[ExI] What is "Elemental Redness"?

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, May 3, 2023, 11:50 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> Hi Jason,
>
> On Wed, May 3, 2023 at 8:24 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, May 3, 2023, 7:53 AM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Jason,
>>> You always have such great things to say, but I'm having a hard time
>>> keeping up with this one.
>>> On Tue, May 2, 2023 at 9:50 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, May 2, 2023, 10:19 AM Gadersd via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> > Chapter One
>>>>> >
>>>>> > There is no 'hard problem'.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > The end.
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that most philosophers are hallucinating a problem into
>>>>> existence, but there is some interesting structure to the way the patterns
>>>>> are organized in the brain that is worth elaborating on. It is beautiful,
>>>>> sort of like a mosaic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The hard problem of consciousness comes about by assuming a particular
>>>> answer to the mind-body problem.
>>>>
>>>> The mind-body problem asks: what is the nature of the connection
>>>> between mind and matter.
>>>>
>>>> If you assume matter is fundamental (materialism) then you end up with
>>>> "the hard problem of consciousness" -- how to explain the appearance of
>>>> consciousness given only matter.
>>>>
>>>> On the other hand:
>>>>
>>>> If you assume consciousness is fundamental (materialism) then you end
>>>> up with "the hard problem of matter" -- how to explain the appearance of
>>>> matter given only consciousness.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Did you mean to use the same term (materialism) in both different cases
>>> here?  Or was that a typo?  Did you mean to say something different like
>>> (spiritualism or subjectivism) in the second case?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Brent, it was a most unfortunate typo. I meant to say "immaterialism"
>> here. This is the idea that consciousness, thought, ideas, etc. are more
>> fundamental than the apparent physical reality. It is common in Buddhism
>> and some parts of Hinduism, and appeared in the west more recently with
>> George Berkeley.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> There is, I believe, a solution to the mind-body problem which explains
>>>> the appearance of matter as well as the existence of consciousness. But the
>>>> answer ventures beyond philosophy of mind and into ontology. I think
>>>> without this complete picture, no attempt at answering either the hard
>>>> problem of consciousness or the hard problem of matter would have led to a
>>>> satisfactory explanation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Can you give some examples of what you mean by ontology, or go into more
>>> details about what you are saying here?
>>>
>>
>> Ontology is the field devoted to questions like:
>> "What is real?"
>> "What exists?"
>> "What is the extent of reality?"
>> "Why does anything exist?"
>> "What is necessary for something to exist?"
>>
>> The full details of what I am saying here are found in my "Why does
>> anything exist?' article:
>> https://alwaysasking.com/why-does-anything-exist/
>>
>> The cliff notes version is that consciousness is tied inextricably with
>> physical reality, much like Wheeler supposes, then observer and the
>> observed forming a pair.
>>
> It's hard to motivate myself to even consider anything like this.  My
> brain just screams: "red herring" ;)  The same feeling I get in Mormon
> Sunday School.
>
>
>> This has been explored and fleshed out more recently by Bruno Marchal,
>> Russel Standish, Max Tegmark, Markus Muller, and most recently by Steve
>> Wolfram. The end result being that physical law emerges out of properties
>> of observers and of observation. In a sense, consciousness is more
>> fundamental than physics, but there is a mathematical consistency that
>> explains the connection.
>>
>
> But it would be so great to have some concise descriptions of some of
> these principles, so we could track how much expert consensus exists for
> and against what parts of these (pre theoretical scientific) ideas.  With a
> focus on what most of the experts agree on.  If I saw some significant
> consensus, that would provide me much more motivation to spend time on
> something like that, which right now, seems just as bad as the stuff I hear
> in Mormon Sunday School.
>

If you have a few hours I have converted my article into a two part video:

https://youtu.be/6hGH-roVl3w
https://youtu.be/lYCul43JSxo

Jason



> My current RQT
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Theories-of-Consciousness/6-Representational-Qualia> view
> is kind of a "pan qualityists"  At least some stuff has 'qualities' and the
> reason they behave the way they do, is because of those qualities.  I don't
> get the Pan psychists view, which believes everything is "conscious" which
> would necessitate everything being "computationally bound" (i.e.
> consciousness = computationally bound qualities).  Which seems crazy to me,
> because not even most of the stuff in my brain is computationally bound
> into my consciousness.  Sure, a rock may have a quality (why it behaves the
> way it does?), but that quality isn't computationally bound with any other
> qualities, so shouldn't be considered conscious.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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