[ExI] Why stop at glutamate?

Wed Apr 12 20:53:31 UTC 2023

*A) 650 nm light*
*B) How Bob perceives 650 nm light*
*C) How Alice perceives 650 nm light*

A) is a real thing even if probably in nature such a thing doesn't exist
because almost every object reflects or emit a range of frequencies. Even
if one looked a particular line in the emission spectrum by the time it
reaches our eye it would be mingle with other light frequencies. But even
if we set this apart.
B) Bob doesn't really perceive 650 nm light but how the light at this
frequencies compares with ambient light, with background of the object that
emitted and a miriad of other things that determine human perception of
light. The bottom line is that a complex process that involve many
components of physiology and brain areas. The thing Brent wants to nail
down cannot be nailed down so precisely as he wants.
However we can measure at any given time Bob response to this particular
light. As pointed out previously it is something somehow fluid (not
completely) and its fundamental properties are in the neural patterns that
are activated when Bob perceives this external stimuli. While we don't have
a full complete picture of all the processes that happen when Bob sees and
perceives A) it is something that theoretically can be measured and
described from a scientific point of view. This is the best science can do
and should do.
C) Very similar to B but not identical. There are overlapping zones of
activities and also different ones because each individual response to
stimuli is unique.
We can recognize B) and C) as "redness" because it is a similar response to
the same stimuli. If we observe these patterns activated again we can go
backwards and deduce that the individuals are perceiving red.

If we want to reproduce this ability to see red, so recreating redness in a
machine we can create a similar level of complexity at the level of
connections and patterns. It is not necessarily to use glutamate or any
other chemical or biological stuff to do that. There is an essence of what
it means to perceive red and it is all in the patterns and the association
with the stimuli.
Train a machine with a neural network to recognize red and alert itself it
is perceiving red. That is redness in the machine that is completely
equivalent in essence (everything that is essential) to B) and C).

