[ExI] Can philosophers produce scientific knowledge?

Mon May 10 18:27:15 UTC 2021

On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 02:10, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Hi Jason,
> I believe you are interpreting everything I'm saying, into your model of
> consciousness.  As long as you do this, you will fail to understand the
> different model I'm trying to describe and fail to see the answers I'm
> providing.
>
> You asked: "Can you articulate how qualia transcend knowledge states?"
>
> This indicates you are asking how I interpret what I am saying into you
> model.  That is the problem.  I'm trying to describe a different model, so
> as long as you are asking how I map, what I'm saying, into your model, you
> will fail to understand the different model I'm trying to describe.
>
> If there is +5 volts, on a line, that is simply an observable
> physical fact.  If there is a hole in a punch card, again, that state of
> matter is simply a physical fact.  Neither of these physical facts
> "transcend knowledge".  If you have a dictionary, both +5 volts, or a
> particular hole on a punch card, both of these physical facts can be
> defined to represent information, like a digital "1" or the word "red".
> Redness is a similar physical fact about the intrinsic quality of something
> in physical reality.  If you have a dictionary for the word 'red', which
> points to something that has an intrinsic redness quality and say "THAT is
> red"  that redness quality can then represent "red" information.
>
> For example, I explicitly answered the question:  "How do you propose
> someone with inverted qualia would answer the question differently? "
> with this image, showing the two different answers each would provide:
>
>
>
>> [image: image.png]
>>
>
I think you’re suggesting one person will say he sees red and the other he
sees green, but that would mean there is a functional difference between
them, whereas functionalism holds that they would only necessarily have the
same qualia if there is no functional difference between them.

> Then you proved you didn't understand how this is the answer to that exact
> question, by yet again, re asking the question, again, while you are
> looking at the answer:
>
> "How do you propose someone with inverted qualia would answer the question
> differently?"
>
>
> Another question you asked, after I've provided the answer is:  "I don't
> see that dictionaries offer anything about the experience of red."
>
> What does the word "red" mean?  Without a dictionary, it means nothing.
> The word 'red' isn't intrinsically red!  If you described the behavior of a
> redness quality, similarly, would that description tell you anything about
> what the quality which had that behavior was like?  No.  Neither the word
> red, nor a descript of redness has an intrinsic redness quality.  The only
> way to know what they are describing, or a label of, is with a dictionary.
> To know what redness means, you point to the knowledge of the person on the
> left of that picture and say: "That is red".  Then you say: "The knowledge
> of the one on the right is green."  these are different answers to the same
> question: "What is redness like for you?"
>
> When we describe the behavior of glutamate, as it reacts in a synapse, for
> all we know that could be exactly the description of how redness behaves.
> Of all the descriptions of stuff in our brain, one of those descriptions
> must be a description of the behavior of redness.  Something different than
> that must be the description of the behavior of greenness.
>
> Once you can read through what I've already said, and see that all
> your questions have been answered then you will know you are understanding
> the model I'm trying to describe.  Until you can do that, restating the
> answer's I've already provided won't help.  Once you start to understand
> the model, you should watch the video
> <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/>, again, so you can finally
> understand it, and see how it is describing a non qualia blind model, a
> model which answers all your questions.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On Sun, May 9, 2021 at 10:08 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 9, 2021, 6:04 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Hi Jason,
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 9, 2021 at 2:09 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I watched the series of videos you linked to, and while I thought it
>>>> was well executed and explained, I did not find any account of qualia given
>>>> either.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Hmmm, not sure how you were able to think that about the video.  You
>>> certainly are the first I've seen to think anything like this.  Almost
>>> every part of the video is going over what we know, infallibly, about
>>> qualia.  everything from the statement in the intro: "We need to
>>> pinpoint the location of your colored qualia" in the introduction to the
>>> description of a few of the many camps  which are supporting sub camp of "Representational Qualia
>>> Theory
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>"
>>> each of which account for qualia in different falsifiable ways.  RQT
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia#statement> is
>>> basically describing how each of the sub camps can be falsified in a way
>>> all the supporters of all sub camps agree with.
>>>
>>
>> I mean I didn't see any additional explanation or resolution offered
>> concerning the problem(s) of explaining qualia. All theories of
>> consciousness struggle with this "hard problem". What new does RQT have to
>> say about it?
