[ExI] Cellular automata, downward causation, and libertarian determinism

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Oct 26, 2025 at 10:34 AM Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 26, 2025 at 3:23 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Oct 26, 2025, 3:05 AM Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sat, Oct 25, 2025 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
> >> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >> >
> >> > Can downwards causation not exist in a universe whose laws are fully
> deterministic?
> >> >
> >> > Consider that the neurons push and guide molecules
> (neurotransmitters) around as much as the molecules define the operation of
> neurons.
> >> >
> >> > The illusion that causes work only bottom-up I think stems from
> taking reductionsm too far.
> >> >
> >> > If we can do readily admit that molecules tell neurons how to behave,
> why are some so reluctant to admit that neurons can also tell molecules how
> to behave?
> >> >
> >> > I think Roger Sperry gives the best treatment of this in his "Mind,
> Brain, and Humanist Values" (
> https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/sperry/Mind_Brain_and_Humanist_Values.html
> )
> >> >
> >> > Jason
> >> >
> >>
> >> Hi Jason. I think it's quite simple: the cosmic operating system
> >> chooses initial conditions, but is not limited to choose all of them
> >> at the same time. Rather, the cosmic operating system chooses
> >> "initial" conditions distributed in time, just like in my little game.
> >> To us, observers limited by time, the universe appears not
> >> deterministic. This is equivalent to Nicolas Gisin's intuitionist
> >> physics. OK, the universe is still deterministic to an observer that
> >> looks at the global history from outside time. But I think the cosmic
> >> operating system doesn't make enough choices to fix one unique
> >> timeline, and this is another, ontological source of nondeterminism.
> >
> >
> > I agree this is a viable answer to the question of no determinism in
> physics. If reality consists of a sufficiently large multiverse, then we
> can expect a vast plenitude of parallel universe states which are almost
> the same, but different only by the position of a single particle, for
> example.
> >
> > Such parallel universes contain identical copies of brain states of all
> the conscious observers, however, when any one of those observers attempts
> to deeply probe into the state of one of those particles, they will find it
> exists in an indeterminate superposition of many possibilities, for the
> reason that this same observer mind state exists also in all those parallel
> similar universes, where the particle is doing something a little different.
> >
> > But once the measurement is made, the observer's mind state changes in a
> way that partitions the set of similar but not quite identical universe she
> is a part of. The observer is said to have "collapsed the wave function"
> but really, she has only adjusted her knowledge in a way that changes the
> set of universes her mind state is still cool compatible with.
> >
> > There will be many such partitionings corresponding to each of the
> possible outcomes of her measurement, and from her perspective before
> making the measurement, the outcome will seem totally random and
> unpredictable, and it was, because she is never in a position to know
> exactly which universe is in (as her current mind state exists identically
> within many different universes).
> >
> > But all this is aside from my original point, which I don't believe
> downwards causation requires indeterminism.
> >
>
> In fact, in the OP and in my first comment (besides the last point on
> multiple timelines) I refer to a deterministic universe with one
> single timeline AND downward causation. But I still think that a
> universe with multiple timelines provides a stronger type of
> nondeterminism.
>

Ahh I see, I understand your point more fully now.


>
> >
> >> More in my last book (I think I sent it to you?).
> >> G.
> >
> >
> > What is the title? I do have "Tales of the Turing Church." Or are you
> referring to a more recent book?
> >
>
> This one:
> https://www.turingchurch.com/p/irrational-mechanics
> You are mentioned in the acknowledgments, because you made useful
> observations on this list.
>

Oh wow, I appreciate that. I have just ordered the paperback version. ;-)

Jason


>
> > Jason
> >
> >>
> >> > On Sat, Oct 25, 2025, 1:12 AM Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >> Cellular automata, downward causation, and libertarian determinism
> >> >> (2). Some more thoughts, and a Sudoku-like game based on cellular
> >> >> automata.
> >> >>
> https://www.turingchurch.com/p/cellular-automata-downward-causation-644
> >> >> _______________________________________________
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> >> >
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