[ExI] The relevance of glutamate in color experience

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Mon May 2 02:29:11 UTC 2022


On Mon, 2 May 2022 at 12:06, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Hi Jason,
>
> Yes, this is the Neuro Substitution Argument for functionalism
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/79-Neural-Substitn-Argument/1-Agreement> Stathis,
> I and others have been rehashing, forever, trying to convince the other
> side..  Stathis, Chalmers, and other functionalists
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/18-Qualia-Emerge-from-Function>
> believe they must accept functionalism because of this argument.  This is a
> specific example of the 'dancing qualia' contradiction (one of many) which
> results if you accept this argument.
>
> I like to point out that this argument is dependent on two assumptions.
> 1., that all the neurons do is the same thing discrete logic gates do in
> abstract computers.  2. That the neuro substitution will succeed.  If
> either of these two fail, the argument doesn't work.
>

The argument does not depend on 1 or 2 being true. It only depends on the
conclusion being true IF there is functional equivalence. If you accept
that, then you accept functionalism. “If all dogs have 5 legs and Spot is a
dog then Spot has 5 legs” is valid, even though it is false that all dogs
have 5 legs.

Steven Leahar, I, and others (there are more functionalists than us)
> predict that the neurons are doing more than just the kind of discrete
> logic function abstract computers do.  Somehow they use qualities, like
> redness and greenness to represent information, in a way that can be
> "computationally bound" doing similar computation to what the mere discrete
> logic gates are doing, when they represent things with 1s and 0s.  A
> required functionality is if redness changes to blueness, or anything else,
> the system must behave differently and report the difference.  But this
> functionality isn't possible in abstract systems, because no matter how the
> substrate changes, it still functions the same.  This is by design.  (i.e.
> no matter what is representing a value like '1', whether redness or
> bluenness or +5 volts, or punch in paper..., you need a different
> dictionary for each different representation to tell you what is still
> representing the 1.)  Redness, on the other hand, is just a fact.  No
> dictionary required, and substrate independence is impossible, by design.
>
> So, the prediction is that it is a fact that something in the brain has a
> redness quality.  Our brain uses this quality to represent conscious
> knowledge of red things with.  Nothing else in the universe has that
> redness quality.  So, when you get to the point of swapping out the first
> pixel of glutamate/redness quality, with anything else, the system must be
> able to report that it is no longer the same redness quality.  Otherwise,
> it isn't functioning sufficiently to have conscious redness and greenness
> qualities.  So, the prediction is, no functionalist will ever be able to
> produce any function, nor anything else, that will result in a redness
> experience, so the substitution will fail.  If this is true, all the
> 'dancing', 'fading', and all the other 'hard problem' contradictions no
> longer exist.  It simply becomes a color problem, which can be resolved
> through experimentally demonstrating which of all our descriptions of stuff
> in the brain is a description of redness.
>
> So, if you understand that, does this argument convince you you must be a
> functionalist, like the majority of people?
>
> Brent
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> On Sun, May 1, 2022 at 3:20 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> I am curious if Brent was familiar with this passage from David Chalmer's
>> "The Conscious Mind" (pages 267-268), which concern the plausibility of
>> different qualia arising between two functional isomorphs made of different
>> physical materials (e.g. silicon chips vs. neurons), and if so, what does
>> this thought experiment imply for the role of molecules in the emergence of
>> distinct quale?
>>
>> “For the purposes of the illustration, let these systems be me and Bill.
>> Where I have a red experience, Bill has a slightly different experience. We
>> may as well suppose that Bill sees blue; perhaps his experience will be
>> more similar to mine than that, but it makes no difference to the argument.
>> The two systems are also different in that where there are neurons in some
>> small region of my brain, there are silicon chips in Bill’s brain. This
>> substitution of a silicon circuit for a neural circuit is the only physical
>> difference between Bill and me.
>>
>>
>> The crucial step in the thought experiment is to take a silicon circuit
>> just like Bill’s and install it in my own head as a backup circuit. This
>> circuit will be functionally isomorphic to a circuit already present in my
>> head. We equip the circuit with transducers and effectors so that it can
>> interact with the rest of my brain, but we do not hook it up directly.
>> Instead, we install a switch that can switch directly between the neural
>> and silicon circuits. Upon flipping the switch, the neural circuit becomes
>> irrelevant and the silicon circuit takes over. We can imagine that the
>> switch controls the points of interface where the relevant circuits affect
>> the rest of the brain. When it is switched, the connections from the neural
>> circuit are pushed out of the way, and the silicon circuit's effectors are
>> attached. (We can imagine that the transducers for both circuits are
>> attached the entire time, so that the state of both circuits evolves
>> appropriately, but so that only one circuit at a time is involved in the
>> processing. We could also run a similar experiment where both transducers
>> and effectors are disconnected, to ensure that the backup circuit is
>> entirely isolated from the rest of the system. This would change a few
>> details, but the moral would be the same.)
>>
>>
>> Immediately after flipping the switch, processing that was once performed
>> by the neural circuit is now performed by the silicon circuit. The flow of
>> control within the system has been redirected. However, my functional
>> organization is exactly the same as it would have been if we had not
>> flipped the switch. The only relevant difference between the two cases is
>> the physical makeup of one circuit within the system. There is also a
>> difference in the physical makeup of another “dangling” circuit, but this
>> is irrelevant to the functional organization, as it plays no role in
>> affecting other components of the system and directing behavior.
>>
>>
>> What happens to my experience when we flip the switch? Before installing
>> the circuit, I was experiencing red. After we install it but before we flip
>> the switch, I will presumably still be experiencing red, as the only
>> difference is the addition of a circuit that is not involved in processing
>> in any way; for all the relevance it has to my processing, I might as well
>> have eaten it. After flipping the switch, however, I am more or less the
>> same person as Bill. The only difference between Bill and me now is that I
>> have a causally irrelevant neural circuit dangling from the system (we
>> might even imagine the circuit is destroyed when the switch is flipped).
>> Bull, by hypothesis, was enjoying a blue experience. After the switch,
>> then, I will have a blue experience too.
>>
>>
>> What will happen, then, is that my experience will change “before my
>> eyes.” Where I was once experiencing red, I will now experience blue. All
>> of a sudden, I will have a blue experience of the apple on my desk. We
>> can even imagine flipping the switch back and forth a number of times, so
>> that the red and blue experiences “dance” before my eyes.
>>
>>
>> This might seem reasonable at first–it is a strangely appealing image–but
>> something very odd is going on here. My experiences are switching from red
>> to blue, but I do not notice any change. Even as we flip the switch a
>> number of times and my qualia dance back and forth, I will simply go about
>> my business, noticing nothing unusual. By hypothesis, my functional
>> organization after flipping the switch evolves just as it would have if the
>> switch had not been flipped. There is no special difference in my
>> behavioral dispositions. I am not suddenly disposed to say “Hmm! Something
>> strange is going on!” There is no room for a sudden start, for an
>> explanation, or even for a distraction of attention. Any unusual reaction
>> would imply a functional difference between the two circuits, contrary to
>> their stipulated isomorphism.”
>>
>>
>> Is there an error in this reasoning? If so, where is it?
>>
>>
>> Jason
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>>
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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