[ExI] A science-religious experience

[efc at disroot.org]

> I think we have largely reached a conclusion on all topics raised in this
> thread. I'll just leave a few responses below to some new things you raised.

Agreed! There might be one or two small things, I'll have a look and heavily
delete the rest.

>       > A = Beethoven's 5th
>       > B = Scribblings of the notes of Beethoven's 5th on paper
>       > C = An orchestral rendition Beethoven's 5th
>       >
>       > If there were a true identity, if the scribblings on paper are identical
>       > to Beethoven's 5th, then A = B. Likewise, if there is an identity between the
>       > orchestral rendition and Beethoven's 5th, then A = C.
>       >
>       > But then, by the transitive nature of identity, then B ought to be identical
>       > with C, yet the scribblings on paper are not identical with the orchestral
>       > rendition. B ≠ C.
>       >
>       > Somewhere along the way an error was made. Can you spot it?
>
>       I think this is a matter of definition. How would you define B5? As a process?
> 
> I would define Beethoven's 5th as a particular mathematical structure,
> isomorphically present in all its various manifestations (as sheet music, live
> performances, as various numeric or alphanumeric lists of notes, in the
> particular patterns of holes in player piano rolls, etc.) this structure, as a
> mathematical pattern, is abstract, informational, and immaterial. The
> isomorphism common in all the various manifestations allow us to recognize
> what is the same between them, but there is not an identity between the
> structure to which they are all isomorphic, and each of its various
> manifestations. The sheet music ≠ the orchestral performance ≠ the piano roll.
> So then we cannot make an identity between any of those manifestations and the
> abstract mathematical pattern, the abstract mathematical pattern is its own
> unique "thing", not identical with any of its various isomorphisms.

For me I think it goes back to process. Depending on the context, dialogue or
situation, different things can represent B5 for me. It can be the sequence of
notes. It could (if written today) be the copyrighted work. It could be the
process of me enjoying the execution of the notes. It all depends on the
situation and the purpose of the investigation.

>       > Would you feel any more content with some further confidence (provided by
>       > philosophical thought experiments) to know there are reasons we can be quite
>       > sure these other beings are conscious?
>
>       Depends on the thought experiment. I might. Try me! ;)
> 
> I lay them all out starting on page 20 of section 3.5: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-SMVWgQFfImXNRRuuB9kQwhgxPLAwxYL
> 
> In brief, the thought experiments I cover are: 
>  1. A "Consciousness" gene (page 26)
>  2. Philosophical Zombies (page 32)
>  3. Zombie Earth (page 38)
>  4. Lying Zombies (page 46)
>  5. A Mental Lockbox (page 51)
>  6. Conscious Behaviors (page 59)
>  7. The Argonov Test (page 73)
>  8. Consciousness and Intelligence (page 81)
>  9. Reflective Zombies (page 88)
>  10. Mary's Room (102)
>  11. Neural Substitution (135)
>  12. Fading Qualia (151)
>  13. Inverted Spectrum (182)
>  14. Dancing Qualia (189)
>  15. Hemispheric Replacement (198)
> Thought experiments 1-5 rule out zombies, and this is shown to rule out epiphenomenalism.

Based on a materialist outlook, I think there is no possibility of a
philosophical zombie. I don't quite see how it could be meaningful. At the end
of the day, we see what we see, and the "subjective" details of what goes on
inside, is forever blocked from objective investigation.

> Thought experiments 6-8 establish by what means we can test for and verify the presence of consciousness.

I think conscious behaviors is a good way. I think it flows from a materialist
point of view.

> Thought experiments 11-15, in my view, more or less conclusively establish functionalism as the only workable theory of
> consciousness.

This might be for another thread.

>       Probably the project of lauching a rocket, the first time, contains both
>       speculation, and application in the form of tests and experiments. Thought
>       experiments, reasoning etc. can be valuable tools. They can also lead us astray.
> 
> An unforseen defect might of course, cause it to explode or fail mid flight,
> but the general laws of physics, for gravity, thermodynamics, enable the
> engineers and rocket scientists to compute exactly, for example, how much fuel
> the rocket should need to get into orbit, or get to the moon, etc.

True.

> Consider, for example, that Boeing's 777 aircraft was designed entirely on a
> computer. There were no test flights, or prototypes built to test and revise
> things along the way. The plane went straight from its design (based entirely
> on models and simulations based on our understanding of physical laws)
> straight into production of the millions of parts that would all need to fit
> and work together. And, it turned out that when all those parts were assembled
> for the first time, the result was a working aircraft that had the range, and
> slight speed, and other characteristics that they had predicted. Such is the
> state of our understanding of physics, and the confidence we have in using
> those models to make predictions.  

