[ExI] [TIQ] Re: after upload, what?

Mon Mar 25 09:13:16 UTC 2024

Note the same is true of physicalism:

Hundreds of billions of neutrinos pass through your brain every second.
Consider then that your conscious state is independent of any particular
neutrino state of your brain.

The neutrino state is part of the physical state of your brain, yet your
consciousness is not affected by its neutrino state. Thus even in
physicalism, You have multiple different physical brain states which result
in the same conscious state. So again consciousness is independent of the
physical brain state.

Does this fact make physicalism a form of dualism?

Jason

On Sun, Mar 24, 2024, 6:09 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Oh, this is very interesting.
>
> Claud seems to be realizing what I've finally realized.  That
> functionalism isn't necessarily different from substance dualism, since
> according to functionalists, subjective experience is something
> separate and independent from any particular physical substrate.  The same
> as predicted by substance dualism.
>
> One of these days I'll have to have a discussion with Claud, and teach him
> about computational binding, which I predict would improve his reasoning
> about all these kinds of implications.
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 24, 2024 at 7:33 AM BillK via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 23 Mar 2024 at 19:58, Keith Henson via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> <snip>
>>>
>>
>>> It is my opinion and I wrote it into the story, that people should be
>>> able to move their minds to and from an uploaded state without even a
>>> break in consciousness.  Personally, I am not interested in uploading
>>> until it is bidirectional.
>>>
>>> Keith
>>> _______________________________________________
>>>
>>
>>
>> I asked Claude about reversible mind-uploading.
>>
>> First, I asked the basics -
>>  Assuming mind uploading becomes possible, how does this affect
>> mind-body philosophy?
>>
>> Claude -
>> The possibility of mind uploading has significant implications for
>> mind-body philosophy and challenges some traditional views while lending
>> support to others. Let's explore the key impacts:
>>
>> 1. Challenges to materialism and identity theory:
>> Mind uploading poses a direct challenge to strict materialist views like
>> identity theory, which hold that mental states are identical to physical
>> brain states. If minds can be uploaded and instantiated in different
>> physical substrates (like computers), it suggests that the mind is not
>> strictly identical to the brain. The same mind could be realized in
>> different physical systems, undermining the idea that particular mental
>> states correspond to particular brain states.
>>
>> 2. Support for dualist views:
>> Conversely, mind uploading lends support to dualist philosophies like
>> substance dualism or property dualism. These views hold that the mind is a
>> distinct substance or property from the physical body. If minds can exist
>> independently of biological brains/bodies in a digital substrate, it
>> implies that the mind is something separate and distinct from the physical
>> brain. Mind uploading suggests the mind could be a distinct entity or
>> property that is not reducible to the physical.
>>
>> 3. Questions of continuity and identity:
>> Mind uploading raises deep questions about the persistence of personal
>> identity and the self. Would an uploaded mind be a continuation of the
>> original person with an unbroken chain of psychological continuity? Or
>> would it merely be a copy or replica of the original person's mind? There's
>> a question of whether subjective experience would continue for the person
>> upon uploading, or if they would simply be creating a copy while their own
>> stream of consciousness ends.
>>
>> 4. The hard problem of consciousness:
>> Even if we can replicate the information processing of the brain, would
>> an uploaded mind have genuine subjective conscious experience? Or would it
>> be a "philosophical zombie" that behaves like a conscious being but lacks
>> inner experience? Mind uploading brings up the "hard problem" of
>> consciousness and the challenge of explaining subjective experience in
>> physical or functional terms. It's unclear if computational replication is
>> sufficient for replicating qualia and first-person inner life.
>>
>> Some key open questions to ponder:
>> - Is the mind purely information processing that can be replicated in
>> other substrates? Or does the physical substrate and implementation matter?
>> - If a mind is uploaded, is that the same individual with continuity of
>> consciousness? Or is it a mere copy while the original person's experience
>> ends?
>> - Can multiple copies of the same mind be created, and would these be
>> distinct individuals or the same person?
