[ExI] Can philosophers produce scientific knowledge?

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Mon May 10 21:49:32 UTC 2021


On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 05:16, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Great, another step forward.
> Can we take another stop forward?
> So, there must be some redness or greenness substrate, which the two are
> using to represent their knowledge of the strawberry with.  The quality of
> this substrate they are representing their knowledge of the strawberry with
> is critically important to what that strawberry is like for them, right?
> I.e, abstractly they can both say the strawberry is "red", but
> subjectively, there experience of 'red' is substrate dependent on each
> different quality of their knowledge.
>

No, one may have glutamate making him see redness and the other may have
punch cards making him see redness.

On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 04:42, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Yay, Stathis, a bit more of a hint of almost considering qualia, even
>>> though you seem to be working as hard as you can to continue to ignore it,
>>> only focusing on the function, ignoring any real qualities those functions
>>> may be describing.
>>>
>>> So, the next stop:  There must be some objectively detectable
>>> qualitative internal difference between the two, right?
>>>
>>
>> If they say different things about their qualia then they may have
>> different qualia. If they say the same things, or if the same individual
>> says the same things after an internal modification, then they may have the
>> same qualia.
>>
>> On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 12:28 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 11 May 2021 at 02:10, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Jason,
>>>>> I believe you are interpreting everything I'm saying, into your model
>>>>> of consciousness.  As long as you do this, you will fail to understand the
>>>>> different model I'm trying to describe and fail to see the answers I'm
>>>>> providing.
>>>>>
>>>>> You asked: "Can you articulate how qualia transcend knowledge states?"
>>>>>
>>>>> This indicates you are asking how I interpret what I am saying into
>>>>> you model.  That is the problem.  I'm trying to describe a different model,
>>>>> so as long as you are asking how I map, what I'm saying, into your model,
>>>>> you will fail to understand the different model I'm trying to describe.
>>>>>
>>>>> If there is +5 volts, on a line, that is simply an observable
>>>>> physical fact.  If there is a hole in a punch card, again, that state of
>>>>> matter is simply a physical fact.  Neither of these physical facts
>>>>> "transcend knowledge".  If you have a dictionary, both +5 volts, or a
>>>>> particular hole on a punch card, both of these physical facts can be
>>>>> defined to represent information, like a digital "1" or the word "red".
>>>>> Redness is a similar physical fact about the intrinsic quality of something
>>>>> in physical reality.  If you have a dictionary for the word 'red', which
>>>>> points to something that has an intrinsic redness quality and say "THAT is
>>>>> red"  that redness quality can then represent "red" information.
>>>>>
>>>>> For example, I explicitly answered the question:  "How do you propose
>>>>> someone with inverted qualia would answer the question differently? "
>>>>> with this image, showing the two different answers each would provide:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> [image: image.png]
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I think you’re suggesting one person will say he sees red and the other
>>>> he sees green, but that would mean there is a functional difference between
>>>> them, whereas functionalism holds that they would only necessarily have the
>>>> same qualia if there is no functional difference between them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Then you proved you didn't understand how this is the answer to that
>>>>> exact question, by yet again, re asking the question, again, while you are
>>>>> looking at the answer:
>>>>>
>>>>> "How do you propose someone with inverted qualia would answer the
>>>>> question differently?"
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Another question you asked, after I've provided the answer is:  "I
>>>>> don't see that dictionaries offer anything about the experience of red."
>>>>>
>>>>> What does the word "red" mean?  Without a dictionary, it means
>>>>> nothing.  The word 'red' isn't intrinsically red!  If you described the
>>>>> behavior of a redness quality, similarly, would that description tell you
>>>>> anything about what the quality which had that behavior was like?  No.
>>>>> Neither the word red, nor a descript of redness has an intrinsic redness
>>>>> quality.  The only way to know what they are describing, or a label of, is
>>>>> with a dictionary.  To know what redness means, you point to the knowledge
>>>>> of the person on the left of that picture and say: "That is red".  Then you
>>>>> say: "The knowledge of the one on the right is green."  these are different
>>>>> answers to the same question: "What is redness like for you?"
