[ExI] DIY Quantum Protection for Bitcoin

[Adrian Tymes]

After you've spent from the one wallet, it lays empty until being
reset just before spending from the other wallet, right?

If so, then assuming the first wallet's key is vulnerable, in theory
someone could try to hack in using the first key and spoof the factory
reset function, so what you later thought was a reset just sets up the
first wallet (which you're transferring funds into) so it'll have a
key the attacker already knows.  The attacker then waits for you to
spend again and transfer funds into the first wallet.

In theory this could be minimized by performing the reset right after
spending funds and transferring money out, but that still leaves a
brief window of vulnerability.

On Mon, Jun 1, 2026 at 2:35 PM Stuart LaForge via extropy-chat
<extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
> Ok, so I think I have come up with a simple low technology method of
> safeguarding bitcoin against Quantum computing algorithms like Shor's.
>
> First you need to but 2 hardware cold wallets (e.g. Trezor, Ledger,
> etc.) Create a seed phrase to generate a public key with one of them and
> send your BTC to it.
>
> When you want to spend or transfer bitcoin, you set up (or reset) a seed
> phrase on your second wallet. Spend whatever bitcoin you need to and
> then transfer the remaining balance to the second wallet. When you
> spend/send bitcoin, the public key of the sending wallet gets exposed on
> the blockchain in a way that a quantum computer could use it to crack
> the private key for the spending wallet, so the idea is to empty that
> wallet completely. The public key of the receiving wallet is kept secret
> because it does not show up anywhere during the transaction. The only
> private key that a quantum computer could derive would be for the empty
> wallet that you no longer use.
>
> Then when you want to spend/send money from your second wallet, factory
> reset the original wallet and create a new seed phrase for it to
> generate a novel public. Spend your bitcoin from the second wallet and
> immediately send the remaining balance to the, now reset 1st wallet that
> has a brand new seed phrase / public key that has never been exposed on
> the blockchain and cannot be used to hack your private key.
>
> Then, when you want to perform another transaction, rinse and repeat.
> Always resetting and reseeding the unused wallet to get a fresh public
> key before use. With two hardware wallets, you should be able to keep
> this up indefinitely. It is a little bit of a hassle, but from what I
> understand of the bitcoin protocol, it should keep your bitcoins safe
> from quantum computing algorithms with existing technology. Let me know
> if you find a weakness in this scheme.
>
> Stuart LaForge
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