>> - Is behavioral and functional replication of a mind enough, or is
>> genuine subjective experience also required for it to truly be a "mind"?
>>
>> In conclusion, mind uploading is a fascinating thought experiment that
>> challenges traditional mind-body philosophies. It puts pressure on strict
>> materialism and lends some support to dualist intuitions. But it also
>> raises profound questions about identity, consciousness, and whether the
>> mind is tied to a specific physical substrate. Grappling with these
>> questions pushes us to refine our philosophical theories of mind. While we
>> don't have definite answers yet, the possibility of mind uploading
>> motivates us to think deeply about the nature of the mind and its relation
>> to the body and brain.
>> ------------------------
>>
>> Then, I asked about reversible mind-uploading -
>> If mind uploading becomes possible, could the process be reversible?
>>
>> Claude -
>> The question of whether mind uploading could be a reversible process is a
>> fascinating one with significant implications for our understanding of the
>> mind-body relationship. Let's explore this idea further.
>>
>> Reversibility of mind uploading would mean that a mind could be uploaded
>> from a biological brain into a digital substrate (like a computer), and
>> then later downloaded back into a biological brain. This would involve
>> mapping the structure and function of the brain, replicating it digitally,
>> and then using that digital information to reconstitute the mind in a
>> biological substrate.
>>
>> Arguments for reversibility:
>>
>> 1. Information preservation: If the uploading process captures all the
>> relevant information about the structure and function of the brain, and
>> this information is preserved in the digital substrate, then in principle,
>> it should be possible to use that information to recreate the mind in a
>> biological brain.
>>
>> 2. Technological advancement: With sufficient technological progress in
>> areas like brain-computer interfaces, nanotechnology, and tissue
>> engineering, it might become feasible to create a new biological brain and
>> body that can receive the downloaded mind.
>>
>> 3. Substrate independence: If the mind is essentially a pattern of
>> information processing that can be realized in different substrates, then
>> there's no principled reason why it couldn't be moved back and forth
>> between digital and biological substrates.
>>
>> Arguments against reversibility:
>>
>> 1. Complexity and resolution: The human brain is extremely complex, and
>> it's unclear if we could ever capture all the relevant information at a
>> sufficient resolution to enable a complete and faithful reconstruction of
>> the mind in a new biological substrate.
>>
>> 2. Continuity of consciousness: Even if we could recreate the mind in a
>> new biological brain, there are questions about whether this would preserve
>> continuity of consciousness and personal identity. Would the reconstructed
>> mind be the same individual or a new person with the same memories and
>> personality?
>>
>> 3. Embodiment and environmental factors: The mind is shaped by the
>> specific body and environment in which it is embedded. A mind that has been
>> uploaded and then downloaded into a new body might have a very different
>> experience of the world, which could affect its mental states and sense of
>> self.
>>
>> Open questions to ponder:
>> - If a mind is uploaded and then downloaded into a new biological brain,
>> would it have a continuous sense of self and a feeling of "waking up" in
>> the new body?
>> - How might the experience of disembodiment and re-embodiment in a new
>> physical form affect the mind's perception of itself and the world?
>> - If reversible mind uploading is possible, does that mean the essence of
>> a person is just information that can be copied and instantiated in
>> different substrates? What does this imply for our notions of identity and
>> individuality?
>>
>> In conclusion, the reversibility of mind uploading is a thought-provoking
>> idea that challenges our intuitions about the relationship between mind,
>> body, and identity. While there are arguments for the theoretical
>> possibility of reversible uploading, there are also significant challenges
>> and open questions. Ultimately, the question of reversibility pushes us to
>> think deeply about the nature of the self, the role of embodiment in
>> shaping the mind, and the potential for technology to transform our
>> understanding of what it means to be human. Whether or not reversible mind
>> uploading ever becomes a reality, grappling with these questions can enrich
>> our philosophical thinking about the mind-body problem.
>> --------------------------
>> _______________________________________________
>> extropy-chat mailing list
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
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