[ExI] Possible seat of consciousness found

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Wed Mar 4 01:29:29 UTC 2020

On Wed, 4 Mar 2020 at 11:05, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Hi Stathis,
> So I still haven't convinced you I fully understand absolutely everything
> about your beliefs, model, and thinking.
> OK, let me try again, yet again.
> I know that all of today's computational systems are made of discrete
> components, where each component has inputs which result in outputs.
> I know that any of these individual discrete components can be replaced
> with myriads of different physical instantiations, and that as long as all
> possible inputs map to the same output of that component, these sets of
> discrete systems must in all aspects, both internal and external, function
> the same, no matter what physics is used to implement them.  If any of the
> physical changes to any of these discrete components, which didn't
> change the mapping of the inputs to the outputs, changed the qualia, that
> would render the idea of qualia absurd or contradictory, hence there is a
> "hard problem".
> So, did I miss anything?

The last phrase, ‘hence there is a “hard problem”’, should not be included.
The “hard problem” is quite a separate issue.

Now, can you describe to me any of the significant problems I see with any
> of that?

I may have this wrong, and if so please forgive me, but you have said that
the qualia affect behaviour so the behaviour would change if the qualia
change, and also you have said that behaviour could be the same even though
the qualia are different, as in the example of the three strawberry-picking
robots. I don’t think these are valid objections.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20200304/85b69a36/attachment.htm>

More information about the extropy-chat mailing list