>>>>>
>>>>> When we describe the behavior of glutamate, as it reacts in a synapse,
>>>>> for all we know that could be exactly the description of how redness
>>>>> behaves.  Of all the descriptions of stuff in our brain, one of those
>>>>> descriptions must be a description of the behavior of redness.  Something
>>>>> different than that must be the description of the behavior of greenness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Once you can read through what I've already said, and see that all
>>>>> your questions have been answered then you will know you are understanding
>>>>> the model I'm trying to describe.  Until you can do that, restating the
>>>>> answer's I've already provided won't help.  Once you start to understand
>>>>> the model, you should watch the video
>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/>, again, so you can
>>>>> finally understand it, and see how it is describing a non qualia blind
>>>>> model, a model which answers all your questions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, May 9, 2021 at 10:08 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, May 9, 2021, 6:04 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi Jason,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, May 9, 2021 at 2:09 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I watched the series of videos you linked to, and while I thought
>>>>>>>> it was well executed and explained, I did not find any account of qualia
>>>>>>>> given either.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hmmm, not sure how you were able to think that about the video.  You
>>>>>>> certainly are the first I've seen to think anything like this.  Almost
>>>>>>> every part of the video is going over what we know, infallibly, about
>>>>>>> qualia.  everything from the statement in the intro: "We need to
>>>>>>> pinpoint the location of your colored qualia" in the introduction to the
>>>>>>> description of a few of the many camps  which are supporting sub camp of "Representational Qualia
>>>>>>> Theory
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>"
>>>>>>> each of which account for qualia in different falsifiable ways.  RQT
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia#statement> is
>>>>>>> basically describing how each of the sub camps can be falsified in a way
>>>>>>> all the supporters of all sub camps agree with.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I mean I didn't see any additional explanation or resolution offered
>>>>>> concerning the problem(s) of explaining qualia. All theories of
>>>>>> consciousness struggle with this "hard problem". What new does RQT have to
>>>>>> say about it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My own beliefs concerning qualia and their ineffability is that
>>>>>>>> qualia relate to how information is processed in the brain, while our
>>>>>>>> third-person ("from afar") representations or descriptions of information
>>>>>>>> can only capture a serialization of 1's and 0's. I can send words or hand
>>>>>>>> gestures to you, or write squiggles on paper, to put new inputs into your
>>>>>>>> senses, but I can't directly manipulate the processing of information as
>>>>>>>> done by your brain. This is what differentiates book knowledge from
>>>>>>>> first-person experience. It is also why Mary learns something new when she
>>>>>>>> sees red for the first time: she activates new forms of processing
>>>>>>>> information by her brain. She could read all the books in the world on what
>>>>>>>> red is like without causing her brain to activate the appropriate areas
>>>>>>>> that make her experience red.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For example, wonder if you have two bio-brains, one engineered to
>>>>>>>>> be red/green qualia inverted.  With questions like: "What is redness like
>>>>>>>>> for you, they will behave very different, but on everything else you are
>>>>>>>>> describing in your post, they will behave identically, even possibly
>>>>>>>>> better, in any way you care to define better.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think it is an open question whether the behavior would be
>>>>>>>> identical for a qualia-inverted being,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Again, not sure how you can think this.  It would simply be a fact
>>>>>>> that if two brains had inverted red/green qualia, and you asked them both:
>>>>>>> "What is your redness like."  It is simply a logical fact that they must
>>>>>>> give different answers, since they each represent red with different
>>>>>>> qualities.  This pictures basically shows each of the different answers
>>>>>>> each of these people would give to the question: "What is redness like for
>>>>>>> you?"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How do you propose someone with inverted qualia would answer the
>>>>>> question differently? What would they say when asked to explain "What is
>>>>>> your redness like?" And how would there answer be different from someone
>>>>>> without inverted qualia?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [image: image.png]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> especially if you include introspection of brain processes in the
>>>>>>>> scope of externally visible ("from afar") behaviors. As you say, to get
>>>>>>>> inverted qualia requires a differently-engineered brain, and that would be
>>>>>>>> a third-person observable difference. For there to be no observable
>>>>>>>> difference in behavior with inverted qualia or not is also to suggest that
>>>>>>>> if we had a switch that could invert or revert the qualia at will, that the
>>>>>>>> observer could not notice or report on the flipping the switch back and
>>>>>>>> forth. If they could not notice the flipping, then I think it is a
>>>>>>>> difference that makes no difference, and thus is not a difference at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For that matter, Stathis is also always completely qualia blind,
>>>>>>>>> and any functionalists I have ever seen, the same.  They never fully
>>>>>>>>> account for qualia in anything they talk about or argue, and always
>>>>>>>>> completely avoid any reference to what qualia are, or how they would fit in
>>>>>>>>> any of the beliefs, or how redness might fit in their 'neuro
>>>>>>>>> substitution'....  To me, this is very strong evidence that any
>>>>>>>>> functionalists has no grasp at all on the qualitative nature of
>>>>>>>>> consciousness, and the assumptions they are making.  They just ignore it
>>>>>>>>> all, thinking it doesn't need to be accounted for.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Visual perception is the most complex, and likely most contentious
>>>>>>>> of qualia to discuss. I think it is easier to consider the quale of the
>>>>>>>> most simplistic of senses, such as stimulation of a single tactile nerve.
