[ExI] Fwd: A science-religious experience

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Mar 6, 2025 at 11:22 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> On Mon, 3 Mar 2025, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> >       True. But if we have a material world, with empirical feedback
> loops and the
> >       method of science, that is not a problem. Over time people will
> tend to
> >       converge. If we do not have feedback loops and empirical proof,
> then imagination
> >       can run wild, leaving us with competing theories that are debated
> for 1000s of
> >       years. ;)
> >
> > I'm no fan of that either. But I am of the opinion that we're now in a
> > position to settle questions that have plagued us for millenium.
>
> Maybe. Time will tell, and I hope you are right. =)
>
> > Consider for example, Darwin solved the ancient problem of whether the
> egg or
> > chicken came first. Einstein's relativity gave an answer to Parmenides
> > eternalism, and his Brownian motion proved Democritus's theory of atoms.
> > Turing's invention of the computer (Disproved Descartes and his
> millenium old
> > idea that an extraphysical soul was required for intelligent
> conversation). So
> > there have been great strides in ancient philosophical problems. I think
> > other, more recent discoveries of the past few decades can also answer
> > fundamental problems in ontology and in philosophy of mind.
> >
> > All this is to say I share your distates for eternal squabblings
> unrooted in
> > what we can conclusively demonstrate or otherwise prove (rationally
> and/or
> > empirically)
>
> Agreed.
>
> >       I think part of the success, is that we have a shared, material
> world. But
> >       languages straddles it, and our subjective minds, and that is why
> it also can
> >       lead us astray.
> >
> > I very much agree with this (that a shared world is so big a part of our
> > successful communication). I wonder too though, how much of having a
> shared
> > world is also experiential. Dolphins and humans inhabit the same physical
> > world, but perhaps a very different mental one. Perhaps their
> echolocation
> > qualia are completely unlike our visual qualia. How much of an impediment
> > might this be for communication?
>
> Interesting question! I would imagine that with the recent AI analysis of
> the
> languages of animals, we might be able to make some progress here perhaps?
>

We can hope. I find that topic quite fascinating. Imagine being able to
converse with a whale.


>
> >       We must also be mindful of that 1. we might not know what is the
> simplest
> >       solution.
> >
> > We may not ever "know", but there are frameworks for comparing relative
> > complexity of theories in completely objective ways. For example:
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
>
> True, but this might lead us astray if we do not know enough about the
> problem,
> and second, it might not be possible to use this methodology today in a
> reliable
> way. This is, however, beyond me.
>
> >       And 2. there is no provable law that says that simplest is always
> >       right.
> >
> > Nothing in science is provable, but there are theories that propose why
> with
> > overwhelming probability, observers should find themselves to exist in
> > universes with simple laws. And moreover, these theories make other
> testable
> > predictions (which so far are confirmed).
>
> Depends on your truth criterion and definition of "proof".
>
> > I know your time is limited and precious, but if you do have time,
> please read
> > (just the abstract) of this article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.01826
>
> This is beyond me. Could you please expand a bit on what empirical proofs
> have
> been found for this? It seems the theory assumes some kind of
> mathematical/idealist universe, which would be a weakness since we have no
> empirical proof of this.
>

It makes 2 assumptions:
A. That observations are generated algorithmically.
B. The distribution of algorithms is in accordance with principles of
algorithmic information theory.

>From this assumption it makes at least 6 predictions (theres are just ones
mentioned early on in the abstract or introduction):

1. Observers will find themselves to exist in environments with stable laws
(i.e. universes)
2. Those laws will be computable
3. Those laws will be simple
4. The laws will only be able to make probabilistic predictions
5. Universes will have a property of time
6. Universes will have a point in time they cannot meaningfully predict
prior time states for (a beginning)

When we perform empirical observations, we confirm all of these
predictions, when we examine the properties of the universe. That is, we
have empirical verification of the 6 predictions that follow from the 2
original assumptions (A and B).

So just as we accept general relativity as a tested theory when we
confirmed its predictions of the bending of light and the existence of
gravitational waves, we should accept this theory (that observations are
algorithmically generated in accordance with AIT), as an empirically tested
theory.



>
> > Why do we believe a theory like relativity is true? Because it makes
>
> Empirical, repeatable experiemnts.
>

In the case of GR, we are repeating observations of the same thing: every
time LIGO goes off, we repeat another observation of gravity waves and
re-confirm GR's prediction of their existence.
In the case of AIT, we repeat observations of the probabilistic nature of
laws any time we shine a photon at a semi-silvered mirror and find it
reflects or transmits in a manner that is unpredictable, and re-confirm
AIT's prediction of probabilistic laws.