True. But it was not designed that way in isolation. It was supported by
countless hours of experience, experiment, knowledge, empiricism, science, that
across generations, went into that software and design.

>       > If you would use the word speculation to cover the behavior of the rocket
>       > scientists in designing a rocket, then you are consistent. As I am suggesting,
>       > no more than what the same laws of physics tell us ought to happen and am
>       > assuming only that the laws apply everywhere to all physical things in this
>       > universe. If that requires speculation, then everything everyone ever does is
>       > speculation.  
>
>       I could say speculate, and then those speculation are tested, when the rocket
>       takes off the first time.
> 
> Do you "only speculate" that the sun will rise tomorrow?

If you want to be strict about it, yes. From a pragmatic point of view, I
refrain from having a conscious opinion. It just happens. If I wanted to
estimate it, I'd look to my empirical experience, and conclude that it is very
certain. I think the key insight for me is that I don't have to have an opinion
on the matter, and thus I avoid the eternal doubter problem.

> To me, "speculate" indicates a degree of uncertainty that I don't think fits
> for the situation I am discussing.

True. I think a lot of our differences come out of us beginning with different
associations, and then discovering that once I more clearly specify what I
think, or you explain, the difference was actually quite small or non-existent.
Your use of the term immaterial for instance, was one such example.

>       > I think this may be another core difference between us, which seems to relate
>       > to our different base ideas around the validity or reliability of deductive
>       > reasoning.
>
>       Yes I think you are right here. Where I feel uncomfortable is when those
>       examples are bridged to the real world. I am not uncomfortable with the
>       mathematician solving mathematical problems. When math is used as a helper for
>       physics, to describe our world, that is where my uncomfort sets in.
> 
> I wonder how comfortable the test pilot was who was the first to take off in
> an entirely untested 777. ;-)

I imagine he had a few butterflies in his stomach. ;)

>       >       So based on my current
>       >       experience, I have never witnessed any resurrections in the strong sense (not
>       >       talking about freezing/thawing or near death experiences here). So assuming an
>       >       all powerful AI who reassembled every atom and electron of a dead body in some
>       >       live state, yes, why not? But the advantage is that this would be something
>       >       happening in the real world, so when it happens I will revise my position.
>       >
>       >       Until it happens, I consider death to be death, since I have not yet seen any
>       >       evidence to the contrary.
>       >
>       > But note that this conclusion contravenes your materialist assumption.
>
>       I don't see how that follows.
> 
> The materialist assumes the brain is a physical object which operates
> according to physical laws. All materialists further believe in the concept of
> experimental reproducibility: material systems arranged to be in the same
> state will evolve in the same way over time. These two materialist assumptions
> together imply that restoring a dead brain to the state it was when it was
> alive will result in the brain resuming its function as it was when it was
> alive. Of course, we might run the experiment some day and find that for some
> reason it doesn't work, but that would refute materialism.  

Ah, I see what you mean. Well, the easy answer is that, I'll revise my position
once the experiment is performed. Theoretically, it might work as you describe,
but we must keep in mind, that at present, it is just a thought experiment. We
also might discover some technical or scientific reason it might not be done. So
in order to minimize my ontological commitments, I'll either say, it is
impossible, from a day to day perspective, or I might say that I refrain from
having an opinion until we have more evidence.

But, to make it more interesting, let's drop the AI and say that we're talking
about the probability of ressurecting someone with a body temperature of 13.7 C
who has been declared dead before the arrival to the hospital, I'd say that the
probability of that is definitely not zero.

>       > I think I may see the problem here.
>       >
>       > I believe you are using the word "possible" to mean "currently technically feasible."
>       > Whereas I use "possible" to mean "possible in principle" (i.e. nomological possibile).
>       >  
>       > But please correct me if my interpretation is wrong.
>
>       Yes, this might be closer to the truth. Another aspect to keep in mind when I
>       speak of impossible, is that it does not mean impossible forever in many cases.
>       Then there are of course cases, to complicate matters, where I consider
>       impossible to be impossible for ever, such as our bearded lord reaching out from
>       the sky. But even that case I would be willing to reconsider if I saw proof of
>       it.
> 
> In my view it is better to speak in terms of probabilities. We could agree
> seeing such an occurrence has a low probability, but it is not a logically
> impossible experience to have. It is not impossible to the same extent as
> "meeting a married bachelor, or "seeing a circle with four corners."

True!

