[ExI] are qualia communicable? Was Why stop at glutamate?

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Sat Apr 15 17:29:33 UTC 2023

Hi Jason,

On Sat, Apr 15, 2023 at 8:31 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Apr 15, 2023, 8:01 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> First off, let me make sure we agree on some (platonic or mathematical?)
>> logical facts.
>> You can't teach a toddler their colors, with a book that has no colors in
>> it.                               You point to the red one and say: THAT is
>> red. (Note: Your are really pointing to the property of the toddlers
>> subjective knowledge of that)
>> You can't tell someone which colors different wavelengths of
>> light represent, without colors.  You add a red color near the 700nm
>> section, and say 700nm light is THAT color.
>> If we agree on those facts, then:
>> Once we have the required dictionary (after exhaustive trial and error,
>> and you discover that is P1, and only P1 that has a redness quality), you
>> take P1, computationally bind it into someone's subjective experience, and
>> say: THAT is redness.
>> At which point the person may say:  "Wow, THAT is my grenness, I must be
>> engineered to be different than everyone else."
> This is good. I think we are having some real communication on these
> issues now.

Yes, very exciting.

Let me start by pointing out that Dennets 2nd property of qualia
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia> is that qualia are: "2. *intrinsic
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic>* – they are non-relational
properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to
other things."
In other words P1 always has the same redness property, no matter who's
brain it is in, and no matter what it is compared to.

> Let me add names for clarity for your above description:
> When Bob says; "Wow, THAT is Alice's redness!" How does Bob know what
> redness is for Alice?

The weak way is we have our dictionary which never fails (as in That (P1)
is always redness)
The strong way is you computationally bind the two brains together, so you
can be directly aware of whatever quality that other brain is using.

> Another possibility to consider is: after we put some new processing
> ability into Bob and he doesn't feel anything, not at first. It may take
> several weeks for his brain to rewire itself to adapt to this new signal,
> as it did for the monkeys given full color vision.
You are describing subjective change here.  You can objectively observe
this change.  If they aren't YET experiencing redness, it is because there
is no redness being computationally bound.  Once you computationally bind
them, you will experience redness.  They are the same thing.

> Is there any promise that Bob's resulting brain changes and rewiring after
> given a new signal will preserve the same relational role for P1 as it had
> within Alice's brain?

You can re-engineer bob, any way you want.  Whatever you objectively rewire
(it may take some time to do this), will be exactly the subjective
experience.  They are the same thing.
Subjective experience doesn't change without that change being objectively
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