>>>>>>>> For example, lightly touch the back of your hand with the top of a pen so
>>>>>>>> you can just barely feel it. What does it feel like? All we can really say
>>>>>>>> about this quale is that it is nothing more than the knowledge of being
>>>>>>>> touched in that particular location. *Qualia are just certain
>>>>>>>> forms of knowledge*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Again, not sure how anyone could get any utility in thinking of
>>>>>>> qualia this way.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Can you articulate how qualia transcend knowledge states?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   Qualia are simply a factual physical quality, or if we assume
>>>>>>> functionalism, a factual functional quality which can represent knowledge.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Knowledge requires a knower. A punch card or hard drive can't know
>>>>>> anything. Knowledge requires (information+a system to be informed).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As we've been pointing out, your redness could represent knowledge of
>>>>>>> red, your redness could represent knowledge of green, or for that matter, a
>>>>>>> bat could use redness to represent knowledge of prey it receives from
>>>>>>> echolocation while hunting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given dreaming, we know conscious states can also be entirely cut off
>>>>>> from an external world. The brain alone has everything it needs to create
>>>>>> the experience of redness, even in total darkness and an absence of any
>>>>>> light with a wavelength of ~700nm. Redness is a property of the structures
>>>>>> and relationships embodied by the brain, and nothing else.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The dictionary definition of consciousness is awareness of
>>>>>>>> information. Awareness is having knowledge of. So consciousness is merely
>>>>>>>> having knowledge of information.  There are infinite forms of information,
>>>>>>>> and interrelations, and ways of processing information, and so I think
>>>>>>>> there are also infinite varieties of possible qualia.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The person with a compu-brain will still cry when in pain, still
>>>>>>>>>> say there's an incommunicable difference between red and green, still
>>>>>>>>>> describe their dull back ache in full (and identical) detail to the person
>>>>>>>>>> with the bio-brain. If based on the brain of Chalmers or Dennett, the
>>>>>>>>>> compu-brain will even still write books in the mysteries of consciousness
>>>>>>>>>> and qualia.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In short, there's would be no objective or scientific test you
>>>>>>>>>> could do to rule out the consciousness of the compu-brain, as all objective
>>>>>>>>>> behaviors are identical.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Although you could reason that "if philosphical zombies are
>>>>>>>>>> logically impossible" then "identically functioning compu-brains must be
>>>>>>>>>> conscious, in the same ways as bio-brains are conscious."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I see no rational basis for an assumption that the compu-brain is
>>>>>>>>>> not consciousness or is differently conscious. But there are rational bases
>>>>>>>>>> for assuming they must be the same (e.g. dancing/fading qualia,
>>>>>>>>>> self-reports, non-dualism, non-epiphenomenalism, successes of neural
>>>>>>>>>> prosthesis, the anti-zombie principle).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 3. There must be something that is responsible for each of the
>>>>>>>>>>> intrinsic qualities of each elemental piece of conscious knowledge, and you
>>>>>>>>>>> must be able to observe these computational differences.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Are you speaking from a first person or third person viewpoint
>>>>>>>>>> when you say you must be able to observer computational differences?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Two answer this, let's assume our description of glutamate,
>>>>>>>>> reacting in a synapse, is a description of your redness quality.
