[ExI] Zombies are logically inconsistent: a proof

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, May 16, 2023, 6:34 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 2:35 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> I think the "no B exists" assumption: "No specific behavior nor any
>> aggregate set of behaviors implies the presence of a conscious mind." also
>> leads to contradiction.
>>
>
> For the record, I'm just devil's advocating here -
>

(I appreciate this service, it helps to clarify and sharpen my thinking on
the subject)

but no, it doesn't seem to lead to a contradiction.
>

The contradiction comes in after the fourth corrolary of this assumption,
which is the possibility of zombies implies qualia are epiphenomenal (they
have no physical effects), but if qualia have no physical effects then we
as physical beings have no access to our qualia either, so we can be no
more conscious then our equivalent zombies. Thus the contradiction rests in
assuming zombies are less conscious than we are, or have less access to
their internal states than we have. If qualia are epiphenomenal then
zombies must have the same amount of access to their qualia as we have:
which would be none.



>
>> Corrolary 1. Talking about one's innermost desires, thoughts, feelings,
>> sensations, emotions, beliefs, does not require consciousness.
>>
>
> Nor does it require actually having desires, thoughts, feelings, and so
> on.  Sociopaths readily lie about their feelings, so LLM AIs could too.
>


But lying would involve different pathways and patterns in the brain, which
would be objectively detectable. A belief in the possibility of zombies
generally extends to include physically identical versions of ourselves.
People who believe in zombies consider the possibility of a zombie earth,
physically and atomically identical to our own, but where everyone lacks
consciousness.


>
>> Corrolary 2. One could claim to be conscious and be wrong for reasons
>> that neither they, nor any other person could ever prove or even know. That
>> is, there would be truths that stand outside of both objective and
>> subjective reality.
>>
>
> Subjective, perhaps, but not objective.  All that any person can measure
> is their subjective reality.
>

It depends on the level of similarity we assume. For some versions, zombies
are considered to be possible or at least logically possible and
conceivable even when physically identical to conscious versions of
ourselves. In the case of physically identical zombies, there could be no
objectively accessible fact to account for the difference within the
universe.


> For that matter, in practice this would at best be, "...nor any other
> person that they meet could ever...".  Those who claim to know that LLMs
> are not conscious grant there could exist some p-zombies, such as LLMs, who
> never meet anyone who knows they are not conscious.
>

But those who believe in the possibility of zombies (at least in physically
identical ones) can never have a justification to conclude other humans
they run into are not zombies. Such zombies may not know they are not
conscious, but they will, like any normal human, claim to be conscious.
There will l, however, be no objective evidence or physical fact that this
statement being a lie.



> But there do exist people who claim to know the difference.  That is many
> of the very people who claim they can tell that LLMs are not conscious.
>

We can never disprove the presence of a mind (for if we are in a simulation
or game world, any object might be "ensouled", or exist in a disembodied
invisible form), but I think we can prove to, some level of confidence, the
presence of a mind when we see behavioral evidence of reactivity to change
indicating an awareness or sense of some environmental variable.



>
>> Corrolary 3. The information indicating the fact that one person is a
>> zombie while another is not would have to stand outside the physical
>> universe, but where then is this information held?
>>
>
> If this information exists and is measurable within some subjective
> realities, and it is provably consistent, then the information upon which
> this was based (regardless of whether the measurement is correct) lies
> inside the physical universe.
>

If there is no behavior that is required for consciousness, then how can
anyone establish that one entity is conscious and another entity is not?
There would be no possible test, as no possible behavior could be tested
for.


> That's how those who hold  this view reason, anyway.  One key problem is
> that "it is provably consistent" notion.  They think it is, but when put to
> rigorous experiment this belief turns out to be false: without knowing
> who's an AI and who's human, if presented with good quality chatbots, they
> are often unable to tell.  That's part of the point of the Turing test.
>
> I know, I keep using the history of slavery as a comparison, but it is
> informative here.  Many people used to say the same thing about black folks
> - that they weren't really fully human, basically what we today mean by
> supposing all AIs are and can only be zombies - but these same tests gave
> the lie to that.  Not all AIs are conscious, of course, but look at how
> this academic problem was solved before to see what it might take to settle
> it now.
>

Are you referring to the Turing test (a test of another's intelligence) or
the problem of other minds (the question of another's consciousness)? The
problem of other minds is generally considered open, but I believe
intelligence implies consciousness, as one cannot respond intelligently
without possession some information concerning the situation/environment
one is in, and possessing and processing information from the environment
constitutes an awareness of some non-zero amount of information, which to
me is what consciousness is. Thus the Turing test, by establishing
intelligence, is also a test of consciousness. This does not say much,
however, as I believe even very simple processes and very primitive forms
of intelligent behavior imply consciousness. Nematodes are conscious of
food or mates they pursue. Guided missiles are conscious of the target they
pursue, and so on.

Jason

>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20230516/9ecac4c1/attachment-0001.htm>