>
> > The problem, it seems to me, is not that the ultimate theory of
> everything is
> > too complicated, it is that it is so simple it slipped under everyone's
> nodes.
> > The theory of everything is (in my view) little beyond the theory of
> > arithmetic.
>
> That does give arithmetically challenged peple like me hope! =)
>

��


>
> >       I reject the simulation hypothesis because it can never be proven
> (as per our
> >       discussion) by empirical and verifiable proof or experiments. It
> is just
> >       speculation, and since we can never know, I refrain from discuss
> it. Present
> >       empirical proof, and I will revisit it.
> >
> > By that reasoning you should reject all of science, because nothing can
> ever
> > be proven, we can only gain evidence that increases or decreases our
> > probability estimates for some idea being true or not. And that is all
> the
> > simulation argument does, provide a framework for consistently updating
> one's
> > probability assessment for the hypothesis that we're presently in a
> > simulation.
>
> I disagree. The fact that simulation is outside this reality, means that by
> definition it is forever beyond us and can never be empirically verified,
> it is
> thus, meaningless.
>
> I also think science has been doing very well with discovering and proving
> things. Based on a pragmatic idea of truth, as well as its prediction
> making
> abilities, I'm perfectly comfortable to say that the world is "proven" and
> that
> simulations, deities etc. will never be proven, and are, from an existence
> point of
> view, nonsense.
>

We have reached an impasse on this, which I believe is due to our different
degrees of willingness to rely on deduction.


>
> >       I do acknowledge the value as exercises in creativity,
> inspiration, poetry and
> >       so on. I also acknowledge value from a pragmatic point of view,
> where people
> >       need god in order to feel happy, or to lead a good and law abiding
> life. I might
> >       find it a bit sad though, but I do see a pragmatic point.
> >
> > The (pragmatic) point of having a mind/brain is to predict probable
> future
> > experiences according to different courses of action. If we fail to
> > incorporate the probability of waking up from a simulation as a possible
> > future experience after death in this universe, you can say it is of no
> > pragmatic difference to anyone left inside the simulation, but not that
> it is
> > of no pragmatic difference to your future experiences.
>
> I disagree. Since I have no evidence or indication that people have woken
> up,
> and since the simulation is beyond anything we, by design, can never know,
> it is
> irrelevant to me.


But my point was that it is something you could turn out to discover
(eventually).


> In fact, believing that it is relevant, or that gods, unicorns
> and other metaphysical realms or beings "could be" real might very well
> have
> negative pragmatic value, so yet another reason why I think they should be
> considered null and void.
>
> However!
>
> And this is the great thing... should god reach out and uplift me, I will
> revise
> my position.
>

You could do that now (by running a calculation/estimate) if you were so
interested.



>
> > Basically every cosmologist who has attempted to answer this question
> comes to
> > the conclusion that it can't be a coincidence. No one knows if it is
> right
> > with certainty, but they're about as sure as it is possible to get as
> far as
> > any scientific theory is concerned.
>
> As far as I am concerned, only theory and no proof has been presented and
> most
> likely will never be presented. Once it does... I'll revise my position.
>

The proof is the empirical evidence that has been gathered which refutes
the hypothesis of "A" (a single universe, not designed).

What that leaves, is up to you to decide, but that is what the empirical
evidence tells us: "not A."


>
> >       What we know is that the constants have the values
> >       they have. _Why_ they have these values, we do not know, we might
> never know,
> >       and speculation is pointless from a pragmatic and scientific point
> of view and
> >       risks leading us astray.
> >
> >       >       "The fine tunings, how fine-tuned are they? Most of them
> are 1% sort of things. In other words, if things are 1%
> >       >       different, everything gets bad. And the physicist could
> say maybe those are just luck. On the other hand, this
> >       >       cosmological constant is tuned to one part in 10^120 — a
> hundred and twenty decimal places. Nobody thinks that’s
> >       >       accidental. That is not a reasonable idea — that something
> is tuned to 120 decimal places just by accident.
> >       That’s the
> >       >       most extreme example of fine-tuning."
> >       > -- Leonard Susskind in “What We Still Don’t Know: Are We Real?”
> (2004)
> >       >
> >       > If you want a scientific answer for this fine-tuning that does
> not presume
> >       > creationism, then the only other answer is a multiverse.
> >
> >       Or the acceptance that we do not know.
>

We know "not A".

We don't know if it is B or C, but we know for sure (as sure as we can be
about anything) that it can't be A.


>
> > We do know it has to be one of these three. Consider that regardless of
> > whether you know what proposition "A" stands for, you should conclude, on
> > logic alone, that the sentence "A or not A" is true. For example, it is
> true
> > that today over your house, it will either rain or not rain. I know this
> is
> > true, despite knowing nothing about your local weather.
>
> True... but this is an event in the physical world, that can be empirically
> proven.
>

That's irrelevant, in my view. We can know that no one has ever seen a
married bachelor anywhere in any possible universe, using logic alone. Note
that this is true whether we are in a position to observe them or not, we
can still be confident in that conclusion. A blind person could, for
example, reach this conclusion, despite not being able to see anything (and
hence, reasons from the standpoint of having no personally accessible
empirical evidence).


>
> I can say, "A or not A" where A equals a pink, multi-dimensional unicorn,
> that
> can never be perceived in any way or proven in any way.
>
> Since this is by definition outside of our reality, and will forever be
> so, A or
> not A in that case is nonsensical.
>

It's still logically true. What the sentence means is:

"A pink multi-dimensional unicorn exists, or A pink multi-dimensional
unicorn does not exist."

