2020 at 4:12 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't think glutamate is sufficient for redness because it's too
>>>>>>>> simple. You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is
>>>>>>>> just an example to facilitate discussion. But I agree that glutamate might
>>>>>>>> be sufficient as part of a component in a system. It cannot be necessary,
>>>>>>>> because once we work out what physical interactions the component is
>>>>>>>> involved in, we can substitute another component.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I always think you understand, especially when you say thing like: "
>>>>>>> You might agree with this, because you have said that glutamate is just an
>>>>>>> example to facilitate discussion."
>>>>>>> But then you prove that you still don't understand, with the rest.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let's back up a bit, and see if we can get this right.  Start by
>>>>>>> watching this video <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/>
>>>>>>> up to the "inverting pixel" section where it goes into a loop (1 pixel
>>>>>>> switching between red and green) till you press continue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm talking about what is the necessary and sufficient set of
>>>>>>> physics (or magic or spirit world stuff, or whatever) for that one pixel to
>>>>>>> have a redness quality.  And what are the changers, when only that one
>>>>>>> pixel changes.
>>>>>>> Implications being you can do this for every pixel you are
>>>>>>> consciously aware of, and that being proof that there must be something
>>>>>>> physical for everything you know, including every pixel of visual knowledge.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the pixel changes subjectively, then it must change objectively
>>>>>> also. That is, there must be some test that can be done on the system which
>>>>>> will reveal that there has been a change: the subject cannot distinguish
>>>>>> between objects that are a different colour, or the subject says that the
>>>>>> strawberry looks different, or something. If there is no such objective
>>>>>> change, then there cannot be a subjective change. It is possible to change
>>>>>> many parts of the system and produce no objective change. It is like a
>>>>>> computer running a program: there are multiple different computers that
>>>>>> will run the program exactly the same and give the same user experience.
>>>>>> Thus it might be sufficient for a certain set of hardware to run Microsoft
>>>>>> Word, but we can't state what is necessary to run Microsoft Word: in a
>>>>>> thousand years time people may be running old computer programs on hardware
>>>>>> based on dark matter, or other technologies that we can't even imagine now.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we abstractly describe glutamate, we have no idea the colorness
>>>>>>> property of what we are objectively describing.  Everything we get,
>>>>>>> objectively, is necessary abstracted away from physical qualities and
>>>>>>> necessary substrate independent.  In other words, without a dictionary, you
>>>>>>> can't know the colorness property you are describing or objectively
>>>>>>> observing.  Subjective experience is very different.  Subjectively, we
>>>>>>> directly experience the physical quality of what our abstract descriptions
>>>>>>> are describing.  In order to connect the two, you need a mapping like both
>>>>>>> the objective word "glutamate" and the subjective word "redness" are labels
>>>>>>> for the same physical thing.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By examining glutamate objectively, we cannot know what redness is
>>>>>> like. However, we do know that IF glutamate is responsible for associated
>>>>>> with redness qualia, and we replicate the objective behaviour of the
>>>>>> glutamate (the qualia-blind behaviour, in your terminology) by some
>>>>>> non-glutamate means, then the redness qualia will also be replicated. It's
>>>>>> quite remarkable that we can say this, but it is true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, despite attempting to define glutamate that way, as you are
>>>>>>> doing here, you think of glutamate in a completely different way than I was
>>>>>>> attempting to describe.  You reveal this misinterpretation of what I'm
>>>>>>> trying to say with things like: "the component is involved in, we can
>>>>>>> substitute another component."  In other words you are assuming glutamate
>>>>>>> is just some "component" of whatever it is that has redness.  (Completely
>>>>>>> changing what it actually says).  Thankfully, in the past, after a
>>>>>>> gazillion requests, you finally provided the "op amp" example.  You pointed
>>>>>>> out that you can replace all the neurons performing the op amp
>>>>>>> functionality with neurons that can perform the same functionality, and it
>>>>>>> would still result in redness.  You think I disagree with this, but I
>>>>>>> don't.  You are just changing the conversion away from what I"m trying to
>>>>>>> talk about.  If glutamate is just a component of rendes, then you must
>>>>>>> substitute glutamate for whatever it is glutamate is a component of that
>>>>>>> performs the necessary and sufficient functionality that is redness for
>>>>>>> that one pixel, THAT is what I'm talking about, and you continue to change
>>>>>>> the subject.  If that is true, I'm not talking about glutamate at all, as
>>>>>>> you continue to think I am.  Glutamate is just a stand in word for whatever
>>>>>>> is the necessary and sufficient set of physics (or functionality.  For your
