[ExI] Google’s Willow Quantum Chip: Proof of the Multiverse?

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Nov 8, 2025, 2:14 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Nov 8, 2025 at 1:30 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 8, 2025, 1:10 PM Adrian Tymes via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >> On Sat, Nov 8, 2025 at 1:04 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> >> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >> > How would you describe the difference between "determinism" and
> "superdeterminism?"
> >> >
> >> > From all your writings on superdeterminism, you never seem to suggest
> any difference between the two. Do you think they are equivalent?
> >>
> >> That depends on your definitions of the term.  I must insist that you
> >> go first, as my usual experience on this topic is that any explanation
> >> I give is immediately strawmanned into someone else's definitions, who
> >> then claims they are "right" when they have actually given
> >> non-sequiturs.
> >
> > Let's go with what Google's AI gave me when I searched: difference
> between determinism and superdeterminism
> >
> > This is what it provided:
> >
> > "Determinism states all events are causally inevitable, while
> superdeterminism is a stricter version that adds the assumption that the
> choices of experimental measurements are also predetermined and correlated
> with the system being measured. This means that not only are the outcomes
> of experiments fixed, but the very act of setting up the experiment is
> coordinated with the outcome, making it impossible to test for randomness
> and free will in the conventional sense.
> >
> > Determinism
> >
> > Definition: All events, including human decisions, are predetermined by
> prior causes and conditions.
> >
> > Example: A simple physics example is predicting a ball's trajectory
> based on its initial position and velocity. A more complex one is that
> every event in the universe is the inevitable result of the laws of physics
> acting on the initial conditions of the universe.
> >
> > Key principle: Causes lead to effects in a predictable chain.
> >
> > Superdeterminism
> >
> > Definition: A more extreme version of determinism where the choices made
> by experimenters (like selecting a measurement setting) are also part of
> the predetermined chain of events, correlated with the system being
> measured.
> >
> > Example: In a quantum experiment, a superdeterministic universe would
> ensure that the choice of measurement setting and the outcome of that
> measurement are correlated from the beginning of time. The "randomness" is
> an illusion, as the experiment was pre-arranged to produce a specific
> result.
> >
> > Key principle: The assumption of measurement independence, which is
> central to how scientists design experiments and interpret results, is
> violated."
> >
> >
> > I find these definitions perfectly acceptable and standard.
> >
> > Do you agree with them?
> >
> > Under these definitions, do you see a difference between determinism and
> superdeterminism?
> >
> > Under these definitions, do you believe in this version of
> superdeterminism?
> >
> > For reference: I believe in determinism, but I reject superdeterminism.
> They are (in my view ) not at all the same thing. One makes science
> possible, the other makes science impossible.
>
> Fair enough.  Then by that...what I believe in is somewhere between
> the two, that I don't have a good term for yet.  I use
> "superdeterminism" as it's more than strictly local determinism.
> Maybe "superdeterminism lite" would be more accurate?
>

Great, this is progress I think.



> In every observed case, it has not been ruled out that the backstop
> for where the states were defined is not just further back than is
> being discussed.  (In particular, people keep talking about quantum
> entanglement as if the states do not exist until measured, but if they
> exist before measurement it would explain a lot.


Yes, which is the broad appeal many had for hidden variables theories, e.g.
with Einstein.

I believe in many-worlds, which I consider the closest to preserving any
notion of local realism, and determinism. It even enables preservation of a
notion of hidden variables, where the variables represent superpositions of
values. When measured, the superposition reveals itself locally in the form
of multiple outcomes being witnessed, and these observed outcomes each
imply distinct possibilities for what one will later learn of the outcome
of the far away experiment. So locality and determinism are preserved, at
the cost of giving up single outcomes for experiments.

  In the
> three-particle experiment I quoted, the phrasing of the experiment
> definition suggests that the results are preordained from when the
> detectors are set up, possibly before, despite the detectors being
> independent after being set up.)
>

I admit I don't understand how the three detector system is arranged. The
conventional description and the one I have always heard was the two
detectors with 3 settings.

I think this case makes it most clear that there's no set of information
each particle can carry that enables anti-correlations greater than 2/3rds
for the experiment where the devices have 3 settings. And yet, we observe
anti-correlations of 3/4.

This means one of the assumptions must be wrong:
- The particles do communicate (locality is violated -- spooky action)
- Experiments have more than one outcome (counterfactual definiteness is
violated -- many worlds)
- Experiments can't be setup independently of one another (measurement
independence is violated -- superdeterminism)

The half-measure, some form of determinism involving hidden variables, by
itself is insufficient, unless it also abandons measurement independence.

And note that it is the abandoning of this concept of measurement
independence that leads to all the nastiness in standard forms of
superdeterminism, where the universe seems to operate in a manner to fool
us (by showing us anti-correlations above 2/3).


> Full superdeterminism - all the way back to the Big Bang or beyond -
> has not been proven and might not be provable, but neither is it
> strictly necessary.  The theoretical delta is one of the angles
> through which "free will", however one defines it, and true randomness
> may be able to come in.
>

I'm not sure I understand this. Are you say there is room for free will and
randomness in your theory?

If there is any degree of randomness or free will permitted, then if one
uses it in deciding how to pick which of the three positions on the Mermin
device, then they would break out of the superdeterministic constraints,
and expose the <= 2/3 anti-correlations we would expect to find in any
local hidden variable theory.


> It is also of note that the full set of initial conditions appears to
> potentially be unknowable, at least within the same universe.  For
> instance, this implies that a transporter-like device, which reads
> every quantum state of the transported object and then does something
> with that information, may be impossible - or at least would require
> much more information storage than is inherent in matter that
> constitutes the object being transported.  Even uploaded copies of
> organic brains might theoretically be imperfect, although if they can
> be gotten close enough - if the delta in being is equal to or less
> than the natural delta in being that people experience over a few
> months (or whatever adjustment time is seen as reasonable) anyway,
> especially after major life changes comparable to switching to a new
> body - then it may not matter in practice.
>
> This technically makes absolute perfect determinism impossible,
>

I would say, rather, that this makes perfect prediction (within this
universe by entities within this universe) impossible. Heisenberg's
uncertainty principle is enough to establish this constraint. But we should
not conclude from this fact alone that the universe does not abide by
deterministic laws. Consider there may be a simulation of a universe which
does not enable entities within that simulated universe to perfectly
measure the state of the simulation. Such beings would not be able to
perfectly predict, and yet their universe could still be fully
deterministic.


although it is often possible to know the initial conditions well
> enough for practical use.  (I can't know for certain that, after I
> kick a ball in front of me, every particle in the ball will not
> suddenly teleport behind me - but I know the odds against that are
> high enough that I can assume it will go forward in practice.)  This
> colors the desire for knowledge or prediction of the initial states
> for superdeterminism: even if one could theoretically model a set of
> values to fit the observed result, it might not matter if no actual
> case was ever able to measure or screen for that set of values.
>
> Part of this, I admit, is cynicism after seeing so many examples that
> I have lost count where things were supposed to be independent or
> random, but subsequently turned out to be provably rigged - and worse,
> when I leaned into the assumption that things were rigged (when
> fairness and justice demanded that one act as if they were not), I was
> often ultimately rewarded if I could figure out how I could exploit
> it.  Figuring out the initial values of human systems is easier than
> figuring out the initial values of large sets of particles.
>

But here I think the situation is much easier and simpler. The task is to
see if there is *any way* any hypothetical system could be rigged, in a
manner that enables us to account for the observed statistics.

Bell proved that (under the assumptions stated) it cannot be done.

This means we have to abandon at least one of those cherished assumptions.

Jason
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