[ExI] Essential Upload Data
stathisp at gmail.com
Wed May 20 13:09:30 UTC 2020
On Wed, 20 May 2020 at 20:58, Re Rose via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Hiya Ben - It was a rhetorical question, I'm pointing out as a thought
> experiment that a "perfect" copy of you in a "perfect" agent copy of your
> body would believe it is you. In fact, IMHO, there would be no way to prove
> to this new agent (i.e., person) that it is *not *you. The only agent in
> the universe who would know that the copy was not you would be....wait for
> it....YOU. Every other person in the world will think it is you (if it is a
> perfect copy - which I have tried to show in my previous grillion posts is
> likely impossible - i.e., no perfect copy can be made).
> Of course a copy of you can be someone other than you. It is. It is a new
> person. It is not you, even if it thinks it is you. And, you and only can
> know it's not you. Go back to my coffee-and-scone thought experiment. Can I
> shoot you? If you belive I can because you will magically be "in" the copy
> - tell me how, please. And where does the consciousness in the copy go?
> You'll be being just as mean as I accused John of being (LOL). You can't
> just take over another person's body! That's just rude.
> The copy becomes its own agent as soon as its online. You can't access
> it. Death does not allow a magical transmogrification into agents you wish
> to occupy.
> Oh, and the symmetrical room problem is a red herring. It only works by
> confusion. You always gonna be you.
If you don’t believe that a copy of you is really you then to be consistent
you should not believe that you are really you, since through normal
metabolic processes the matter in your body is replaced with matter from
the food, water and air you consume, and the original matter excreted into
> Message: 3
> Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 21:17:07 +0100
> From: Ben <ben at zaiboc.net>
> To: extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Essential Upload Data
> Message-ID: <82b33da3-950b-09ce-d3e8-b688a3dd9683 at zaiboc.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed
> On 15/05/2020 17:28, Re Rose wrote:
> > My biggest concern is that we might discover a technology that is
> > "good enough" to fool people. It seems plausible that a copy, or a
> > really good ASC preserved brain, should hold the data we need. That,
> > IMHO, is a dangerous idea, because people will convince themselves
> > that's all you need to preserve yourself. So the goal - to reanimate
> > and continue to live your life - will not be met but YOU are not
> > around to advocate for yourself! Your copy will be very happy to be
> > reanimated, though, just as a stranger or a sibling might be. You are
> > not your sibling, or a stranger, though, and you will not be there.
> "How would a copy of you know it's not you? Hm. After all, it would be a
> It being with your memories and experiences and and I believe it will
> believe it is you"
> That sounds like a nonsensical question to me.
> How could you tell that a copy of 'Imagine' by John Lennon was not in
> fact 'Imagine' by John Lennon? After all, it would have all the same
> notes in the same order, and it would sound just like 'Imagine' by John
> You could argue that a piece of music is not the same as a mind, but
> then you'd be arguing for something special, above and beyond
> information, that constitutes a mind, and you've already said that you
> don't claim that. I recognise that minds are not fixed patterns, whereas
> a specific piece of music is, but that doesn't affect the argument. A
> dynamic pattern of information just contains extra information that
> describes how the pattern changes under particular circumstances. In
> essence, this is no different to a static pattern. It's all information.
> I can't really get my head around this concept that an identical copy (a
> good-enough copy, really) of you isn't really 'you'. Who would it be? it
> can't be Napoleon, it can't be Genghis Khan, it can only be you. Saying
> "but it's only a copy!" is meaningless. Yes, it's a copy. A copy of you.
> Ergo, you. It can't be anyone else, can it.
> I wrote a post about the amoeba splitting, but my computer crashed and I
> lost it. Basically, I said the amoeba is just like a neuron, and if one
> of your neurons underwent the same fission process, you wouldn't be able
> to tell any difference between the two daughter neurons, and if you
> destroyed one, it wouldn't matter one bit which one was destroyed
> (assuming the same connections to other neurons were preserved).
> Extrapolate this to all the neurons in your brain, and you effectively
> have a copy of your brain which is identical to the original. Do you
> really think this would result in a person that was 'not you'?
> Ben Zaiboc
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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