[ExI] Google’s Willow Quantum Chip: Proof of the Multiverse?

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Tue Oct 14 18:05:29 UTC 2025


On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 1:24 PM John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com> wrote:

> *The subjective experience of Many Worlds and Many Minds is identical, but
> Many Minds needs to explain what fundamental laws of physics makes a
> distinction between matter that behaves as a mind and matter that does not,*
>

That would only be the case if many-minds said that the matter of minds
worked differently from ordinary matter. It makes no such claim.


> * why quantum mechanics duplicates minds that are made of matter but not
> matter that does not compose a brain.*
>

There is no duplication. There is only differentiation. All the
minds/universes/histories already exist. Nothing is splitting, branching,
or duplicating. It's all already there.


> * Many Worlds has no need to do that therefore Occam's Razor says it is
> the superior explanation.*
>

Perhaps, but we can get an even simpler picture than many worlds by merely
assuming all computations exist. And then we can show how QM can be derived
from this simpler assumption. And the picture this leaves us with is
better conceived as a many-minds picture, rather than one involving
branching universes.


>
> On Tue, Oct 14, 2025 at 10:21 AM Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> *>>>  I think the description given by "many minds" is closer to the
>>>> truth of things.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> *>>Then you have to get into the problem of explaining what is and what
>>> is not an "observation", and what exactly is a "mind", and explaining how
>>> consciousness works.*
>>>
>>
>> *> Not really. Because observers are just parts of physical systems.
>> Unlike in Copenhagen, consciousness isn't causing magical things like
>> collapse, and unlike Many Worlds, it's not causing the universe to branch.
>> It is simply mutual logical consistency between the observer and what is
>> observed.*
>>
>>
>>> *>> But there is no need to open that can of worms, Many Worlds can
>>> provide a coherent picture of what's going on without any of that; all you
>>> need is one assumption, at the most fundamental level matter obeys the same
>>> laws of physics regardless of if it's smart or stupid, or conscious or
>>> unconscious, or capable of making an observation or incapable of doing so.
>>> Therefore Occam's Razor tells us that the Many Worlds idea is superior to
>>> the Many Minds idea. *
>>>
>>
>> *> You misinterpret the many-minds idea. It makes no special claims about
>> what conscious is. No does it add any assumptions about what it can do.
>> Note that even many-worlds needs to bring in consciousness to explain the
>> appearance of collapse when there isn't any. This much is the same with
>> many-minds.*
>>
>
> *The subjective experience of Many Worlds and Many Minds is identical, but
> Many Minds needs to explain what fundamental laws of physics makes a
> distinction between matter that behaves as a mind and matter that does not,*
>

There is none.


> * why quantum mechanics duplicates minds that are made of matter but not
> matter that does not compose a brain.*
>

There is no duplication.


> * Many Worlds has no need to do that therefore Occam's Razor says it is
> the superior explanation.*
>

I find the explanation of differentiation easier to understand than the
more nebulous world splitting, but that is a matter of taste, and I find no
great fault in either.

Jason
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