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> My own beliefs concerning qualia and their ineffability is that qualia
>>>> relate to how information is processed in the brain, while our third-person
>>>> ("from afar") representations or descriptions of information can only
>>>> capture a serialization of 1's and 0's. I can send words or hand gestures
>>>> to you, or write squiggles on paper, to put new inputs into your senses,
>>>> but I can't directly manipulate the processing of information as done by
>>>> your brain. This is what differentiates book knowledge from first-person
>>>> experience. It is also why Mary learns something new when she sees red for
>>>> the first time: she activates new forms of processing information by her
>>>> brain. She could read all the books in the world on what red is like
>>>> without causing her brain to activate the appropriate areas that make her
>>>> experience red.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> For example, wonder if you have two bio-brains, one engineered to be
>>>>> red/green qualia inverted.  With questions like: "What is redness like for
>>>>> you, they will behave very different, but on everything else you are
>>>>> describing in your post, they will behave identically, even possibly
>>>>> better, in any way you care to define better.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think it is an open question whether the behavior would be identical
>>>> for a qualia-inverted being,
>>>>
>>>
>>> Again, not sure how you can think this.  It would simply be a fact that
>>> if two brains had inverted red/green qualia, and you asked them both: "What
>>> is your redness like."  It is simply a logical fact that they must give
>>> different answers, since they each represent red with different qualities.
>>> This pictures basically shows each of the different answers each of these
>>> people would give to the question: "What is redness like for you?"
>>>
>>
>> How do you propose someone with inverted qualia would answer the question
>> differently? What would they say when asked to explain "What is your
>> redness like?" And how would there answer be different from someone without
>> inverted qualia?
>>
>>
>>
>>> [image: image.png]
>>>
>>>
>>>> especially if you include introspection of brain processes in the scope
>>>> of externally visible ("from afar") behaviors. As you say, to get inverted
>>>> qualia requires a differently-engineered brain, and that would be a
>>>> third-person observable difference. For there to be no observable
>>>> difference in behavior with inverted qualia or not is also to suggest that
>>>> if we had a switch that could invert or revert the qualia at will, that the
>>>> observer could not notice or report on the flipping the switch back and
>>>> forth. If they could not notice the flipping, then I think it is a
>>>> difference that makes no difference, and thus is not a difference at all.
>>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> For that matter, Stathis is also always completely qualia blind, and
>>>>> any functionalists I have ever seen, the same.  They never fully
>>>>> account for qualia in anything they talk about or argue, and always
>>>>> completely avoid any reference to what qualia are, or how they would fit in
>>>>> any of the beliefs, or how redness might fit in their 'neuro
>>>>> substitution'....  To me, this is very strong evidence that any
>>>>> functionalists has no grasp at all on the qualitative nature of
>>>>> consciousness, and the assumptions they are making.  They just ignore it
>>>>> all, thinking it doesn't need to be accounted for.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Visual perception is the most complex, and likely most contentious of
>>>> qualia to discuss. I think it is easier to consider the quale of the most
>>>> simplistic of senses, such as stimulation of a single tactile nerve. For
>>>> example, lightly touch the back of your hand with the top of a pen so you
>>>> can just barely feel it. What does it feel like? All we can really say
>>>> about this quale is that it is nothing more than the knowledge of being
>>>> touched in that particular location. *Qualia are just certain forms of
>>>> knowledge*.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Again, not sure how anyone could get any utility in thinking of qualia
>>> this way.
>>>
>>
>> Can you articulate how qualia transcend knowledge states?
>>
>>   Qualia are simply a factual physical quality, or if we assume
>>> functionalism, a factual functional quality which can represent knowledge.
>>>
>>
>> Knowledge requires a knower. A punch card or hard drive can't know
>> anything. Knowledge requires (information+a system to be informed).
>>
>> As we've been pointing out, your redness could represent knowledge of
>>> red, your redness could represent knowledge of green, or for that matter, a
>>> bat could use redness to represent knowledge of prey it receives from
>>> echolocation while hunting.
>>>
>>
>> Given dreaming, we know conscious states can also be entirely cut off
>> from an external world. The brain alone has everything it needs to create
>> the experience of redness, even in total darkness and an absence of any
>> light with a wavelength of ~700nm. Redness is a property of the structures
>> and relationships embodied by the brain, and nothing else.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> The dictionary definition of consciousness is awareness of information.
