[ExI] Is Artificial Life Conscious?

Tue May 10 13:04:30 UTC 2022

Hi Stathis,
[image: 3_robots_tiny.png]

We can say *functionality* is multiply realizable, the above systems being
different examples of the same knowledge of the strawberry functionality.
We can say the same for *intelligence*.
But if you define "*consciousness*" to be computationally bound elemental
intrinsic qualities, like redness and greenness, that is basically saying
it is important to ask questions like what is your consciousness like?
Which of the above 3 qualities are you using to paint your conscious
knowledge of the strawberry with?

And given that definition of "*consciousness*" isn't this the opposite of:
"No, I don’t think *consciousness* can be tied to any particular [colorness
quality of the] substrate or structure."

On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 8:27 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 12:12, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Right, so you are agreeing that what consciousness is like is substrate
>> dependent, at the elemental level.
>> Elemental greenness is not like elemental redness, and the word 'red' is
>> not like either one, even though all 3 can represent 'red'
>> information sufficiently for the system to tell you the strawberry is red.
>>
>
> No, I don’t think consciousness can be tied to any particular substrate or
> structure. I agree that greenness is different to redness and I agree that
> the word “red” is not like either one. I also think that glutamate and
> electronic circuits are unlike any qualia, they are different categories of
> things. If the system can tell that something is red that does not mean
> that it has redness qualia. A blind person can use an instrument to tell
> you that a strawberry is red. However, a blind person with an instrument is
> not functionally identical to someone with normal vision, since the blind
> man will readily tell you that he can’t see the strawberry, an obvious
> functional difference.
>
>>
>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 7:59 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 11:00, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 09:04, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Redness isn't about the black box functionality, redness is about how
>>>>>> the black box achieves the functionality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That may seem plausible, but the functionalist position is that
>>>>> however the functionality is achieved, redness will be preserved.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In other words, you are not understanding where I pointed out, below,
>>>> that you can't achieve redness via functionality, either, according to this
>>>> argument.
>>>> So, why do you accept your substitution argument against substrate
>>>> dependence, but not the same substitution argument for why redness can't
>>>> superveen on function, as you claim, either?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The function that must be preserved in order to preserve the qualia is
>>> ultimately the behaviour presented to the environment. Obviously if you
>>> swap living tissue for electronic circuits the function of the new
>>> components is different.
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:53 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Exactly, I couldn't have set it better myself.
>>>>>>> Those aren't reasons why redness isn't substrate dependent.
>>>>>>> If you ask the system: "How do you do your sorting, one system must
>>>>>>> be able to say "bubble sort" and the other must be able to say: "quick sort"
>>>>>>> Just the same as if you asked: "What is redness like for you, one
>>>>>>> would say your redness, the other would say your greenness."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:51 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Those are not reasons why redness can't supervene.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 3:42 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> OK, let me explain in more detail.
>>>>>>>>> Redness can't supervene on a function, because you can substitute
>>>>>>>>> the function (say bubble sort) with some other function (quick sort)
>>>>>>>>> So redness can't supervene on a function, either because "you
>>>>>>>>> replace a part (or function) of the brain with a black box that affects the
>>>>>>>>> rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the subject must behave
>>>>>>>>> the same"
>>>>>>>>> So redness can't superven on any function.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Mon, May 9, 2022 at 4:03 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, 10 May 2022 at 07:55, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> OK, let me try saying it this way.
>>>>>>>>>>> You use the neural substitution argument to "prove"
>>>>>>>>>>> redness cannot be substrate dependent.
>>>>>>>>>>> Then you conclude that redness "supervenes" on some function.
>>>>>>>>>>> The problem is, you can prove that redness can't "supervene" on
>>>>>>>>>>> any function, via the same neural substitution proof.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It supervenes on any substrate that preserves the redness
>>>>>>>>>> behaviour. In other words, if you replace a part of the brain with a black
>>>>>>>>>> box that affects the rest of the brain in the same way as the original, the
>>>>>>>>>> subject must behave the same and must have the same qualia. It doesn’t
>>>>>>>>>> matter what’s in the black box.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 6:02 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 07:47, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, May 5, 2022 at 1:00 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, 6 May 2022 at 02:36, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, May 4, 2022 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou via
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think colourness qualities are what the human behaviour
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associated with distinguishing between colours, describing them, reacting
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to them emotionally etc. is seen from inside the system. If you make a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> physical change to the system and perfectly reproduce this behaviour, you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will also necessarily perfectly reproduce the colourness qualities.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An abstract description of the behavior of redness can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perfectly capture 100% of the behavior, one to one, isomorphically
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perfectly modeled.  Are you saying that since you abstractly reproduce 100%
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the behavior, that you have duplicated the quale?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is where I end up misquoting you because I don’t
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understand what exactly you mean by “abstract description”.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> [image: 3_robots_tiny.png]
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is the best possible illustration of what I mean by
>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstract vs intrinsic physical qualities.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The first two represent knowledge with two different intrinsic
>>>>>>>>>>>>> physical qualities, redness and greenness.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Red" is just an abstract word, composed of strings of ones
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and zeros.  You can't know what it means, by design, without a dictionary.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The redness intrinsic quality your brain uses to represent
>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge of 'red' things, is your definition for the abstract word 'red'.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But the specific example I have used is that if you perfectly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reproduce the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain using a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> different substrate, and glutamate is involved in redness qualia, then you