Clearly, one of those two sub-propositions is true, and because they are
connected with an "OR" this means the sentence overall is true (everywhere,
everywhen, in every possible universe).

Note that if we used an "AND" rather than an "OR" then the sentence would
be universally false, since we know one of the two sub-propositions is
false.


>
> > Along the same vein, any time you have multiple propositions that are
> > exhaustive (they cover all possibilities) and mutually exclusive (no two
> can
> > both be true), then even without telling you what those propositions are,
> > because they are exhaustive, you know at least one of them must be true,
> and
> > further, because they are mutually exclusive, the probabilities all add
> to
> > 100%, and you can add probabilities of independent propositions to get
> the
> > combined probability.
> >
> > In the case here, the propositions are:
> > A: There is only one universe and it was not designed to support life
> (coincidence)
> > B: There is only one universe and it was designed to support life
> (creationism)
> > C: There is not one universe. (multiverse)
> >
> > There is no room for any 4th possible option here, these 3 cover all
> > possibilities and so we know, without having to do any experiment, that
> at
> > least one of these is true.
> >
> > Given the overwhelming observational evidence against proposition A, we
> can
> > assign it a very low probability. Let's say we assign it less than 1%
> > probability. This means that the probability of (B or C) is greater than
> 99%.
>
> This goes back to reality. Let's back up a bit here and look at what we can
> empirically verify and let's unpack the premisses a bit. What can we
> observe and
> empirically verify?


We have empirically verified the improbable nature of all the dimensionless
constants having the values they happen to have. Take these images for
example:

https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tegmark-spacetime-dimensionality.png
https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tegmark-strong-force-coupling-constant.png
https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/barnes-particle-masses-forces-chemistry-1024x771.png
https://cdn.alwaysasking.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tegmark-matter-density-q-1024x966.png

"It is logically possible that parameters determined uniquely by abstract
theoretical principles just happen to exhibit all the apparent fine-tunings
required to produce, by a lucky coincidence, a universe containing complex
structures. But that, I think, really strains credulity."
-- Nobel laureate physicist Frank Wilczek
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Wilczek> in “Physics Today
<https://ctpweb.lns.mit.edu/physics_today/phystoday/Abs_limits400.pdf>”
(2006)

Would you agree that Frank Wilczek is talking about things we have
empircally measured, when he talks about all the parameters that have
apparently been finely-tuned? (i.e., that he isn't talking about abstract,
theoretical things here).



> That one universe exists. I think this is a very
> uncontroversial statement and true in every common meaning of the word
> true.
>

I am not sure what you mean here. If you are rerring to my phrasing "there
is not one universe", I mean "the number of universes = 1" is not true. Of
course, there is at least 1 universe, so we know the number is not 0, or
negative. So we should take, on the basis of our observational evidence of
at least one univer, that if the number of universes is not equal to 1, and
given that it is not 0 or negative, this means that there are multiple
universes. i.e., "number of universes > 1"


>
> When it comes to if it was designed or not, we can never know, since that
> lies
> outside the scope of our empirical world, likewise C. Therefore, I do not
> agree
> to A, B and C, and therefore I cannot agree with your entire logical
> reasoning
> here.
>

Not agreeing with B or C isn't a matter of debate. If A is false, then
either B or C must be true.

Again we can reach this conclusion by way of pure logic, without the need
of any empirical observation.

We only introduced empirical observations to rule out A, which is why we
are now in the present situation of: either B or C.


>
> >       > We have 3:
> >       > Coincidence
> >       > Creationism
> >       > Multiverse
> >       >
> >       > I have seen no scientific theory, proposal, or hypothesis to
> explain
> >       > fine-tuning aside from these 3.
> >
> >       Ok.
> >
> > We don't have to pursue this any further, but I think it is the strongest
> > evidence we have for a multiverse.
>
> I think you are right in that we probably have reached an impasse. Let's
> put it
> to rest.
>

I think there were points of unclarity which I hope I have resolved with my
further clarification. If my point is still unclear, I am happy to explain
further.


>
> > If you have to doubt math to keep to your hypothesis, then I agree we
> can go
> > no further on this topic.
>
> I don't doubt math. It is a good tool we can use to make predictions. Math
> without any prediction, or used in a way that changes nothing in the
> world, would
> be quite useless.
>

We can debate or question its utility, but we shouldn't question its
reliability/validity.


>
> >       Philosophy can yield personal, subjective truth, it can help
> clarify concepts,
> >       highlight the reasons for our ideas or the implications of them.
> It is another
> >       tool. But when it comes to our world, empirical proof is the only
> way.
> >
> > I think we may have found another fundamental point of disagreement here
> > (regarding the utility of rationality).
> >
> > I think this passage (written by Arnold Zuboff) is relevant to
> explaining the
> > role of empiricism and "a priori" (rational) reasoning, and why both are
> > important and necessary:
>
> I do not deny the value of reasoning, but I've explained earlier in the
> thread
> my position on thought experiments, discussions and empirical proof.
>

Okay.