>>>> Awareness is having knowledge of. So consciousness is merely having
>>>> knowledge of information.  There are infinite forms of information, and
>>>> interrelations, and ways of processing information, and so I think there
>>>> are also infinite varieties of possible qualia.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> The person with a compu-brain will still cry when in pain, still say
>>>>>> there's an incommunicable difference between red and green, still describe
>>>>>> their dull back ache in full (and identical) detail to the person with the
>>>>>> bio-brain. If based on the brain of Chalmers or Dennett, the compu-brain
>>>>>> will even still write books in the mysteries of consciousness and qualia.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In short, there's would be no objective or scientific test you could
>>>>>> do to rule out the consciousness of the compu-brain, as all objective
>>>>>> behaviors are identical.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Although you could reason that "if philosphical zombies are logically
>>>>>> impossible" then "identically functioning compu-brains must be conscious,
>>>>>> in the same ways as bio-brains are conscious."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I see no rational basis for an assumption that the compu-brain is not
>>>>>> consciousness or is differently conscious. But there are rational bases for
>>>>>> assuming they must be the same (e.g. dancing/fading qualia, self-reports,
>>>>>> non-dualism, non-epiphenomenalism, successes of neural prosthesis, the
>>>>>> anti-zombie principle).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3. There must be something that is responsible for each of the
>>>>>>> intrinsic qualities of each elemental piece of conscious knowledge, and you
>>>>>>> must be able to observe these computational differences.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Are you speaking from a first person or third person viewpoint when
>>>>>> you say you must be able to observer computational differences?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Two answer this, let's assume our description of glutamate, reacting
>>>>> in a synapse, is a description of your redness quality.
>>>>> If not, then substitute all instances of glutamate, with whichever
>>>>> description of stuff in our brain, is a description of redness.
>>>>> Given that, here is the answer:
>>>>>
>>>>> We "Directly apprehend" glutamate reacting in a synapse as a redness
>>>>> quality of subjective experience (first person)
>>>>> We observe glutamate, from afar, possibly using scientific
>>>>> instruments, and we end up with a description of glutamate, and how it
>>>>> behaves.  (third person)
>>>>> Notice any description of how glutamate behaves tells you nothing of
>>>>> the colorness quality of that behavior.  You need a dictionary to know that.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I think we can rule out "glutamate" or any particular neural
>>>> transmitter or molecule as having any immediate role in our perception, on
>>>> the basis of the pigeonhole principle. There are far more possible
>>>> perceptions (even just considering possible perceived colors) than there
>>>> are chemicals/proteins in the brain. Color-blind individuals can perceive
>>>> around 10,000 colors. Normally sighted individuals with trichromatic vision
>>>> enables humans to distinguish around 1,000,000 different colors. A few rare
>>>> humans are tetrachromats, and can perceive 100,000,000 distinct colors.
>>>> This number is far greater than the number of genes in the human genome, so
>>>> it is more than the number of unique proteins our cells can manufacture. So
>>>> it's not possible for base molecules to represent qualia -- only higher
>>>> level structures have room for enough unique complexity to explain the
>>>> variety of our perception.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Of course. but that IS the point.  That fact that you can so easily
>>> falsify the prediction that glutamate = redness, is the point.  Once you
>>> falsify glutamate, you just keep substituting another description of
>>> something in the brain, till it can no longer be falsified.  Then you will
>>> have an objective definition of redness, having connected the subjective
>>> with the objective.
>>>
>>> The second point is for simplicity's sake.  everyone always get's lost
>>> and distracted in all the complexity, and they completely miss the
>>> important principle.  So, imagine you were a researcher in a simple 2 color
>>> world,  The only two colors were red and green, no other shades of color or
>>> anything.  Emagine that in this world a description of glutamate is a
>>> description of what you'd directly apprehend as redness, and a description
>>> of glycine is a description of greenness.  So, given you were in such a
>>> simple world, and didn't know these two facts, how might you connect the
>>> subjective and the objective descriptions?  Then, once you can understand
>>> how once you can make the connection that glutamate = redness and glycine =
>>> greenness, you can then eff the ineffable, answer questions like: "What is
>>> redness like for you?" (answer being glutamate, for one person and glycine
>>> for the other) and so on.
>>>
>>
>> Even in a world with simple conscious states I think we could find
>> reasons to doubt mind-brain identity theories. If we encountered space
>> aliens or robots with different neurochemistry that behaved or claimed to
>> be conscious, for instance. This is in my view, the main appeal of
>> functionalism.
