[ExI] after upload, what?

[BillK]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2024 at 19:58, Keith Henson via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> <snip>
>

> It is my opinion and I wrote it into the story, that people should be
> able to move their minds to and from an uploaded state without even a
> break in consciousness.  Personally, I am not interested in uploading
> until it is bidirectional.
>
> Keith
> _______________________________________________
>


I asked Claude about reversible mind-uploading.

First, I asked the basics -
 Assuming mind uploading becomes possible, how does this affect mind-body
philosophy?

Claude -
The possibility of mind uploading has significant implications for
mind-body philosophy and challenges some traditional views while lending
support to others. Let's explore the key impacts:

1. Challenges to materialism and identity theory:
Mind uploading poses a direct challenge to strict materialist views like
identity theory, which hold that mental states are identical to physical
brain states. If minds can be uploaded and instantiated in different
physical substrates (like computers), it suggests that the mind is not
strictly identical to the brain. The same mind could be realized in
different physical systems, undermining the idea that particular mental
states correspond to particular brain states.

2. Support for dualist views:
Conversely, mind uploading lends support to dualist philosophies like
substance dualism or property dualism. These views hold that the mind is a
distinct substance or property from the physical body. If minds can exist
independently of biological brains/bodies in a digital substrate, it
implies that the mind is something separate and distinct from the physical
brain. Mind uploading suggests the mind could be a distinct entity or
property that is not reducible to the physical.

3. Questions of continuity and identity:
Mind uploading raises deep questions about the persistence of personal
identity and the self. Would an uploaded mind be a continuation of the
original person with an unbroken chain of psychological continuity? Or
would it merely be a copy or replica of the original person's mind? There's
a question of whether subjective experience would continue for the person
upon uploading, or if they would simply be creating a copy while their own
stream of consciousness ends.

4. The hard problem of consciousness:
Even if we can replicate the information processing of the brain, would an
uploaded mind have genuine subjective conscious experience? Or would it be
a "philosophical zombie" that behaves like a conscious being but lacks
inner experience? Mind uploading brings up the "hard problem" of
consciousness and the challenge of explaining subjective experience in
physical or functional terms. It's unclear if computational replication is
sufficient for replicating qualia and first-person inner life.

Some key open questions to ponder:
- Is the mind purely information processing that can be replicated in other
substrates? Or does the physical substrate and implementation matter?
- If a mind is uploaded, is that the same individual with continuity of
consciousness? Or is it a mere copy while the original person's experience
ends?
- Can multiple copies of the same mind be created, and would these be
distinct individuals or the same person?
- Is behavioral and functional replication of a mind enough, or is genuine
subjective experience also required for it to truly be a "mind"?

In conclusion, mind uploading is a fascinating thought experiment that
challenges traditional mind-body philosophies. It puts pressure on strict
materialism and lends some support to dualist intuitions. But it also
raises profound questions about identity, consciousness, and whether the
mind is tied to a specific physical substrate. Grappling with these
questions pushes us to refine our philosophical theories of mind. While we
don't have definite answers yet, the possibility of mind uploading
motivates us to think deeply about the nature of the mind and its relation
to the body and brain.
------------------------

Then, I asked about reversible mind-uploading -
If mind uploading becomes possible, could the process be reversible?

Claude -
The question of whether mind uploading could be a reversible process is a
fascinating one with significant implications for our understanding of the
mind-body relationship. Let's explore this idea further.

Reversibility of mind uploading would mean that a mind could be uploaded
from a biological brain into a digital substrate (like a computer), and
then later downloaded back into a biological brain. This would involve
mapping the structure and function of the brain, replicating it digitally,
and then using that digital information to reconstitute the mind in a
biological substrate.

Arguments for reversibility:

1. Information preservation: If the uploading process captures all the
relevant information about the structure and function of the brain, and
this information is preserved in the digital substrate, then in principle,
it should be possible to use that information to recreate the mind in a
biological brain.

2. Technological advancement: With sufficient technological progress in
areas like brain-computer interfaces, nanotechnology, and tissue
engineering, it might become feasible to create a new biological brain and
body that can receive the downloaded mind.

3. Substrate independence: If the mind is essentially a pattern of
information processing that can be realized in different substrates, then
there's no principled reason why it couldn't be moved back and forth
between digital and biological substrates.

Arguments against reversibility:

1. Complexity and resolution: The human brain is extremely complex, and
it's unclear if we could ever capture all the relevant information at a
sufficient resolution to enable a complete and faithful reconstruction of
the mind in a new biological substrate.

2. Continuity of consciousness: Even if we could recreate the mind in a new
biological brain, there are questions about whether this would preserve
continuity of consciousness and personal identity. Would the reconstructed
mind be the same individual or a new person with the same memories and
personality?

3. Embodiment and environmental factors: The mind is shaped by the specific
body and environment in which it is embedded. A mind that has been uploaded
and then downloaded into a new body might have a very different experience
of the world, which could affect its mental states and sense of self.

Open questions to ponder:
- If a mind is uploaded and then downloaded into a new biological brain,
would it have a continuous sense of self and a feeling of "waking up" in
the new body?
- How might the experience of disembodiment and re-embodiment in a new
physical form affect the mind's perception of itself and the world?
- If reversible mind uploading is possible, does that mean the essence of a
person is just information that can be copied and instantiated in different
substrates? What does this imply for our notions of identity and
individuality?

In conclusion, the reversibility of mind uploading is a thought-provoking
idea that challenges our intuitions about the relationship between mind,
body, and identity. While there are arguments for the theoretical
possibility of reversible uploading, there are also significant challenges
and open questions. Ultimately, the question of reversibility pushes us to
think deeply about the nature of the self, the role of embodiment in
shaping the mind, and the potential for technology to transform our
understanding of what it means to be human. Whether or not reversible mind
uploading ever becomes a reality, grappling with these questions can enrich
our philosophical thinking about the mind-body problem.
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