>
> > You can say, I don't know enough to have an opinion on this, and
> truthfully, I
> > don't either, but this was a prediction made by inflation, one later
> confirmed
> > by observation. So assuming what I and these other scientists say is
> true on
> > this, should you not (if you had the time to research, understand, and
> accept
> > this evidence) reach a similar conclusion regarding the reality of the
> > inflationary cosmos beyond what we can see?
>
> I don't think it needs me to commit to things that lie beyond what we can
> see.
> There is an observable effect, and I'm quite content with observable
> effects.
>

But isn't the point of science to use observations to build and refine our
theories?


>
> >       It is important to realize the questions we can answer, and the
> questions we can
> >       never answer. If not, we risk wasting a lot of time.
> >
> > I agree. I don't waste time on questions I don't think we can answer. I
> think
> > you and I just differ on what questions we believe can be answered.
>
> Yes, I think you are correct here. I have a much narrower "universe" than
> you
> have, since I am not happy about inference, and rooted in observability,
> effects
> in the world and predictions.
>
> What we do have in common though, is updating our ideas in the light of new
> evidence, even though our standard and strictness there differs.
>

I am glad we settled on the root of our disagreement here.


>
> >       >       I disgaree. See above. There are alternative QM theories
> as well.
> >       >
> >       > I wouldn't call the alternatives theories. They're only
> conjectures, and
> >       > incomplete ones at that (they give no mathematically describable
> account of
> >       > when, or how, or why collapse happens), nor can they explain
> quantum computers
> >       > or Wigner's friend coherently.
> >
> >       Let's see if they will be refined in the future. =) Withholding
> judgement is a
> >       valid approach.
> >
> > Max Tegmark on Everett vs. Copenhagen: "The former is a mathematical
> theory,
> > the latter is not. The former says simply that the Schrödinger equation
> always
> > applies. The latter says that it only applies sometimes, but doesn't
> given an
> > equation specifying when it doesn't apply (when the so-called collapse is
> > supposed to happen). If someone were to come up with such an equation,
> then
> > the two theories would be mathematically different and you might hope to
> make
> > an experiment to test which one is right.”
> >
> > They've had about 100 years to formalize the collapse hypothesis into a
> > mathematical theory. We're still waiting.
>
> Maybe it takes longer and longer, the further science progresses?
>

I think there is some element of that, in the sense that our current
theories are so good, that the range of where theories give different
predictions requires such extremes of energy, or density, etc. that
progress is difficult to come by.

But I don't think that is what is the issue with Copenhagen. I think
Copenhangen was just a poorly conceived idea that never had any hope of
being a valid theory, and the entire motivation for assuming it in the
first place was shown to be in error by Everett. (He was able to explain
collapse as a subjective illusion, without having to assume it as some real
objective phenomenon (as Copenhagen does)). So what Copehagen set out to
explain, in fact, didn't need to be explained, as it can be fully derived
from the existing basic postulates of QM. So at this point, as a theory it
is kind of "dead on arrival" -- it died before it even was attempted to be
mathematically formalized.


>
> > Do you want an answer to the question of whether there are multiple
> universes
> > or not, or do you not care, or not want to know? If you don't care or
> don't
> > want to know, I will stop pursuing this topic.
>
> This is actually a very interesting question. I don't see how I could ever
> get
> that answer, without some way which would link the two universes together.
> If I
> could get an answer to that question, that would mean that somehow
> information
> would be able to flow between the two world, and that would "bring it"
> into my
> physical world, and I would very much like an answer to this question.
>

Very interesting.


>
> My current opinion on it is that since it would not as far as I can see,
> make
> any difference to my life, I think there are other questions that are more
> interesting to pursue.
>
> So it's at the moment hovering around "don't care" _but_ it depends on if a
> "link" is discovered which brings in into this world so to speak.
>

Okay. For what it's worth, I see one's consciousness (and its possible
paths of continuation) as being a plausible link between different
universes.
It is not then that some other universe can be brought into ours, but
rather that you (your consciousness) can be brought into other universes.
So to me, it is not entirely idle speculation.

And for those seeking scientific answers to questions of fine-tuning, the
origin of the big bang, or the workings of quantum computers, then other
universes must be invoked as elements of those explanations.


>
> So I guess a "flat out" don't care it not entirely correct.
>

That's good!


> > [snip] If I summarize our disagreement here, I see the solipsist as the
> odd
> > man out, and eternal doubter/agnostic together. The way you see it is
> that
> > solipsist/eternal doubter are together, and the agnostic is the odd man
> out.
>
> Yes, I think that makes sense.
>
> >       > But then I could say, if the fish might develop legs, humanity
> might
> >       > develop hyperdrives and escape to other unseen parts of the
> universe
> >       > beyond the horizon. By this reasoning, those parts of the
> universe are
> >       > real and scientific.
> >
> >       As I say... if we do, if evidence is presented, I'll revise my
> position.
> >
> > It seems you want to have it both ways though:
>
> Isn't that the human condition? ;)
>
> > You want the fish (before it develops legs and escapes the pond) to be a
> > scientist when he talks of his theory-based conclusion of a larger world
> > outside his pond which he has never seen. You want humans (before it
> develops
> > hyper drive and escapes the observable universe) to be philosophers
> debating
> > pointlessly when we talk about our theory-based conclusions for a larger
> > reality beyond the observable universe which we have never seen.
> >
> > So I am not asking for a revisioned position, but if you had to be
> consistent,
> > would you say the fish in my example was doing philosophy, or would you
> say
> > that the humans (before hyper drives) are doing science?
>
> Science developed out of philosophy, so I could see how that would apply
> to the
> though experiment. The key is revising ones position in light of new
> evidence.
>

On that point we agree.