>>
>>
>>> Then once you understand the important principle of how the objective
>>> and subjective can be connect, then you can start thinking about more
>>> complex theories much more capable of not being falsified in our more
>>> complex world.
>>>
>>
>> Could you explain your view of how the subjective and objective are
>> connected?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> For more info on this, see the "Distinguishing between reality and
>>>>> knowledge of reality
>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/?chapter=differentiate_reality_knowledge>"
>>>>> chapter of our video.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If functionalism fails at the neural-simulation level, would your
>>>> theory say it succeeds if we simulate everything physical down to the
>>>> quark-lepton level, which includes all the electric fields, particles,
>>>> glutamate particles, etc.? Or would this simulation result in a zombie
>>>> world, with non-conscious patterns nonetheless writing books about qualia
>>>> and the mysterious nature of the redness of red?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Your terminology is all so vague.  There are thousands of different ways
>>> all of it could be interpreted to mean, so having troubles knowing which of
>>> these thousands I should be thinking you mean.
>>>
>>
>> What I mean to ask is: imagine a vast computer simulation that simulated
>> the entire observable universes down to the detail if the smallest
>> fundamental particles and field theories. Would the simulated humans in the
>> simulated Earth in the simulated Milly Way be conscious?
>>
>>
>> Redness can be represented and simulated by most anything.  It can be
>>> represented by greenness, or it can be represented by +5 volts on a line
>>> (as we indicated in the video) or anything else.  The only important thing
>>> to realize is that anything that is NOT redness, which is representing
>>> redness, needs a dictionary to know what that thing is representing.
>>>
>>
>> I don't see that dictionaries offer anything about the experience of red.
>>
>>
>> While redness, itself, is simply a physical fact about the quality of you
>>> knowledge of red things, no dictionary required.  The prediction is that no
>>> functionalist will ever be able to produce a redness quality experience
>>> with ANY function, no matter what it is, or no matter what is running it.
>>>
>>
>> What is your rational for reaching this conclusion?
>>
>>
>>> I always like to ask functionalists to offer a similarly falsifiable
>>> function, comparable to my Molecular Materialism glutamate falsifiable
>>> example.  Like, maybe the function x squared is redness and x cubed is
>>> greenness?  But of course, functionalists just always seem to give you that
>>> blank stare proving they have no idea what you are even asking of them,
>>> they don't seem to realize how absurd any functionalist prediction that any
>>> particular function could in any way result in a physical redness quality
>>> really is.
>>>
>>
>> A function whose information content is less than the information content
>> of the conscious experience could be falsified.
>>
>> Whatever function is responsible for red experience is probably not
>> simple. Multiple layers of processing by various brain regions, involving a
>> total of some 30% of our cortex is involved in creating our visual
>> experience. I would think the function is vastly complex and also may
>> involve relationships with other non visual areas of the brain. It's not
>> clear to me you could have a red experience without considering the whole
>> brain.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> While there are many reasons to doubt functionalism/computationalism,
>>>> there is strong indirect observational evidence supporting it, which is
>>>> that if we assume computationalism is true, we can directly explain many of
>>>> the observed properties of our physical world. I have written about this
>>>> here:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>>>>
>>>
>>> We clearly think of qualia and consciousness in very different ways, and
>>> I'm having a real hard time getting a clear picture of your way.
>>>
>>
>> Ask away if anything I have said us unclear.
>>
>>
>>   It'd sure be great if we could get your way 'canonized" in a camp in
>>> the "Theories of Cons consciousness
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/1-Agreement>"
>>> topic.  Could we get you to come up with a camp name, and a concise
>>> statement describing your view on all this, so we could get it canonized
>>> with the other theories we've collected to date?
>>>
>>
>> I don't know that my view is any different from standard digital
>> mechanism / computationalism. It's just functionalism with an assumption of
>> finiteness and computability, which I understand is the standard
>> computational theory of mind.
>>
>>
>>   FYI, as you can see, Stathis' camp is Functional Property Dualism
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism#statement>,
>>> and mine is "Molecular Materialism
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/36-Molecular-Materialism#statement>".
>>> It sounds like your version of functionalism has more to it than just Functional
>>> Property Dualism
>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism#statement>
>>> ?
>>>
>>
>>
>> I'll check out these definitions and let you know. Thanks! This site is a
>> noble effort serving and important purpose.
>>
>> Jason
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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