>>>>>>>>> If not, then substitute all instances of glutamate, with whichever
>>>>>>>>> description of stuff in our brain, is a description of redness.
>>>>>>>>> Given that, here is the answer:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We "Directly apprehend" glutamate reacting in a synapse as a
>>>>>>>>> redness quality of subjective experience (first person)
>>>>>>>>> We observe glutamate, from afar, possibly using scientific
>>>>>>>>> instruments, and we end up with a description of glutamate, and how it
>>>>>>>>> behaves.  (third person)
>>>>>>>>> Notice any description of how glutamate behaves tells you nothing
>>>>>>>>> of the colorness quality of that behavior.  You need a dictionary to know
>>>>>>>>> that.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think we can rule out "glutamate" or any particular neural
>>>>>>>> transmitter or molecule as having any immediate role in our perception, on
>>>>>>>> the basis of the pigeonhole principle. There are far more possible
>>>>>>>> perceptions (even just considering possible perceived colors) than there
>>>>>>>> are chemicals/proteins in the brain. Color-blind individuals can perceive
>>>>>>>> around 10,000 colors. Normally sighted individuals with trichromatic vision
>>>>>>>> enables humans to distinguish around 1,000,000 different colors. A few rare
>>>>>>>> humans are tetrachromats, and can perceive 100,000,000 distinct colors.
>>>>>>>> This number is far greater than the number of genes in the human genome, so
>>>>>>>> it is more than the number of unique proteins our cells can manufacture. So
>>>>>>>> it's not possible for base molecules to represent qualia -- only higher
>>>>>>>> level structures have room for enough unique complexity to explain the
>>>>>>>> variety of our perception.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Of course. but that IS the point.  That fact that you can so easily
>>>>>>> falsify the prediction that glutamate = redness, is the point.  Once you
>>>>>>> falsify glutamate, you just keep substituting another description of
>>>>>>> something in the brain, till it can no longer be falsified.  Then you will
>>>>>>> have an objective definition of redness, having connected the subjective
>>>>>>> with the objective.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The second point is for simplicity's sake.  everyone always get's
>>>>>>> lost and distracted in all the complexity, and they completely miss the
>>>>>>> important principle.  So, imagine you were a researcher in a simple 2 color
>>>>>>> world,  The only two colors were red and green, no other shades of color or
>>>>>>> anything.  Emagine that in this world a description of glutamate is a
>>>>>>> description of what you'd directly apprehend as redness, and a description
>>>>>>> of glycine is a description of greenness.  So, given you were in such a
>>>>>>> simple world, and didn't know these two facts, how might you connect the
>>>>>>> subjective and the objective descriptions?  Then, once you can understand
>>>>>>> how once you can make the connection that glutamate = redness and glycine =
>>>>>>> greenness, you can then eff the ineffable, answer questions like: "What is
>>>>>>> redness like for you?" (answer being glutamate, for one person and glycine
>>>>>>> for the other) and so on.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Even in a world with simple conscious states I think we could find
>>>>>> reasons to doubt mind-brain identity theories. If we encountered space
>>>>>> aliens or robots with different neurochemistry that behaved or claimed to
>>>>>> be conscious, for instance. This is in my view, the main appeal of
>>>>>> functionalism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then once you understand the important principle of how the
>>>>>>> objective and subjective can be connect, then you can start thinking about
>>>>>>> more complex theories much more capable of not being falsified in our more
>>>>>>> complex world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Could you explain your view of how the subjective and objective are
>>>>>> connected?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For more info on this, see the "Distinguishing between reality and
>>>>>>>>> knowledge of reality
>>>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/?chapter=differentiate_reality_knowledge>"
>>>>>>>>> chapter of our video.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If functionalism fails at the neural-simulation level, would your
>>>>>>>> theory say it succeeds if we simulate everything physical down to the
>>>>>>>> quark-lepton level, which includes all the electric fields, particles,
>>>>>>>> glutamate particles, etc.? Or would this simulation result in a zombie
>>>>>>>> world, with non-conscious patterns nonetheless writing books about qualia
>>>>>>>> and the mysterious nature of the redness of red?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Your terminology is all so vague.  There are thousands of different
>>>>>>> ways all of it could be interpreted to mean, so having troubles knowing
>>>>>>> which of these thousands I should be thinking you mean.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What I mean to ask is: imagine a vast computer simulation that
