[ExI] Why stop at glutamate?

Giovanni Santostasi gsantostasi at gmail.com
Thu Apr 13 03:50:50 UTC 2023 

*We just need to know the true quality of things, not just the qualities
things seem to be.*Do you realize that science has abandoned this way of
thinking about reality since Galileo's time?
That is how pre-scientific "thinkers" where thinking about the universe. It
was abandoned for a reason, it leads nowhere.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 8:48 PM Giovanni Santostasi <gsantostasi at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> *It's just that if we objectively observe it, it doesn't tell us what it
> is like.*Yeah, the drawing of a pizza doesn't feel my stomach. The
> sentence above is both trivially right and absurd.
> What are you trying to say?
> It drives me nuts.
>
> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 5:46 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>> There are many cases where there is conscious awareness, without a
>> subject.
>> One example is when Buddhists meditate.   They achieve a state where the
>> self ceases to exist, and the claim to be "one with the universe"
>> But of course we know they are jost one with their knowledge of the
>> universe, all in their head.
>>
>> We know, absolutely, that we can have subjective knowledge that has a
>> redness quality.
>> There must be something in the brain that is this redness quality.
>> We can objectively describe everything in the brain, but that tells us
>> nothing about what the subjective quality of that behavior is like.
>> One of those descriptions of all the stuff we objectively know, simply
>> must be that redness.
>> That redness must be causally active, and there is no reason we can't
>> objectively observe that causal effect.
>> It's just that if we objectively observe it, it doesn't tell us what it
>> is like.
>>
>> We simply need to observe the stuff in the brain, in a non quality blind
>> way,
>> so we can learn to relate subjective experiences (without mapping them
>> back to the stimulus that initially caused those experiences) to what we
>> are objectively observing.
>>
>> Once we can reliably predict which objective stuff has your redness
>> quality, we will have our dictionary.  Hard problem solved.
>> We just need to know the true quality of things, not just the qualities
>> things seem to be.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 1:27 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, 2:02 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Jason,
>>>> Oh, perhaps that's our communication problem.  You don't yet realize
>>>> that we redefine color terms.  Traditional color terminology is 'quality
>>>> blind'.  With traditional ambiguous terminology that only has one term
>>>> 'red' that represents all the properties that have to do with perception
>>>> and conscious awareness of red things, you can't tell if the term red is
>>>> referring to the strawberry or knowledge of the strawberry, or the light.
>>>> THAT ambiguity is 99% of everyone's problem, and evidently the problem we
>>>> are suffering from now.
>>>>
>>>> This redefinition is specified in the RQT
>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>
>>>> statement.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    - “*red*” The intrinsic property of objects that are the target of
>>>>    our observation, the initial cause of the perception process (i.e. when the
>>>>    strawberry reflects 650 nm (red) light). A label for Anything that reflects
>>>>    or emits ‘red’ light.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    - “*redNESS*” The different intrinsic property of our knowledge of
>>>>    red things, the final result of our perception of red.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> With terminology that can represent multiple properties which you can
>>>> then sufficiently ground to physical properties (subjective and objective),
>>>> you can make effing of the ineffable statements like:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>    - "My redness(glutamate) is like your grenness(also glutamate),
>>>>    which is what I use to represent what we both call red."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Does that help?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Not quite. It might be clearer if we instead used language like:
>>>
>>> A) 650 nm light
>>> B) How Bob perceives 650 nm light
>>> C) How Alice perceives 650 nm light
>>>
>>> I grant that all 3 of these things are different things. But note that
>>> nowhere above is there any definition for an 'objective perception of 650
>>> nm light'. I don't know what that could mean or be. There must always be a
>>> subject in question to have a particular perception. How can one define a
>>> perception in objective terms when perceptions are always relative to some
>>> subject?
>>>
>>> If we accept your theory that particular molecules are associated with
>>> objective perceptions, how do we prove that? How do we even test for that,
>>> in principle?
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 9:02 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023, 10:21 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 12, 2023 at 7:23 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 8:38 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 9:51 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 11:30 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 7:45 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 9:20 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023 at 3:21 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 12:05 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Other parts of the brain decode the meaning of the signals
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they receive.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They decode it to WHAT?  Decoding from one code, to another
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> code, none of which is like anything
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> You are now theorizing that there is nothing it is like to be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the process that decodes a signal and reaches some state of having
>>>>>>>>>>>>> determined which from a broad array of possibilities, that signal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> represents. That is what qualia are: discriminations within a high
>>>>>>>>>>>>> dimensionality space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nor are they grounded is not yet grounding anything.  It is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> still just a code with no grounded referent so you can't truly decode them
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in any meaningful way.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> What does it mean to ground something? Explain how you see
>>>>>>>>>>>>> grounding achieved (in detail)?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is all about what is required (experimentally) to get
>>>>>>>>>>>> someone to experience stand alone, no grounding dictionary required, "old
