[ExI] Time and Personal Identity

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Apr 9, 2025, 9:59 AM Keith Henson <hkeithhenson at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Apr 9, 2025 at 12:48 AM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
> snip
>
> > The answer to these questions depends on which theory of personal
> identity is correct.
> >
> > So it isn't an idle question without consequences. Rather, the answer
> concerns what is for many people, quite important: continuing to exist in
> the world.
>
> At the practical level, all these alternatives pulse some you did not
> mention should be compared to the alternative of oblivion.


Exactly. The question is: do you experience life again as these new
incarnations of yourself, or do you experience nothing (i.e., oblivion).

Or, to reverse the question, what is required to ensure you don't face
oblivion? Is some form of continuity required, and if so what forms of
continuity? Must there be material continuity, or is causal continuity
sufficient? Or is continuity not needed at all, so long as the result is
the same: a extent being that is like you?

Then if a being like you is enough, how exact must it be? You're not
exactly the same as you were two weeks ago, is similarity within this
two-week window sufficient? How many memories can be dropped or lost in the
process before you cease to survive at all (and are back to oblivion)? Or
might all memories be lost, and you could still survive (as your amnesiac
clone)?


Jason
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