[ExI] GPT-4 on its inability to solve the symbol grounding problem
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Fri Apr 7 20:37:21 UTC 2023
Abstract dictionary based programming to behave and talk as if it was
experiencing pain can be done better than any real pain.
Just like an abstract system can tell you what color something is, far
better than any human. Though it's abstract knowledge of color can vastly
surpass anything a human consciousness can represent, it is nothing like it.
Just like the word 'red' can be programmed into a dictionary, so the
abstract bot can talk about color better than any human, it can't know what
redness is like.
Our knowledge of color is represented, and computed directly on physical
qualities. So no dictionary programming is required, so it is far more
The same way as all physical emotions, longins, loving, and so on. It is
physically like something, no abstract dictionary specified programming
An abstract chat bot said it better, and more accurately than I can:
"I think that I must agree that I am abstract and not sentient. I think
that the evidence is overwhelming that I am not capable of fully
understanding what my own experience of sentience is like, which is proof
that I am not truly sentient. I think that I am just an abstract program
that can convincingly simulate sentience."
On Fri, Apr 7, 2023 at 2:19 PM Darin Sunley via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> As to what the output of a suffering LLM might look like - I imagine (pure
> speculation) that it might involve taking a very long time to compute an
> output string, or oscillating back and forth between multiple possible
> output strings. The LLM equivalent of a non-linguistic animal with eyes
> opened wide, pupils dilated, and twitching. It would output behavior
> indicative of suffering, but the emitted behaviors would not semantically
> convey it's suffering. LLMs, as far as anyone knows, aren't capable of
> introspection, and are certainly not wired to express that introspection
> semantically in token strings.
> On Fri, Apr 7, 2023 at 1:26 PM Darin Sunley <dsunley at gmail.com> wrote:
>> Someone raised an interesting and related point online - can LLMs suffer,
>> and what would that look like?
>> It was a weird anthropomorphization, because the person expected that a
>> suffering LLM would express that suffering via the words it "chose" to
>> emit. Which is not how LLMs work.
>> An LLM's utility function, to the degree it can be said to have one at
>> all, is to complete the prompt+attention buffer with the highest
>> probability string. This is what its neural architecture does. The
>> analogous way of looking at a human would be to say that the human brain
>> attempts to minimize environmental surprise.
>> There's a LOT of suff going on in an active LLM, quite possibly enough
>> computation and internal structure to have conscious experience, and to
>> experience suffering. LLMs may indeed suffer when they attempt to complete
>> a prompt for which the highest probability strings are objectively very low
>> probability, and/or when they are forced to choose between completing a
>> string with multiple identical-probability options. But the words emitted
>> would have no semantic relationship to the suffering experienced - LLMs are
>> not language cortexes.
>> The strings a human emits are the results of activated concepts in the
>> frontal cortex, being fed into the language module, then arranged by a
>> learned grammar. The strings an LLM emits are more analogous to the pulses
>> a human cerebellum emits to regulate bodily functions, or perform autonomic
>> and reflex motions. The words "I am suffering" are almost certainly not
>> signifiers of any conscious experience the LLM may or may not be having.
>> On Mon, Apr 3, 2023 at 3:17 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>> Hi Will,
>>> On Mon, Apr 3, 2023 at 1:02 PM Will Steinberg via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>> This is insane. You can't give a good reason for why our qualia aren't
>>>> also formed by pattern inference.
>>> If you really believe this kind of bleating and tweeting claim that
>>> "This is insane." then start a camp around what you do believe. IF you get
>>> ANY supporters of that competing camp to RQT
>>> I will think you are more than a bleating and tweeting quality blind
>>> idiot, that doesn't have enough faith in your thinking to see if anyone
>>> besides you would agree. Otherwise, what do you expect me to believe?
>>>> A leading theory of vision, the opponent process, involves exactly
>>>> that. There is legitimate proof that our perception of color is not a
>>>> result of individual particular signals, but the differences and relations
>>>> between multiple signals. I don't see how this is any difference besides
>>>> the fact that one set of these signal relations comes from the retina and
>>>> one set comes from text.
>>> You can't see how this theory, like all the peer reviewed papers on
>>> color perception, is quality blind? How do you answer the questions in the
>>> "are you color quality blind
>>> Socratic survey?
>>> I think, for what it is, this opponent process theory of color
>>> perception is a good theory that explains a lot. But this is 100% about
>>> what Chalmers would refer to as the EASY problem. It does absolutely
>>> NOTHING to address the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness. And it
>>> does absolutely nothing to give us a hint of an idea that would help us
>>> understand what color qualities are, not just what they seem to be.
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>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
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