On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 12:27 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, 2:02 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>> Oh, perhaps that's our communication problem.  You don't yet realize that
>> we redefine color terms.  Traditional color terminology is 'quality
>> blind'.  With traditional ambiguous terminology that only has one term
>> 'red' that represents all the properties that have to do with perception
>> and conscious awareness of red things, you can't tell if the term red is
>> referring to the strawberry or knowledge of the strawberry, or the light.
>> THAT ambiguity is 99% of everyone's problem, and evidently the problem we
>> are suffering from now.
>>
>> This redefinition is specified in the RQT
>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>
>> statement.
>>
>>
>>    - “*red*” The intrinsic property of objects that are the target of
>>    our observation, the initial cause of the perception process (i.e. when the
>>    strawberry reflects 650 nm (red) light). A label for Anything that reflects
>>    or emits ‘red’ light.
>>
>>
>>
>>    - “*redNESS*” The different intrinsic property of our knowledge of
>>    red things, the final result of our perception of red.
>>
>>
>> With terminology that can represent multiple properties which you can
>> then sufficiently ground to physical properties (subjective and objective),
>> you can make effing of the ineffable statements like:
>>
>>
>>    - "My redness(glutamate) is like your grenness(also glutamate), which
>>    is what I use to represent what we both call red."
>>
>>
>> Does that help?
>>
>
> Not quite. It might be clearer if we instead used language like:
>
> A) 650 nm light
> B) How Bob perceives 650 nm light
> C) How Alice perceives 650 nm light
>
> I grant that all 3 of these things are different things. But note that
> nowhere above is there any definition for an 'objective perception of 650
> nm light'. I don't know what that could mean or be. There must always be a
> subject in question to have a particular perception. How can one define a
> perception in objective terms when perceptions are always relative to some
> subject?
>
> If we accept your theory that particular molecules are associated with
> objective perceptions, how do we prove that? How do we even test for that,
> in principle?
>
> Jason
>
>
>
>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 9:02 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, 10:21 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 7:23 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 8:38 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 9:51 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 11:30 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 7:45 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 9:20 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 3:21 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 12:05 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Other parts of the brain decode the meaning of the signals
>>>>>>>>>>>>> they receive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> They decode it to WHAT?  Decoding from one code, to another
>>>>>>>>>>>> code, none of which is like anything
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You are now theorizing that there is nothing it is like to be
>>>>>>>>>>> the process that decodes a signal and reaches some state of having
>>>>>>>>>>> determined which from a broad array of possibilities, that signal
>>>>>>>>>>> represents. That is what qualia are: discriminations within a high
>>>>>>>>>>> dimensionality space.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> nor are they grounded is not yet grounding anything.  It is
>>>>>>>>>>>> still just a code with no grounded referent so you can't truly decode them
>>>>>>>>>>>> in any meaningful way.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What does it mean to ground something? Explain how you see
>>>>>>>>>>> grounding achieved (in detail)?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is all about what is required (experimentally) to get someone
>>>>>>>>>> to experience stand alone, no grounding dictionary required, "old guys
>>>>>>>>>> redness".  (the requirement for grounding as in: "oh THAT is what old guys
>>>>>>>>>> redness is like.")
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You need to be the conscious of old guy's brain to ever know that.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I've had this identical conversations with multiple other people
>>>>>>>> like John Clark.  Our response is canonized in the RQT camp
>>>>>>>> statement
>>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>.
>>>>>>>> In summary, It's the difference between elemental qualities and
>>>>>>>> composite qualities.  Of course, if you consider redness to be like the
>>>>>>>> entire monalisa, it is going to be much more difficult to communicate what
>>>>>>>> all that is like.  And you have to transmit all the pixels to accomplish
>>>>>>>> that.  All that is required, is elemental codes, that are grounded in
>>>>>>>> elemental properties.  And send that grounded code, for each pixel of the
>>>>>>>> monalisa, to that person.
>>>>>>>> P.S.  the person receiving the coded message, could decode the
>>>>>>>> codes, representing the mona lisa, with redness and greenness inverted, if
>>>>>>>> they wanted.  I guess you would consider that to be the same painting?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is no objective image (i.e. imagining) of the Mona Lisa. There
>>>>>>> just some arrangement of atoms in the Louvre. Each person creates the image
>>>>>>> anew in their head when they look it it, but there's no way of sharing or
>>>>>>> comparing the experiences between any two individuals.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you think otherwise could you explain how two people with
>>>>>>> different brains could come to know how the other perceives?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is the weak form of communicating qualities which you can do if
>>>>>> your terms are physically grounded (i.e. redness is glutamate) in a
>>>>>> reliably reproducible way.  so if you objectively detect that objective
>>>>>> description of redness for one brain, is an objective description of
>>>>>> greenness in another brain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> How can there be an objective description of redness for one brain?
>>>>> Isn't that subjective? How does one determine when glutamate is redness in
>>>>> one brain but greenness in another?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, glutamate (or whatever objectively observed physics it turns out to
>>>> be) is always the same subjective quality.  They are the same thing. the
>>>> prediction is you can objectively observe subjective qualities.  We just
>>>> don't currently know which of all the stuff we are objectively observing is
>>>> subjective redness)  One person may use it to represent red visual
>>>> knowledge (they would call it redness) but another person could be
>>>> engineered to use glutamate quality to represent green.  So far that
>>>> person, they would call it greenness.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Just when I thought I understood your theory this last paragraph above
>>> completely undermines that understanding.
>>>
>>> In one sentence you say that it always has the same subjective property,
>>> but then in another you say it could be used to represent redness or
>>> greenness. I don't see how to reconcile these two ideas. What is the common
>>> subjective property, is it color of any kind?
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> That would enable you to ground a sufficiently defined statement like:
>>>>>> "My redness(glutamate) is like your greenness(glycine), both of which we
>>>>>> call red."
>>>>>> Here is a description of the strongest form of effing the ineffable
>>>>>> taken from my "3 Types of Effing the Ineffable
>>>>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JKwACeT3b1bta1M78wZ3H2vWkjGxwZ46OHSySYRWATs/edit>"
>>>>>> document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Half of our visual knowledge is in our left hemisphere, the other
>>>>>> half, in the right.  The Corpus Callosum
>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_callosum> computationally
>>>>>> binds these into one unified conscious awareness of everything around us.
>>>>>> If we had a neural ponytail
>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uf9SWvs4beE>, which could
>>>>>> computationally bind like the corpus callosum, this would enable us to
>>>>>> experience all of the experiences, not just half, when we hug someone.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There's a case of some conjoined twins with a "thalamic bridge" that
>>>>> enables them to hear each other's thoughts and see out of each other's eyes.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's an interesting question to consider whether this bridge ensures
>>>>> they see the same colors or whether the separate processing by their unique
>>>>> visual cortexes allows them to stil perceive colors differently. The same
>>>>> question would arise with neural ponytails.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes, exactly.  If people double neural ponytails are possible, and they
>>>> are often VERY shocked to hear of this, and it falsifies their doubt, for
>>>> sure.  Demonstrable proof the 4 hemispheres can be bound just as well as 2
>>>> hemispheres.
>>>>
>>>> If the first two inverted systems were computationally bound with a
>>>>>> neural ponytail, they would both directly (infallibly) experience the
>>>>>> other's inverted knowledge of the world.  You’d be aware of what is behind
>>>>>> you, as seen through your partner’s eyes, that knowledge being red green
>>>>>> inverted from your knowledge of what is in front of you.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think it depends on what level of processor the information is
>>>>> shared. If the ponytails shared data from the optic nerves and they had
>>>>> similar retinal behavior, their color experience would likely not change.
>>>>> Oft, however higher level visual information from the visual cortex were
>>>>> shared, then this could present as some kind of inverted qualia.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are you aware of the experiment were color blind monkeys had their
>>>>> retinas infected with a retro virus that made their cone cells produced new
>>>>> color sensing proteins, and after a few weeks they gained trichromatic
>>>>> vision? The only change to their biology occurred in their retina. How can
>>>>> the "qualia are physical properties" theory account for the results of this
>>>>> experiment?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, I wasn't aware of that.  Very interesting.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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