[ExI] Criticisms of Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI)

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023 at 4:44 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Good evening Jason,
>


Hi Daniel,


>
> On Sat, 16 Sep 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >       But the problem is that predictions about things outside our reach
> can
> >       never be verified, so we can never know how accurate they are.
> >
> > I think the two sides of our positions boil down to a single question:
> > do we, or don't we, trust our scientific theories?
> >
> > I don't know that there's any more to add beyond that, and I think our
> difference there can account for all of our differences on
> > this topic. But if you feel otherwise I am anxious to see if you have a
> different take.
>
> I think you are right. I did have a look through wikipedia, and I think
> our differences might be sorted under the categories of scientific
> realism for you, vs some kind of shift between instrumentalism and
> constructive empiricism for me. What do you think?
>

>From wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_realism>:
"Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is
real regardless of how it may be interpreted."

I think that's a fair description of my view.

>From wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism>: "In
philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a
methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth
of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting
natural phenomena. According to instrumentalists, a successful scientific
theory reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's
unobservable objects, properties or processes."

I think that sounds like a good description of the position/stance you have
been arguing from.

>From wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructive_empiricism>:
"Constructive empiricism states that scientific theories are semantically
literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their
acceptance involves, as belief, only that they are empirically adequate. A
theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about
observable entities is true (regardless of what it says about unobservable
entities). A theory is semantically literal if and only if the language of
the theory is interpreted in such a way that the claims of the theory are
either true or false (as opposed to an instrumentalist reading)."

This description isn't clear enough for me to understand. Though it seems
to support the scientific realism view more so than the instrumentalist
view, as it takes the stance that claims of a theory are either true or
false (and it seems to me, the existence of objective truth requires the
existence of an objective reality). I don't know to what extent you take
instrumentalism to imply any form of anti-realism, I don't think you have
argued that. Rather, you seem to be of the opinion that theories should be
taken to be silent regarding predictions of which we haven't found the
means to directly test.


>
> > The reason I have trust in our theories, even for things we haven't
> tested, is that if one doesn't believe theories will work for
> > things we haven't tested, then we arrive at the position where we only
> trust our theories for things that have been tested. But then,
> > what's the use in having a theory?
>
> That makes sense, and for me, as you know by now, the test is of the
> essence, and without tests, its an interpretation. But yes, we seem to
> have reached an impasse here, but, we the added benefit of you having
> made me think really hard about why I believe what I believe, and also,
> I feel I understand MWI and QM much better than before. So even though
> we might have reached the point where we agree to disagree, it still
> has been very valuable for me.
>

That is wonderful.

Just this morning I was going over what I had written on relativity, and
noticed something pertinent to this discussion. Einstein wrote his theory
of special relativity in 1905. But it wasn't experimentally confirmed until
1932, even though, by that time, nearly all physicists had come to accept
it as true. Einstein's Nobel prize, given in 1921, wasn't for his
relativity, which was still too controversial given it had not been
experimentally confirmed. Experimenters might have thought: there's no way
we can ever build things to approach the speed of light and verify any of
these predictions anytime this century, relativity is useless, and we
shouldn't believe its predictions of time dilation, length contraction,
relativity of simultaneity, etc. but all of these were eventually
confirmed, and they were fundamental to understand to create many of
Today's technologies, like GPS, ring laser gyroscopes, and particle
accelerators.
https://alwaysasking.com/what-is-time/#Testing_time_dilation

At what point would you have accepted (been willing to wager even money on)
the truth of the phenomenon of the relativity of simultaneity (as predicted
by Einstein's theory)
A) After Einstein published his paper in 1905
B) After personally reading and understanding his paper and seeing why it
was a better theory
C) After a majority of physicists had endorsed Einstein's theory
D) After one prediction of special relativity had first been confirmed (in
1932)
E) Only after the effect of relativity of simultaneity had been
experimentally demonstrated
F) Only after practical technologies exploiting relativity of simultaneity
had come into common use
G) Only after you had personally used and benefited from such practical
technologies
H) Only after someone invents a device to experience two reference frames
at once, to witness the same two events occur in a different order

Now let us consider the analogous question for QM, and at which point you
would accept many-worlds:
A) After Everettt published his paper in 1957
B) After personally reading and understanding his paper and seeing why it
was a better theory
C) After a majority of physicists had endorsed Many-Worlds
D) After one prediction of Many-Worlds had been experimentally confirmed
(i.e., any prediction of QM that casts doubt on collapse, Wigner's friend,
EPR, etc.)
E) Only after the effect of Many-Worlds had been experimentally
demonstrated (i.e., no collapse by a conscious AI on a quantum computer)
F) Only after practical technologies exploiting Many-Worlds had come into
common use (e.g., quantum computers that factor 2048-bit RSA keys)
G) Only after you had personally used and benefited from such practical
technologies (e.g., you had rented a quantum computer on IBM and used it to
break an RSA key)
H) Only after someone invents a portal that lets us peer into or
communicate with these other worlds


> >       We could be wrong about our starting point (qm), or
> >       in our interpretation (maybe our human language is not up to the
> task of
> >       translating the equation into something we understand).
> >
> > Human language is Turing universal so it can describe any system or
> process that is computable. Whether we humans have brains that
> > can understand such descriptions is another question.
>
> Yes, I think perhaps that is what I was trying to get at. We are beings
> who live in 3+1 dimensions, and our brains, languages, figures of speech
> are completely attuned to that. With QM, we have reached a level that
> deviates so far from our ordinary world, that when we think we are
> translating equations into ordinary language, our intuitions cause us to
> err. But of course this is just pure speculation, but I wouldn't be
> surprised if reality is so strange and foreign to us, that it might not
> be possible for us to grasp with images and our spoken languages. We
> need another language to express those truths, and things and aspects
> will be lost in translation.
>

It is true that the reality described by QM is quite alien to our everyday
experience, and why math is so much better suited as a language for
physicists to describe reality. Words like "splitting", and "branching",
and "multiple universes" are very apt to be conceived of in different ways
by different readers, and should better be considered as analogies for what
the math in the theory literally describes.


>
> >       Then it also depends on the criterion of truth. If you have a
> pragmatic
> >       view, "truth is what works":ish, then the extrapolation will never
> reach
> >       the status of truth.
> >
> > Science never gets to truth, it only chases it.
>
> I agree with that, but see the realism vs the other options above for
> some points about what science is about.
>
> >       But I think we've already touched upon these thoughts, but I just
> wanted
> >       to try a different set of words to see if perhaps it would become
> more
> >       clear what I'm trying to say or if anything else interesting comes
> up.
> >
> >       Hm, on the other hand, maybe we should fold this into the other
> thread?
> >       I know you wrote about some of what I'm saying above in the other
> >       thread, so I think we'll get back to this subject.
> >
> >       Best regards, Daniel
> >
> > Yes, many of these points are in that monster of a thread. Feel free to
> break out any specific items from my reply into their own
> > threads if that would be helpful.
>
> Yes, I'll have a look at it, and let's see. =)
>
>
Best,

Jason



> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> >
> > Jason
> >
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>
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