[ExI] Another reason why Platonism can't be true

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Feb 23, 2026 at 12:36 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 23/02/2026 15:39, BillK wrote:
> > Obviously, Ben and Jason are disagreeing because they are relying on
> different assumptions.
> >
> > Ben is sticking with the universe as we experience it. When you burn a
> book, that knowledge disappears until research replaces it with similar or
> alternative knowledge. Infinite undiscovered knowledge does not eternally
> exist in other universes, waiting to be brought into our universe.
> > Unfortunately, Ben's assumptions cannot *disprove* other universes'
> existence. He can only say that nobody has seen or detected them.
> >
> > Jason, on the other hand, by stepping outside our universe, has an even
> greater task to prove that an infinity of other universes exists. Gaps in
> knowledge about our universe, like creation theory, quantum indeterminacy,
> etc., are not *proof* of other universes. This is a philosophical argument
> along the lines of 'turtles all the way down'. It may be the correct way to
> view an infinity of universes, but it can never be proved because, by
> definition, these universes lie outside our universe.
>
>
> I'm not trying to say that there aren't other universes, not at all.
> That's orthogonal to my argument, which is basically that you can't have a
> language that consists of only verbs.
>

Thanks, that clarifies your position to me. It reminds me of a phrase I
heard: "correlations without correlata." I agree with you that it makes
little sense.


>
> Or, to put it another way, you can't have a language that nobody speaks
> and that isn't written down or recorded in any way.
>
> Or, a pattern of Xs without any Xs is a null concept. A pattern, in order
> to exist at all, /has to be applied to something/.
>

Yes I agree. I think then where disagree is what qualifies as a "thing."
If you would not reject the idea that other universes (i.e., other
structures defined by different laws) could exist, then what would you
suppose the common requirement be between those structures that exist and
those that don't?
Does a universe with different particles (none of which are common to our
universe) still contain things? Can it still contain information, even
though it lacks protons and electrons?
Does an ever simpler universe, like a Game-of-Life world, which contains
only cells that can be in one of two states still contain information? Even
though it lacks particles and 3 dimensional space?
Where does this stop?

>From my perspective, I see no reason to draw a line at universes with
particles but no electrons, nor at universes with simple 2D grids of cells.
All of these structures (in my view) have an equal right to exist as our
own universe.

And if we assume this to be the case (that all computationally possible
structures/programs exist) then that explains why the world we see has some
of the properties it has (e.g. why it's quantum mechanical, why it's life
friendly, why its laws are simple, etc.). This is how I justify my position
that allows any possible structure to exist, because it is a theory that
makes testable predictions, and these predictions have been empiracally
confirmed.


>
> That's the simplest way I can think of to make my point.
>
> It's not a matter of my experience, it's a matter of simple logic. If
> anyone wants to throw diaphanous elephantine equations at it, go ahead, it
> won't achieve anything, you can't break logic.
>
>
You say it is important that there be some "nouns" rather than just
"verbs". We agree on this.
For there to be an electric force that affects things, you need to have
something like charged particles for it to act upon. Thus if there is a
relationship between two charged particles, there can be information. I
think we still agree.

Would you agree that there can be a relationship between two cells in the
Game of Life, and that if such a hypothetically Game of Life universe is
real, there could be information embodied by that relationship between
those cells?

Would you be willing to go on step further, and consider a hypothetical
universe consisting not of cells, but unique positions on a 1D line? Could
there be information defined by the specific rules relating positions on
this line? For example the number of discrete "jumps" required to get from
one position on this line to another?

If you can accept the idea of information existing in a 2D Game of Life
universe, I see no reason to reject the notion of information in this 1D
universe.

This 1D universe of unique definite positions on a line is equivalent to
the universe of natural numbers. Now if there can be relationships between
the natural numbers (discrete positions in this 1D universe), then there
can be information. The numbers (positions) are the nouns you seek. The
verbs are the relationships that exist between them.

I don't think we disagree on anything fundamental. We disagree only on how
broad our ontologies are in accepting the existence of other kinds of
universes.

Jason
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