>
> > Until electron microscopes let us see them, evidence of atoms came
> indirectly,
> > by way of statistical arguments worked out by Einstein.
>
> Now we can! So I think that is an excellent example of focusing on making
> predictions and empirical proof, and eventually time and progress will
> bring
> more and more of reality into our domain of knowledge and focus. Note that
> atoms
> are "things" in our world, unlike god or parallel universes.
>
> > It is like that with multiple universes, the evidence is indirect, or
> > statistical.
>
> This is old ground.
>

Yes (but I think my point was new, we relied on statistical arguments for
other things we couldn't (at the time) directly see: atoms). And those
arguments were accepted by the broader scientific community.


>
> >       Agree! =) I think last time we had a nice mega-thread going on, we
> also ended up
> >       on different sides of one fundamental philosophical position. I
> find it
> >       fascinating how mental worlds unfold from these different
> positions about these
> >       fundamental questions!
> >
> > Indeed! I wonder how much of someone's mentality could be worked out from
> > their answers to just a few core questions. What might those questions
> be?
>
> This is a very interesting question! I also wonder if this could be
> applied to
> ones politics. If ones politics can be worked out from some small amount of
> traits or core values?
>

Now that you mention it, there was something I read or heard a long time
ago about a professor (I think of psychology) who worked out the set of
metaphysical questions that he thought could reliably predict someone's
political leanings.
Unfortunately I do not recall enough of that reference to find it.
*Maybe* this is it? It is just something that came up when I did some
casual searches, but I haven't read the paper to confirm it:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406455


>
> >       > This becomes
> >       > clearer when you view our universe according to the "block time"
> eternalist
> >       > view, seeing it as one coherent, unchanging structure. It is a
> mathematical
> >       > object, not unlike the unit circle or the Mandelbrot set.
> >
> >       So you don't think the concept of 3 would be destroyed if all
> conscious minds in
> >       the universe were destroyed? Where would 3 exist in that case?
> >
> > Thoughts about 3 would be destroyed, but 3 itself would remain.
>
> Another fundamental difference! Well, nothing knew, we've already
> identified
> this difference. =)
>

Wonderful. We should make a list. :-)


>
> > Note that 3 possesses an infinite number of properties, only an
> > infinitesimal fraction of those properties have been considered by human
> > minds, yet they remain out there, waiting to be discovered. So did we
> really
> > invent 3, when it has so many innumerable properties that humans will
> never
> > consider?
>
> I disagree.


How many integer factors does 0 have?


> Math is a language, a process in the brain and does not have an
> external reality or platonic universe. I have never seen any empirical
> evidence
> for this. ;)
>

If we assume a physical universe, we can't explain the existence of
mathematical objects. If they exist at all, they have to be added as a
further assumption.

If instead we assume mathematical objects, then the physical universe falls
out automatically as a consequence of the existence of mathematical
objects. No further assumptions are required.

Which then, is the simpler theory?


>
> > As Tegmark says: "Mathematical structures are eternal and unchanging:
> they
> > don’t exist in space and time—rather, space and time exist in (some of)
> them.
> > If cosmic history were a movie, then the mathematical structure would be
> the
> > entire DVD." -- Max Tegmark in “Our Mathematical Universe” (2014)
>
> I think you know my answer. ;) I will not pursue this further, because I
> would
> repeat myself.
>



>
> >       Or as the ancient joke goes... what is the difference between the
> mathematicians
> >       office and the philosophers office? The philosophers office does
> not have a
> >       garbage bin. ;)
> >
> > LOL that's a good one. Why is it that these jokes always seem to favor
> the
> > mathematicians? Don't they have better things to do than work out jokes
> to
> > disparage the other departments? ;-)
>
> Haha... true. On the other hand... did any philosophers ever change the
> world? ;)
>

I think if you reframe your question as "Did any *idea* ever change the
world?" the answer is made clearer.


>
> >       True. A very fascinating thought! Makes one think that there's
> nothing new under
> >       the sun. Makes one wonder what the old brahmins might have come up
> with if they
> >       had access to a mailinglist like this? Or would there have been
> trolling and
> >       flame wars that would have prevented them from working? ;)
> >
> > I think that might be why Hinduism contains so many great truths, that
> it was
> > alive with new writers, thinking, debate, etc., and for whatever reason
> it
> > didn't get locked into a single book, but kept growing.
>
> Yes, perhaps.
>


>
> >       When do you think QC will have it's "wow" moment, that puts all
> the current
> >       press releases to shame?
> >
> > It's had a few so far:
> > - First working quantum computer
> > - First execution of Shor's algorithm to factor a number
> > - Quantum supremacy
>
> The reason I asked is that it is my impression that some people think
> there has
> been no "wow" moment and that it is a marketing fraud. I cannot judge, but
> I am
> intrigued by this difference of opinion among very smart men.
>

The people who say they haven't been wowed yet are waiting for a practical
application (which I have reasons to doubt will ever come).

