[ExI] Why do the language model and the vision model align?

[Ben Zaiboc]

I don't know about anybody else, but I see a distinct difference between the reality of the world, that we can't directly perceive but have to interpret (or at least invent (or model as best we can)) from our sensory input, and Plato's concept of the real existence of abstract forms.

If we take, for an example, Beauty (or Justice, or Homesickness, etc., etc.), Plato's philosophy regards it as a real thing, that exists somewhere, somehow, independently of human minds. My philosophy, and I suspect (or at least hope) that of most sensible people, holds that it is not. That it is completely inside, and dependent on, the human mind, that it is actually a product of the human mind and not something belonging to 'the real world', independent of any minds.

There are other things that, as far as we know, must be 'real', or at least derived from the 'real world' that we can't directly perceive, like for instance this keyboard on which I'm typing. To a blind person it's a different experience, but still it's the same thing. This is like the 'shadows on a cave wall' example, but it's not Platonism.

Another category contains things like the number 4. That's an abstract concept, but it could be argued that it represents something that 'really' exists, as in, it can be said to be an objective property of certain collections of things.

It's hardly surprising that thinking systems would converge on efficient ways of representing what exists in the real world, including objective properties. That's not the same thing as Platonism, which claims that subjective concepts have an existence outside the mind. Which is, of course, absurd, or they wouldn't be subjective.

Colour is a popular topic among certain members of this list. Does Colour 'really' exist, in a Platonic sense? Having studied how our nervous systems process visual information, including how it deals with different wavelengths of light, I say no, it doesn't exist as an objective thing independent of human (or any) minds. Colour is related to, but different from, wavelengths of light. It's subjective, created by our minds from information that includes wavelength as well as other things, like intensity and contrast, and various properties of our bodies. If you're doubtful about this, look up "Magenta". You may be surprised to find that it doesn't 'really' exist.

It might be interesting to find out if different AI systems create representations of colour like we do (do they see magenta?), or if they use representations of wavelength instead. I'd guess that if they do create internal colours, they'd be subject to the same, or similar, illusions that humans are, and different sensory apparatus would lead to different representations.
But if they do, that's not evidence in support of Platonism.

In fact, I suspect that Magenta is one of the things that Stefano is referring to when he says that "Platonic Ideas have been extensively demonstrated to be false by science".

Plato's allegory of the Cave doesn't support Platonism, as it can only deal with things that do actually exist outside the cave. Compassion, frustration and hunger don't cast shadows on the cave wall, they exist only in the minds of the observers.

Jason Resch wrote:
> I think you may be reading too much into the name "Platonic representation hypothesis". The fact that the word "Platonic" is used is the name of this hypothesis is not meant as an endorsement or claim to the the truth of Platonism.

Ah, ok. Then the name is (very) misleading.

This is just like using the term "substrate-independent" to refer to what should be called "substrate-indifferent". It sounds like it refers to the old SF concept of minds that are discarnate, not tied to matter at all, but in fact it doesn't. It's actually just the opposite of what we tend to call 'carbon chauvinism' - the idea that only biological beings can host minds.

We are using terms that are not fit-for-purpose. It's as if someone started calling their Thorium Fission power plant a "Cold Fusion generator", and everyone goes "yeah, ok, we'll call it that".

It surprises me that people who are so intelligent and imaginative are so willing to tolerate and use and even promote, such imprecise and misleading language, especially when we all know that miscommunication causes a large percentage of the problems in the world.

Anyway, that's my rant over.

So, can I take it that the "Platonic representation hypothesis" in fact has nothing to do with Platonism? (The idea that abstract objects are asserted to exist in a third realm distinct from both the sensible* external world and from the internal world of consciousness).

Are we all in agreement on this?

---
Ben

* Meaning 'perceptible'.