[ExI] The relevance of glutamate in color experience

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Mon May 2 03:53:37 UTC 2022


On Sun, May 1, 2022 at 8:22 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> From presenting this argument to various people over years, the main
> problem seems to be with the concept of functional equivalence. They often
> respond that if the qualia were different the subject would notice,
>  although this could only happen if there were no functional equivalence.
>

The required functionality is, if redness changes, it MUST notice it and
change behavior.  Otherwise, it isn't a consciousness, composed of that
particular redness, and able to detect differences from redness, as my
consciousness is able to do.
I must be able to detect when redness changes to anything else.  There must
be some change in the system which is  responsible for the change from
redness to anything else, which enables the ability to know what redness
is, and when it is not redness.   If it can't do all that, it isn't
qualitatively like me.

Not sure I understand your 5 dog argument, as it is kind of like saying 1 =
2 (the same as 5 = 4).  If you do that, you can prove anything and
everything to be true.  It is just a contradictory set of assumptions that
gives the system zero utility.
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