The source of the wow, for me, lies in the implications stemming from the
fact that they work at all (wow, this means there's a ton of other
universes out there!)


>
> >       > So even pure thought experiments can be quite useful in
> advancing science, at
> >       > least, their utility shouldn't be entirely disregarded.
> >
> >       Oh yes... I'm sorry if I gave the impression of thought
> experiments being
> >       useless. You are right of course, thought experiments can be very
> valuable
> >       tools!
> >
> > No worries, I am glad we agree on this!
>
> Agreed! =)
>



>
> > I only raise it as an example where you are comfortable settling on a
> > conclusion by way of theory, despite lack of any empirical evidence.
>
> Hm, I think I responded out of turn elsewhere. Will leave this.
>


>
> > I mean even empirically, speaking, I find proof too strong a word in
> science.
> > I think evidence is better. Proof, to me, implies certainty. Though I
> > understand you use it in less strict a manner.
>
> Ah yes. This is very good. I will try to remember to speak of evidence and
> not
> proof. Good that we cleared that up. =)
>

:-)


>
> >       > All those people I cite believe in a material world. They just
> disagree on the
> >       > material world necessarily being the most fundamental aspect of
> reality.
> >
> >       Well, let me add a very important point here. I do not know what
> the fundamental
> >       aspect of reality is. The investigation is currently on going!
> >
> > I am glad to see this. :-) I agree.
>
> I came up with another philosophy buzz word a year ago
> (pareto-utilitarianism is
> a new one I launched! ;) ) when we discussed this and I think it was
> agnostic
> monism. Does that ring a bell?
>

It took me a while, but I remember it now.


>
> If I remember correctly the idea was that what we have is "reality" loosely
> defined as what we meet every day when we live. We explore it further and
> further, at ever increasing levels of details, until we reach a horizon
> beyond
> which we (currently) cannot see. The idea was that ultimately and finally,
> we
> have no idea about the subtrate... be it strings, fnords, ideas, etc. and
> hence
> from a certain point of view, it doesn't really matter if its ideas,
> atoms, hard
> matter, soft matter energy.
>
> The idea is that regardless of this, there is one fundamental substrate.
>
> I think, but this was a year ago or more, was the underlying idea behind
> agnostic monism.
>

It reminds me a bit of Russell's "neutral monism" -- he made no claims as
to the nature of this neutral stuff, but he postulated its existence.


>
> >       Ok. As always, it was a pleasure to discuss!
> >
> > Yes I have enjoyed this discussion immensely.
>
> Good to hear! =)
>
> > This field might interest you (Axiology/Value Theory):
> > https://www.britannica.com/topic/axiology
> > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_theory
>
> Ahh... I am no stranger to those pages. You are right... I am interested!
>

It comes as no surprise to me, given your depth of discussion on these
topics, that you had seen these before. :-)


>
> >       > My only frustration is that when I do present empirical
> evidence, you don't
> >       > seem to update your "priors" accordingly (as a true Bayesian
> would).
> >
> >       Oh this can be due to several reasons. I might find the evidence
> not
> >       satisfactory. I might not understand the evidence. It might be a
> question of
> >       time, that is... I might think it over, reject it, encounter it
> again, think it
> >       over, I might see a point, and finally accept it.
> >
> > Thanks. I appreciate that insight to your thought process.
>
> You're welcome. I apologize for my human stubborn side. ;)
>

Me too, as I am sure it seems to others that I can be. :-)


>
> >       "Sometimes it's hard to be agnostic..."
> >
> > LOL
>
> I think Dolly is a christian, I doubt she would ever record this one for
> me. ;)
>

I think it's only a matter of raising enough money. :-)

In any case, with AI voice cloning, it is now easy enough to create for
your own private appreciation.


>
> >       No, more that Occam himself might lead us astray when it comes to
> choosing
> >       between options, we if don't really know what we are choosing
> between.
> >
> > This is where I would turn to something like Kolmogorov complexity, to
> make it
> > rigorous and objective.
>
> Is that an established wya of comparing theories? Is it clear cut and
> achievable?
>

Well it is recognized, but unfortunately, it is of limited practical
utility, since finding the shortest program that generates a particular
output is a computationally intractable problem.

For example, to find the shortest program that outputs the 20 bit string
"1001100110100011" (assuming there is one shorter than 20 bits) would
require running 2^20 programs to their completion. 2^20 is itself not an
insurmountable number for computers (roughly a million) but what is
insurmountable is the fact that some of those millions of programs may
never stop running. And (as Turing proved with his Halting problem) there
is no way to determine whether those programs that seem to run on forever,
may eventually (some day) finish, and may possibly output that string we
were looking for.

But despite these limitations, it is seen as an important result, for
example it defines a bound in the field like data compression. One could do
no better for compression, than finding the shortest program that generates
the compressed information as its output.