>       > I think this quote, from Dennett, really drives home the problem of zombies:
>       >
>       >       "Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination
>       > you can remove consciousness while leaving all
>       > cognitive systems intact […] is like supposing that by
>       > an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove
>       > health while leaving all bodily functions and powers
>       > intact. If you think you can imagine this, it’s only
>       > because you are confusedly imagining some health-
>       > module that might or might not be present in a
>       > body. Health isn’t that sort of thing, and neither is
>       > consciousness."
>       > — Daniel Dennett in “The Unimagined Preposterousness of
>       > Zombies” (1995)
>
>       Makes a lot of sense to me.
> 
> If you come to see zombies as logically impossible, (as I make the case for in
> the thought experiments I cited above), then this means certain behaviors can
> provide evidence for the presence of a mind. Note, this does not mean behavior
> is mind, as behaviorists claimed, nor does it mean absence of certain
> behaviors indicates a lack of a mind, but it does mean, in certain conditions,
> witnessing behaviors can justify a belief in the presence of a mind.  

Well, based on a materialist starting point, I see them as impossible. It is a
good example of a thought experiment gone wrong, where we chase after something
which really does not make any sense at all. Just like Qualia. A red herring,
that doesn't really exist as something outside of an active process when mind
meets the world. Without the mind, there is no qualia or redness.

>       >  *  Remember an earlier thought
>       >  *  Describe how one feels
>       >  *  Invent a theory of consciousness
>       > Or do you think there are some behaviors for which a conscious mind is a requirement?
>
>       I think we first of all, have a bad grasp of what consciousness is. Keeping that
>       in mind, I think all of the above could be replicated by a machine, in terms of
>       how it behaves and acts in the world. Some of those would be dependent on
>       definition as well.
> 
> Certainly such behaviors could be replicated by a machine. But the more
> pertinent question is: Could all these behaviours be replicated by a machine
> that was not conscious? Or does the performance of these behaviors imply that
> the machine doing them is conscious?

I think this is just a matter of definition. I'm perfectly content equating
conscious behaviour, as per the list above, with something being conscious. I
also think the zombie argument is nonsense from a material point of view. I
really do not see how it could work.

>       > If there are any, then detecting consciousness can be made into an empirical science.
>
>       I am content with using behaviour in the world as a guide to consciousness. What
>       I am waiting for in the current AI gold rush is volition, goals and
>       self-preservation.
> 
> AI language models have goals: to produce meaningful responses that get good
> feedback from the users. And there was recently the case where researchers
> observed the AI acting in a manner showing a desire for self-preservation.
> ( https://futurism.com/the-byte/openai-o1-self-preservation )
> 
> A (possibly relevant)
> cartoon: https://www.digitaltonto.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Kurzweil-AI-cartoon.gif

True. I have not been personally convinced yet, that LLMs are conscious. I
encourage more research, and I would also like to see a resurrection of some
kind of harder Turing-prize.

Anyone rich reading this and who wants to sponsor please reach out, it would 
be a lot of fun to get involved! =)

I wonder what size of the prize is necessary to motivate people to win?

>       > What would be needed for you to conclude it was resurrected? (Or does that
>       > determination rest on what you consider to be unresolved questions of
>       > identity?)  
>
>       Probably that the biological body started to move again, from the state where it
>       stopped. I'd say that what was done was that the patterns of the worm where
>       cloned and replicated in a computer, for now.
> 
> Well they were copied into a robot body. So it was given a new body. The word
> resurrect means only to bring back to life (and sets no requirement on it
> being the same body). If we restrict resurrection to only bringing the
> original body back to life, I would class that as "revival" or
> "resuscitation".  

This I think might be better continued in our thread about the "identity formula" (C)! ;)

>       As for identity, this is actually an interesting question! Is there an accepted
>       "line" where we speak of animals with identities, and animals without
>       identities? Higher animals have preferences, listen to their names, to some
>       extent, can pick up on feelings etc. Where does that stop? Does a worm have an
>       identity?
> 
> I don't think an entity needs to recognize or be aware of its identity for it
> to have one. For example, philosophy struggles even to define identity for
> inanimate objects (famously the Ship of Theseus:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus ). 
> 
> As to the matter of whether the worm has a "personal identity", to me, that
> question rests on whether or not there is anything it is like to be that worm:
> is that worm conscious? If so, then we can ask valid questions about its
> identity in the same way as is commonly done in the field of personal
> identity.
> 
> E.g., What is required for the worm to survive? Which experiences belong to
> the worm? If the worm gets cut in two and continues living, does its identity
> split, or does each copy preserve and contain the original worm's identity?
> etc.

Hmm, maybe we should move this into the other thread as well?

Best regards, 
Daniel