>>>>>>> sake, let's assume an addition op amp has the redness quality, and when
>>>>>>> that pixel switches from redness to grenness, the op amp functionality
>>>>>>> changes from addition to subtraction.  I can completely agree with you that
>>>>>>> you could implement both an addition and a subtraction op amp in either
>>>>>>> neurons, or silicone, or anything else, but I"m not talking about
>>>>>>> components of redness, I'm talking about redness.  In this case it is the
>>>>>>> the addition op amp functionality which can be implemented with either
>>>>>>> silicon or neurons.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You seem to be agreeing with me that if the op amp is involved in
>>>>>> redness qualia, and it is changed for a functionally identical op amp in a
>>>>>> different substrate, then the redness qualia will be preserved. If the op
>>>>>> amp configuration is changed, say from inverting to non-inverting, while
>>>>>> leaving everything else the same, the behaviour of the system will change
>>>>>> and the redness qualia may also change. On the other hand, if the op amp
>>>>>> configuration is changed but other circuitry is also changed to compensate,
>>>>>> the behaviour of the system will be preserved and so will the redness
>>>>>> qualia. This demonstrates that there can be no particular physical property
>>>>>> of the op amp that is necessary and sufficient for redness qualia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The binding system is part of the required functionality.  The
>>>>>>> binding system makes you aware of the pixel that is changing from an
>>>>>>> addition op amp, to a subtraction op amp (bound with all the other pixels
>>>>>>> of color of yet different op amps that are not changing, while this one
>>>>>>> pixel does change.)  Anything else you present to that binding system, for
>>>>>>> that pixel, the system must immediately be aware of the change, just as
>>>>>>> when you see that pixel change from addition op amp ness to subtraction op
>>>>>>> amp ness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sun, Jan 26, 2020 at 3:55 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>>>>>>>> stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Glutamate may be involved when red qualia are experienced, but
>>>>>>>>>> this cannot be a unique property of glutamate, because if glutamate's
>>>>>>>>>> physical effect in the brain,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It almost sounds like you think you have found a way arround my
>>>>>>>>> "proof" that if it can't be glutamate, it can't be anything.  Since you now
>>>>>>>>> seem to be on board (a change?) with glutamate at least being sufficient
>>>>>>>>> for redness, but not necessary?  Is this new?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> changing the shape of glutamate receptors to which it binds, were
>>>>>>>>>> replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia would continue.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> How is this not just saying redness isn't physically real, it is
>>>>>>>>> just magic.  There must be a very discoverable set of objectively
>>>>>>>>> observable physics, that can result in a redness experience.  This is just
>>>>>>>>> up to nature.  Either it is within that set or it isn't.  We don't get to
>>>>>>>>> specify when we do and do not want redness to arise so it will fit our
>>>>>>>>> possible faulty thinking.  Do you agree that even if there is some
>>>>>>>>> "software functionality"  (trying to imagine what a "non physical
>>>>>>>>> functionality" might be), it is up to physics (or God?) as to whether
>>>>>>>>> redness will "arize' from that, right?  In other words, in all possible
>>>>>>>>> cases, redness is a real physical quality?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I honestly can't see why you think that if the glutamate is
>>>>>>>> replaced by another mechanism and everything works the same, that means
>>>>>>>> qualia are magic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Again, you are thinking completely incorrectly about what I think,
>>>>>>> as I indicated above.  If it is the entire mechanism that has the redness
>>>>>>> quality, and glutamate is only a "component" of that mechanism.  In that
>>>>>>> case, you need to replace glutamate, with the entire mechanism, or whatever
>>>>>>> it is that is the necessary and sufficient set of functionality required
>>>>>>> for you to directly experience it as a pixel of redness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Also, changing the shape of the glutamate receptor can't uniquely
>>>>>>>>>> be the determinant of red qualia because if the physical effect in the
>>>>>>>>>> brain of (one type of) glutamate receptor, opening sodium ion channels when
>>>>>>>>>> glutamate binds, were replicated with a different mechanism, the red qualia
>>>>>>>>>> would continue.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I've repeatedly tried to show the error I think I see in this
>>>>>>>>> logic (you are clearly thinking as if glutamate isn't the redness, that
>>>>>>>>> redness is something higher up in the system) but you just continue to even
>>>>>>>>> acknowledge what I'm trying to say, let alone point out some mistake in my
>>>>>>>>> logic.  You just keep saying this same old (clearly mistaken to me)
>>>>>>>>> argument over and over again.  There must be something that is the
>>>>>>>>> redness.  If this physically changes in any way, it will be physically
>>>>>>>>> different than redness.  The system only works if it is physical redness.