And even when we cannot prove a shortest program, if we have two theories,
and we want to gauge their relative complexity, we can try to express the
theories programmatically as efficiently as possible, and that would
provide a rough comparison of the overall relative complexity of the two
theories. The only complication is we might later discover there is in
fact, an even shorter way of writing a program that represents one of those
theories, and so that could cause us to change our opinion as to which one
is simpler.



>
> > Things get a lot easier when one dispenses with the either or mentality.
> It
> > doesn't have to be one or the other. In an infinite reality, we each have
> > infinite explanations. So it is not one or the other, either, or, or
> both, it
> > is all.
>
> In an infinite universe, with infinite options, how do you think that
> affects
> your ethics, and punishment? Don't you think you could act and do what
> ever you
> want, since on the whole, it won't really matter, since all options are
> valid
> and existing everywhere?
>

On the contrary, I think under this view, one's decisions take on vastly
more weight. This follows because any action you choose will affect vast
untold numbers of future versions of yourself, and others, across the
multiverse.

There is an ancient saying that comes to mind, which I think expresses this
view that follows from conceiving oneself as living in such a multiverse:

"Whoever destroys a single soul, destroys an entire world; whoever saves a
single soul, saves an entire world."
-- Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5


>
> >       > Even if it is perfect, it is possible to break out if someone on
> the outside
> >       > is watching, assuming we do something interesting enough for
> them to want to
> >       > intervene or break us out. :-)
> >       >
> >       > Many stories begin with an air-gapped AI convincing someone on
> the outside to
> >       > let it out.
> >
> >       True. Let me know if someone reaches out! That would really shake
> my agnostic
> >       mind! =)
> >
> > They could abduct a copy of you or me into their realm, and interview
> that
> > one, without having to disturb the course of this simulation.
>
> Spoiling all the fun!
>

Heh.


>
> > Perhaps every day we pause the simulation of this world, go out, stretch
> or
> > legs, run some errands, then jump back in just where it left off when it
> > paused. None of us inside need remember having taken a break, just as we
> don't
> > remember anything of our real life on the outside. (I guess it would be
> like
> > being severed).
>
> True!
>
> >       Maybe even simpler... certainty of some kind of computations, that
> takes place
> >       in some kind of substrate? That would hold true regardless of if
> you are a
> >       simulated person in the mind of an AI. It would still be a
> computation in some
> >       kind of substrate (and I'm not talking crass, material substrates
> here).
> >
> > That is assuming functionalism or computationalism, as a true theory of
> consciousness. But accepting that, I agree that would a
> > conclusion you can draw.
>



> >
> >       > Though some have taken Descartes's dictum further to say one
> knows only "this
> >       > thought exists" and it is a further supposition to assume there
> is an "I" or a
> >       > "thinker" beyond that thought.
> >
> >       Well, for both of those to be possible, there needs to be some
> form of
> >       computation done "in" something.
> >
> > "Even if everything in this universe were an illusion, there would still
> have
> > to be something outside this universe that generates the illusion."
> -- John A.
> > Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn in “The Mystery of Existence” (2013)
>
> Ahh... better way of phrasing it.
>

Your way was fine! I just thought you would appreciate seeing others who
agree with you. :-)
And note that I agree with your/their logic here too.


>
> > If one believes in epiphenomenalism, then the people you see and argue
> with
> > need not be conscious (they could be zombies, or other non-conscious
> > sub-elements of your own imagination).
>
> But I think it goes deeper than that. If you believe the others are just
> your
> own imagination, why would you feel a need to argue the point with them?
> Since
> they are you, you have already won the argument. You would just be shadow
> boxing.
>

Well, need doesn't necessarily come into it.

One can dream about being chased by a monster in one's dream, which is
itself a figment of their imagination.
You could ask why fight with monsters in your dream? But the dreams are not
necessarily in your control, and the same could be said of the experiences
of the solipsist.


>
> >       Sounds good.
> >
> > I look forward this one a lot. :-) I hope we can get somewhere.
>
> Let's see! =)
>
> > I greatly appreciate your response here. None of us is ever fully
> consistent
> > and it is only in testing our ideas to the limit and trying to break
> them that
> > we can, as you say, get a little closer to truth. ;-)
>
> True! =)
>


>
>
> > That is only the assumption. To prove it (empirically) we need to
> examine what
> > predictions follow from that assumption, then compare it against what we
> > observe in the real world.
> >
> > If (and its a big IF) there is a correspondence, and no prediction is
> refuted,
> > we can build confidence in the truth of that assumption. Please see the
> > sub-sections of that section to see what predictions follow, and how we
> have
> > (so far) found empirical verification.
>
> Got it. Thank you for the explanation.
>

��


>
>
> >
> > (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a
> > “posthuman” stage;
> >
> > as well as:
> >
> > (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant
> > number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations
> thereof);
> >   Then following the reasoning in the argument, (short of finding a flaw
> in
> > it), you should revise your probability estimate for yourself being
> within a
> > simulation.
>
> But I don't see how I could calculate and verify the calculation about a
> simulation from within a simulation. But to back up a bit to an example
> from our
> world... let's say I lived before human flight... and I saw a kite, I would
> think it more likely that humans will fly, than before I ever knew kites
> existed.
>

I could see someone revising their assumed probability of 1% up to say 10%.