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> necessarily also reproduce the redness qualia. This is because if it were
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not so, it would be possible to grossly change the qualia without the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> subject noticing any change, which is absurd.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the confusion comes in the different ways we think
>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "the physical effect of glutamate on the rest of the brain
>>>>>>>>>>>>> using a different substrate"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Everything in your model seems to be based on this kind of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "cause and effect" or "interpretations of interpretations".  I think of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> things in a different way.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I would emagine you would say that the causal properties of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> glutamate or redness would result in someone saying: "That is red."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, to me, the redness quality, alone, isn't the cause of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> someone saying: "That is Red", as someone could lie, and say: "That is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Green", proving the redness isn't the only cause of what the person is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> saying.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The causal properties of the glutamate are basically the
>>>>>>>>>>>> properties that cause motion in other parts of the system. Consider a
>>>>>>>>>>>> glutamate molecule as a part of a clockwork mechanism. If you remove the
>>>>>>>>>>>> glutamate molecule, you will disrupt the movement of the entire clockwork
>>>>>>>>>>>> mechanism. But if you replace it with a different molecule that has similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> physical properties, the rest of the clockwork mechanism will continue
>>>>>>>>>>>> functioning the same. Not all of the physical properties are relevant, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> they only have to be replicated to within a certain tolerance.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The computational system, and the way the knowledge is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousnessly represented is different from simple cause and effect.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The entire system is aware of all of the intrinsic qualities
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of each of the pixels on the surface of the strawberry (along with any
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasoning for why it would lie or not)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> And it is because of this composite awareness, that is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> cause of the system choosing to say: "that is red", or choose to lie in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> some way.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the entire composit 'free will system' that is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> initial cause of someone choosing to say something, not any single quality
>>>>>>>>>>>>> like the redness of a single pixel.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> For you, everything is just a chain of causes and effects, no
>>>>>>>>>>>>> composite awareness and no composit free will system involved.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am proposing that the awareness of the system be completely
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignored, and only the relevant physical properties be replicated. If this
>>>>>>>>>>>> is done, then whether you like it or not, the awareness of the system will
>>>>>>>>>>>> also be replicated. It’s impossible to do one without the other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> If I recall correctly, you admit that the quality of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious knowledge is dependent on the particular quality of your redness,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> so qualia can be thought of as a substrate, on which the quality of your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness is dependent, right?  If you are only focusing on a different
>>>>>>>>>>>>> substrate being able to produce the same 'redness behavior' then all you
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are doing is making two contradictory assumptions.  If you take that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> assumption, then you can prove that nothing, even a redness function can't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> have redness, for the same reason.  There must be something that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> redness, and the system must be able to know when redness changes to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything else.  All you are saying is that nothing can do that.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I am saying that redness is not a substrate, but it supervenes
>>>>>>>>>>>> on a certain type of behaviour, regardless of the substrate of its
>>>>>>>>>>>> implementation. This allows the system to know when the redness changes to
>>>>>>>>>>>> something else, since the behaviour on which the redness supervenes would
>>>>>>>>>>>> change to a different behaviour on which different colour qualia supervene.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> That is why I constantly ask you what could be responsible for
>>>>>>>>>>>>> redness.  Because whatever you say that is, I could use your same argument
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and say it can't be that, either.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If you could describe to me what redness could be, this would
>>>>>>>>>>>>> falsify my camp, and I would jump to the functionalist camp.  But that is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible, because all your so-called proof is claiming, is that nothing
>>>>>>>>>>>>> can be redness.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> If it isn't glutamate that has the redness quality, what can?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nothing you say will work, because of your so-called proof.  Because when
>>>>>>>>>>>>> you have contradictory assumptions you can prove all claims to be both true
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and false, which has no utility.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Glutamate doesn’t have the redness quality, but glutamate or
>>>>>>>>>>>> something that functions like glutamate is necessary to produce the redness
>>>>>>>>>>>> quality. We know this because it is what we observe: certain brain
>>>>>>>>>>>> structures are needed in order to have certain experiences. We know that it
>>>>>>>>>>>> can’t be substrate specific because then we could grossly change the qualia
>>>>>>>>>>>> without the subject noticing, which is absurd, meaning there is no
>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between having and not having qualia.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Until you can provide some falsifiable example of what could be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> responsible for your redness quality, further conversation seems to be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> waste.  Because my assertion is that given your assumptions NOTHING will
>>>>>>>>>>>>> work, and until you falsify that, with at least one example possibility,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> why go on with this contradictory assumption where qualitative
>>>>>>>>>>>>> consciousness, based on substrates like redness and greenness, simply isn't
>>>>>>>>>>>>> possible?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>>
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> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
> _______________________________________________
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