>>>>>>>>>>>> guys redness".  (the requirement for grounding as in: "oh THAT is what old
>>>>>>>>>>>> guys redness is like.")
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You need to be the conscious of old guy's brain to ever know
>>>>>>>>>>> that.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I've had this identical conversations with multiple other people
>>>>>>>>>> like John Clark.  Our response is canonized in the RQT camp
>>>>>>>>>> statement
>>>>>>>>>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia>.
>>>>>>>>>> In summary, It's the difference between elemental qualities and
>>>>>>>>>> composite qualities.  Of course, if you consider redness to be like the
>>>>>>>>>> entire monalisa, it is going to be much more difficult to communicate what
>>>>>>>>>> all that is like.  And you have to transmit all the pixels to accomplish
>>>>>>>>>> that.  All that is required, is elemental codes, that are grounded in
>>>>>>>>>> elemental properties.  And send that grounded code, for each pixel of the
>>>>>>>>>> monalisa, to that person.
>>>>>>>>>> P.S.  the person receiving the coded message, could decode the
>>>>>>>>>> codes, representing the mona lisa, with redness and greenness inverted, if
>>>>>>>>>> they wanted.  I guess you would consider that to be the same painting?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is no objective image (i.e. imagining) of the Mona Lisa.
>>>>>>>>> There just some arrangement of atoms in the Louvre. Each person creates the
>>>>>>>>> image anew in their head when they look it it, but there's no way of
>>>>>>>>> sharing or comparing the experiences between any two individuals.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you think otherwise could you explain how two people with
>>>>>>>>> different brains could come to know how the other perceives?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is the weak form of communicating qualities which you can do
>>>>>>>> if your terms are physically grounded (i.e. redness is glutamate) in a
>>>>>>>> reliably reproducible way.  so if you objectively detect that objective
>>>>>>>> description of redness for one brain, is an objective description of
>>>>>>>> greenness in another brain.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How can there be an objective description of redness for one brain?
>>>>>>> Isn't that subjective? How does one determine when glutamate is redness in
>>>>>>> one brain but greenness in another?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, glutamate (or whatever objectively observed physics it turns out
>>>>>> to be) is always the same subjective quality.  They are the same thing. the
>>>>>> prediction is you can objectively observe subjective qualities.  We just
>>>>>> don't currently know which of all the stuff we are objectively observing is
>>>>>> subjective redness)  One person may use it to represent red visual
>>>>>> knowledge (they would call it redness) but another person could be
>>>>>> engineered to use glutamate quality to represent green.  So far that
>>>>>> person, they would call it greenness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Just when I thought I understood your theory this last paragraph above
>>>>> completely undermines that understanding.
>>>>>
>>>>> In one sentence you say that it always has the same subjective
>>>>> property, but then in another you say it could be used to represent redness
>>>>> or greenness. I don't see how to reconcile these two ideas. What is the
>>>>> common subjective property, is it color of any kind?
>>>>>
>>>>> Jason
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That would enable you to ground a sufficiently defined statement
>>>>>>>> like: "My redness(glutamate) is like your greenness(glycine), both of which
>>>>>>>> we call red."
>>>>>>>> Here is a description of the strongest form of effing the ineffable
>>>>>>>> taken from my "3 Types of Effing the Ineffable
>>>>>>>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JKwACeT3b1bta1M78wZ3H2vWkjGxwZ46OHSySYRWATs/edit>"
>>>>>>>> document.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Half of our visual knowledge is in our left hemisphere, the other
>>>>>>>> half, in the right.  The Corpus Callosum
>>>>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_callosum> computationally
>>>>>>>> binds these into one unified conscious awareness of everything around us.
>>>>>>>> If we had a neural ponytail
>>>>>>>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uf9SWvs4beE>, which could
>>>>>>>> computationally bind like the corpus callosum, this would enable us to
>>>>>>>> experience all of the experiences, not just half, when we hug someone.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There's a case of some conjoined twins with a "thalamic bridge" that
>>>>>>> enables them to hear each other's thoughts and see out of each other's eyes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's an interesting question to consider whether this bridge ensures
>>>>>>> they see the same colors or whether the separate processing by their unique
>>>>>>> visual cortexes allows them to stil perceive colors differently. The same
>>>>>>> question would arise with neural ponytails.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, exactly.  If people double neural ponytails are possible, and
>>>>>> they are often VERY shocked to hear of this, and it falsifies their doubt,
>>>>>> for sure.  Demonstrable proof the 4 hemispheres can be bound just as well
>>>>>> as 2 hemispheres.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the first two inverted systems were computationally bound with a
>>>>>>>> neural ponytail, they would both directly (infallibly) experience the
>>>>>>>> other's inverted knowledge of the world.  You’d be aware of what is behind
>>>>>>>> you, as seen through your partner’s eyes, that knowledge being red green
>>>>>>>> inverted from your knowledge of what is in front of you.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think it depends on what level of processor the information is
>>>>>>> shared. If the ponytails shared data from the optic nerves and they had
>>>>>>> similar retinal behavior, their color experience would likely not change.
>>>>>>> Oft, however higher level visual information from the visual cortex were
>>>>>>> shared, then this could present as some kind of inverted qualia.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Are you aware of the experiment were color blind monkeys had their
>>>>>>> retinas infected with a retro virus that made their cone cells produced new
>>>>>>> color sensing proteins, and after a few weeks they gained trichromatic
>>>>>>> vision? The only change to their biology occurred in their retina. How can
>>>>>>> the "qualia are physical properties" theory account for the results of this
>>>>>>> experiment?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, I wasn't aware of that.  Very interesting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> extropy-chat mailing list
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20230412/d1422bda/attachment.htm>

More information about the extropy-chat mailing list