>>>>>> simulated the entire observable universes down to the detail if the
>>>>>> smallest fundamental particles and field theories. Would the simulated
>>>>>> humans in the simulated Earth in the simulated Milly Way be conscious?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Redness can be represented and simulated by most anything.  It can be
>>>>>>> represented by greenness, or it can be represented by +5 volts on a line
>>>>>>> (as we indicated in the video) or anything else.  The only important thing
>>>>>>> to realize is that anything that is NOT redness, which is representing
>>>>>>> redness, needs a dictionary to know what that thing is representing.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't see that dictionaries offer anything about the experience of
>>>>>> red.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> While redness, itself, is simply a physical fact about the quality of
>>>>>>> you knowledge of red things, no dictionary required.  The prediction is
>>>>>>> that no functionalist will ever be able to produce a redness quality
>>>>>>> experience with ANY function, no matter what it is, or no matter what is
>>>>>>> running it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What is your rational for reaching this conclusion?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I always like to ask functionalists to offer a similarly falsifiable
>>>>>>> function, comparable to my Molecular Materialism glutamate falsifiable
>>>>>>> example.  Like, maybe the function x squared is redness and x cubed is
>>>>>>> greenness?  But of course, functionalists just always seem to give you that
>>>>>>> blank stare proving they have no idea what you are even asking of them,
>>>>>>> they don't seem to realize how absurd any functionalist prediction that any
>>>>>>> particular function could in any way result in a physical redness quality
>>>>>>> really is.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A function whose information content is less than the information
>>>>>> content of the conscious experience could be falsified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Whatever function is responsible for red experience is probably not
>>>>>> simple. Multiple layers of processing by various brain regions, involving a
>>>>>> total of some 30% of our cortex is involved in creating our visual
>>>>>> experience. I would think the function is vastly complex and also may
>>>>>> involve relationships with other non visual areas of the brain. It's not
>>>>>> clear to me you could have a red experience without considering the whole
>>>>>> brain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> While there are many reasons to doubt
>>>>>>>> functionalism/computationalism, there is strong indirect observational
>>>>>>>> evidence supporting it, which is that if we assume computationalism is
>>>>>>>> true, we can directly explain many of the observed properties of our
>>>>>>>> physical world. I have written about this here:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/#Predictions_of_the_Theory
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We clearly think of qualia and consciousness in very different ways,
>>>>>>> and I'm having a real hard time getting a clear picture of your way.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ask away if anything I have said us unclear.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   It'd sure be great if we could get your way 'canonized" in a camp
>>>>>>> in the "Theories of Cons consciousness
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/1-Agreement>"
>>>>>>> topic.  Could we get you to come up with a camp name, and a concise
>>>>>>> statement describing your view on all this, so we could get it canonized
>>>>>>> with the other theories we've collected to date?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't know that my view is any different from standard digital
>>>>>> mechanism / computationalism. It's just functionalism with an assumption of
>>>>>> finiteness and computability, which I understand is the standard
>>>>>> computational theory of mind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   FYI, as you can see, Stathis' camp is Functional Property Dualism
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism#statement>,
>>>>>>> and mine is "Molecular Materialism
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/36-Molecular-Materialism#statement>".
>>>>>>> It sounds like your version of functionalism has more to it than just Functional
>>>>>>> Property Dualism
>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/8-Functional-Prprty-Dualism#statement>
>>>>>>> ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'll check out these definitions and let you know. Thanks! This site
>>>>>> is a noble effort serving and important purpose.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jason
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
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>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
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>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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