Likewise, if someone thought simulated consciousness was impossible (maybe
they subscribed to Searle's biological naturalism, or panpsychism) but then
saw evidence that certain materials were not needed, that the uploaded
brains worked the same regardless of the hardware of the computer on which
they were run, then that person could, upon seeing functional uploads who
claimed to be conscious and acted as if they were conscious, update their
assumed probability from 1% to 10%.

(Note these are just example probabilities) if you wanted harder figures,
you would have to do more detailed calculations to take into account, for
example, to count the number of simulated lives vs. non-simulated lives,
etc.


>
> >       I disagree. Without consciousness there are no numbers and no
> truth. Both are
> >       dependent on conscious minds.
> >
> > How does that follow?
> >
> > If electrons (themselves mathematical objects) can exist independently of
> > human minds, why can't integers (which are much simpler mathematical
> objects
> > than electrons).
>
> Easy! Because integers are symbols.


We have symbols we use for integers, yes. Likewise, we have the symbol "e-"
for electrons.

But note the fact that we have symbols for something, is not a
demonstration that the objects (to which the symbols refer) have no
independent existence beyond the symbols.

For example: the fact that we use "e-" as a symbol for electrons, is not
proof that electrons do not exist.


> They do not exist outside of our
> consciousness as objective features of the world.


This is, for what I can see, purely an assumption of yours.


> They depend on a conscious
> mind having learned the language, and then, at that moment in time,
> processing
> the language.


Our discovery of their properties depends on these things. But again, that
tells us nothing about whether these things have an independent existence
or not.


> Same with truth. If nothing exists to make predictions, or to "see
> if it works" the concept becomes meaningless.
>

But my theory is that the existence of mathematical objects is what gives
us a reality to see in the first place. It is therefore not meaningless,
but the source of all observations we ever have that provide any meaning.


>
> Now it could be that this is just the same misunderstanding as immaterial
> vs
> material processes when we discussed cosciouness in the other thread, so
> looking
> at the definition of an integer might clear this difference of opinion up.
>

*Mathematical objects* are things that have independent, objective,
discoverable properties, and for which we develop theories about (we call
axiomatic systems).
*Physical objects* are things which have independent, objective,
discoverable properties, and for which we develop theories about (we call
them laws of physics).

Both constitute objective fields, concerning things whose properties are
objective and discoverable, and we try to make frameworks of thought that
describe the objects of those systems. Given that both fields concern
themselves with things beyond us, which are discovered not invented, and
which have objective properties, then I think we should equally consider
them to be fields concerning objects that exist independently of us. That
is to say, the number 7 was prime before any mathematician was born who
proved 7 to be prime. That is enough to conclude that integers have
properties independent of us.


> > Most problems in morality seem to be incomputable. (At least at the
> limit, of
> > ensuring one never makes a mistake)
>
> That is one thing I like about virtue theories. They dispense with the
> moral
> dilemmas, and tells us to focus on developing our virtues, and if we become
> virtues, trusts that we will then be able to work out good solutions to
> moral
> dilemmas.


> But of course you then have the problem of which virtues? Why those? How to
> improve them and define them and so on. But I like the "side step" from
> theories
> that work on developing rules to cover every single situation which does
> seem
> like a futile hobby.
>

Yes, it's easy, but in being easy they are at best, unjustified, and at
worst, wrong.

I think there are no shortcuts (like this passage expresses):
https://archive.org/details/mindsifantasiesr0000hofs/page/342/mode/2up?q=%22definition+of+the+devil%22


>
> > It didn't perfectly match Pareto utilitarianism, but I thought it was
> similar,
> > in saying (basically) do good, but if you can't do that, at least don't
> do
> > bad.
>
> True. It is a good start.
>
> >       That was one long session! I think we reached a agree to disagree
> on quite a few
> >       tracks here, and also some that led us into new topics. I also
> would like to
> >       thank you for finding inconsistencies and questioning me. This is
> how we get
> >       closer to the truth (TM)! =)
> >
> > It has been very rewarding, though increasingly time consuming. I am not
> sure
> > how much longer I will be able to continue, but I will try. :-)
>
> Haha, true. Please do not feel that you have to respond. And if there is
> anything specific that piques your interest, please feel free to break it
> out
> into a separate thread, or just send me an email off list. =)
>

Thank you.


>
> >       As Epicurus used to say...
> >
> >       "In a philosophical dispute, he gains most who is defeated, since
> he learns the
> >       most". -- Vatican Sayings, saying 74.
> >
> > A wonderful quote we should all live by. :-)
>
> Yes... Epicurus is one of my favourite philosophers. He also reached the
> conclusion of the libertarian NAP by himself, and also there are seeds of
> contractarianism in him. It is a shame we have so little of his writings
> saved.
> =(
>

Interesting, I did not know that. I should read more of him.


>
> > As always, thank you Daniel.
>
> And thank you!
>
>
>
Best,

Jason
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