>>>>>>>>> If the system can't tell when the redness has physical changed, resulting
>>>>>>>>> in the entire system being aware that it has changed, physics, it isn't
>>>>>>>>> functioning correctly.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Glutamate changes the shape of receptors that it binds to due to
>>>>>>>> the electrostatic force, and this is how it causes other physical effects
>>>>>>>> in the body, such as muscle movement. Therefore, if the shape of the
>>>>>>>> receptors can be changed by some other means than glutamate, the other
>>>>>>>> effects in the body will be the same. Your error is to assume that
>>>>>>>> glutamate has some other physical effect, "redness", that can cause muscle
>>>>>>>> movement, such as the muscle movement associated with saying "I see red".
>>>>>>>> But there is no extra such effect; changing the shape of receptors that it
>>>>>>>> binds to due to the electrostatic force is 100% of the relevant physical
>>>>>>>> effect of every glutamate molecule in every human that has ever lived.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> More proof that you are completely misunderstanding what I"m trying
>>>>>>> to say.   Again, in the case you are talking about, glutamate is only a
>>>>>>> "component".  In that case I'm not talking about a "component" of redness,
>>>>>>> I'm talking about whatever is the necessary and sufficient set of physics
>>>>>>> that has the redness quality we directly experience for that one pixel.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This analysis can be continued for the whole brain, replacing
>>>>>>>>>> every part with a different part, but preserving all the qualia and
>>>>>>>>>> consciousness. It cannot be any one component, or any one physical process,
>>>>>>>>>> that is identified with qualia.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Again, as I've said, and demonstrated (remember the checkmate?) IF
>>>>>>>>> this is true, then the result is that nothing can have redness, for the
>>>>>>>>> same reason.  It seems like you are completely ignoring that, and just
>>>>>>>>> going back and replaying the old steps that lead to the checkmate, without
>>>>>>>>> changing anything, yet expecting different results?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I misunderstood the "checkmate". Was it that qualia are
>>>>>>>> epiphenomenal? I don't consider that "checkmate".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> OH, yea.  That was my bad.  James Carroll, who is also a
>>>>>>> functionalist (the guy that joined the conversation on Quora the other day,
>>>>>>> he liking your "functionalists" responses, and hem adding additional
>>>>>>> functionalist responses.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My recollection is that he would repeatedly say the neural
>>>>>>> substitution argument proves that if it is glutamate that has the redness
>>>>>>> quality, then redness must be "epiphenomenal", which we both agreed meant
>>>>>>> redness would not be approachable via science, and we both agreed that
>>>>>>> would be game over or something neither one of us could accept.  Kind of
>>>>>>> ironic, in a way.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, it was a big surprize to me to hear you say you believe qualia
>>>>>>> are epiphenomenal.  But anyway, that doesn't matter.  What I was talking
>>>>>>> about, was the second argument I was making that would also be a "check
>>>>>>> mate", especially in your case.  (in James' case, I think I have a double
>>>>>>> check mate, but let's ignore that for now.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, back to the op amp being the necessary and sufficient set of
>>>>>>> functionality to experience a redness quality (including when you can
>>>>>>> achieve the same addition op amp with various diverse sets of
>>>>>>> "components")  So, now, we need to replace glutamate, with this op amp (or
>>>>>>> whatever it is, including magic) that is the necessary and sufficient set
>>>>>>> of physics that have the redness quality you can experience for that one
>>>>>>> pixel.  For the same reason you are claiming it can't be glutamate, you
>>>>>>> must also make the same claim for addition op amps.  They can't have
>>>>>>> redness, absolutely nothing, even magic, can have redness, and you can
>>>>>>> prove that for anything that you try to substitute glutamate with.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> With that I'm thinking:  And we all know, more than anything, that
>>>>>>> we can experience redness.  So if your so called "proof" "proves" we can't,
>>>>>>> there is something wrong with your proof.
>>>>>>> That seems to me to be Checkmate.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Does that help at all?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I wouldn't say it's hopeless for scientific study if qualia are
>>>>>> epiphenomenal. We effectively study qualia by talking to people, and
>>>>>> deducing from that what they are experiencing. We cannot be sure that other
>>>>>> beings have qualia, but we can also be sure, as I have explained many
>>>>>> times, that IF they have qualia, replicating just the objective behaviour
>>>>>> will also replicate the qualia. Replicating the objective behaviour could
>>>>>> be done in an indefinite number of ways, so there is no particular physics
>>>>>> that is necessary for particular qualia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>> extropy-chat mailing list
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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