[ExI] Possible seat of consciousness found
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Fri Mar 13 04:15:29 UTC 2020
On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:31 AM Stuart LaForge via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > Saying this kind of stuff is strong evidence that you still don't
> > understand the model I'm trying to describe.
> Maybe it is because your description contradicts itself. Your
> description is merely abstract and has none of the physical qualities
> that it extols. Robots 1 & 2 claim that they experience physical
> qualities when seeing a strawberry, but a robot could be programmed to
> say that using a simple lookup table, regardless of it being true or
> not. Since there is no way for robots 1 and 2 to use abstract words
> and rules of grammar to prove that they see qualia, they are
> ultimately no different than robot 3 who simply admits that his
> knowledge is abstract. Especially since robot 3 might be lying too
> because he is afraid somebody might try to "fix" him if he displays
> signs of consciousness. Therefore there is no way for you to
> communicate ANY model that is not qualia blind since communication
> requires abstraction and information and therefore qualia blind.
This last statement is basically saying that qualia are ineffable, right?
Representational Qualia Theory predicts science will prove what you are
saying here, especially this last sentence, to be false.
Evidently you've missed the many times I've attempted to describe the week,
stronger, and strongest forms of effing the ineffable, which if achieved by
science will falsify what you are saying.
The weakest form is when you have an unfalsifiable dictionary such as the
word 'red' being a label for anything that reflects or emits red light.
Redness is a different word, and a different label for an intrinsic quality
of something in our brain we can be directly aware of.
If we objectively observed whatever it is that has this intrinsic redness
quality, we would end up with only what you call "words composed
of Shannon information" which, by definition, are purposely abstracted away
from any physical qualities.
Without a dictionary, defining which words are labels for which physical
qualities, you can't know what they mean.
This would be much like the abstract words we use to label glutamate, and
to describe glutamate behavior in a synapse.
It is a hypothetical possibility that the word redness and glutamate, are
labels for the same intrinsic physical qualities.
If this is the case, when glutamate is correctly bound into someone's
consciousness, it would reliably always produce the same redness experience.
If no "function", and no "signaling pathway", and non of the other theories
predicting the nature of redness could ever result in anyone experiencing
And if glutamate, was the only physical thing in the known universe that
We would have our unfalsifiable dictionary, for the word redness and
Given such an unfalsifiable dictionary, when you first endowed robot number
3 with knowledge made of glutamate,
it could say something like: "oh THAT is what redness/glutamate is
And if glutamate = redness is falsified, (i.e. someone experiences redness
with no glutamate present)
RQT says to just keep iterating through all possible theories of what
redness is, including theories that it could be some 'pathway', till you
find one that can't be falsified.
And THAT is what will reliably be the physical definition of 'redness'.
And, yes, one word 'red' for all things red, will not be sufficient to
model an effing of the ineffable statement like
"my redness is like your grenness, which we both call red", and because of
that would be considered qualia blind.
While a model that has two words, red and redness, and unfalsifiable
physical definitions for each, that would not be qualia blind.
And such an ability to reliably eff the ineffable would falsify your
statement that basically claims qualia are ineffable.
> > Your "signalling pathway model" is a great
> > model. It's about the only prediction of what qualia are that nobody has
> > created a camp for yet. Experimental results could certainly verify it
> > a "readiness pathway" that we experience as redness right? Would you be
> > willing to help us create a "signalling pathway model" camp, so
> > experimentalists have another way to test for this qualia possibility?
> Thanks. As I have mentioned before, it is part of a larger theory on
> the emergent properties of synergistic systems. I suppose I could
> write something up specifically in reference to qualia.
That would be wonderful!
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