[ExI] Fwd: Open Individualism

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at 12:15 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jan 19, 2024 at 7:19 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> When there are three possibilities and two are logically ruled out, what
>> do you call that? Is such reasoning not a necessary part of science?
>>
>
> In this case?  That you are incorrectly assuming that there are only three
> possibilities,
>

Would you care to name which other possibility that is missing aside from
these three?

https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1UvJ5X8ovzz6ZrJJWKDoiUvj2g6p6H6p-nUz1XdDt6aU/edit#slide=id.g2ac585a35ce_0_43


> or that you are tripping over your wording to assume that two are
> logically ruled out.
>

I make no assumptions. I said we can use thought experiments to logically
rule two out.


>
>
>> There are only two opinions for the question of whether or not you
>> survive the teleportation machine: either you survive, or you don't.
>>
>
> Define "you".
>

Exactly, you have come upon the central concern of personal identity. You
have three options:

1. You are only a single isolated thought moment
2. You are a collection of some thought moments, but not others
3. You are all thought moments.


> Define "survive".
>

The continuation of your consciousness, from your own internal, subjective,
first-person, point of view.


> There are quite many outcomes where the "you" by one definition survives
> by one definition of "survive", but pick certain other definitions for
> either or both words, and you do not survive by the new definition(s).
> This allows for a situation where it is simultaneously true that you
> survive (by one set of definitions) and that you don't survive (by another
> set).
>

Yes we need rigorous definitions. The "folk theory" of personal identity is
not rigorously defined, and I would say it is inconsistent, which is why
there is so much trouble with these questions.

When we attempt to define some version of personal identity that is
logically consistent, we are left with either empty individualism
(definition 1 above), or open individualism (definition 3 above). Then, if
you add the assumption that we experience more than one point in time
(which is a foundational assumption of science, with physics being the
science of predicting future observations from past ones), the only
tenable option that is consistent with science as practiced is open
individualism.


>
> Unfortunately, further discussion of this situation has confused the
> definitions after picking a set that determines whether you survive or
> don't.  For instance, the situation where another body is made at the far
> side then the initial body is destroyed could be argued that you (the
> original body) do not survive...but this is then used to argue that no one
> who goes through a teleporter has no legal rights to that identity's
> possessions (as that identity did not survive), which is clearly not the
> case: were that to happen today, the law would assume that what emerged on
> the far side was still "you".  "You" by one definition did not survive,
> while "you" by another definition did survive.
>

I'm unconcerned with legal definitions. What matters here is the subjective
experience of the person undergoing the experiment. Do they hit a wall and
become an "eternal blank", or do they feel themselves awaking in the new
location, their subjective experience not missing a beat?

Jason
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20240119/5ecc48d1/attachment-0001.htm>