[ExI] Red
Ben Zaiboc
benzaiboc at proton.me
Tue Jun 30 21:04:57 UTC 2026
On 30/06/2026 20:08, Brent Allsop wrote:
> Thanks for talking about qualities like this, as I think it is the key to understanding what phenomenal consciousness is like, and how a more powerful computational model works.
>
> Frist off we've got to stop talking ambiguously so we can know what people are talking about. By default, the term 'red' is ambiguous. You can't tell if you are talking about the physical properties of the surface of the strawberry, the light, any of the other states in any perception chain, and ultimately the physical properties of our subjective knowledge of red things, as rendered into our consciousness by our perception system.
>
> We're building and tracking consensus around a better way to define these physical terms in the consensus representational qualia theory camp. They define the terms as follows:
>
> “red” The intrinsic property of objects that are the target of our observation, the initial cause of the perception process (i.e. when the strawberry reflects 650 nm (red) light). A label for Anything that reflects or emits ‘red’ light.
> “redNESS” The different intrinsic subjective property of our knowledge of red things, the final result of our perception of red.
>
>
> So, given that, can you guys ask your questions so I can understand what everyone is talking about?
>
OK.
My understanding is that the word for any colour ("Red", Blue", etc.) can refer to:
1) The wavelength, or a range of wavelengths, of light reflected by a surface and received by our eyes. You could call this "the colour of light".
2) The propensity of a substance to absorb/reflect various wavelengths of light. You could call this "the intrinsic colour of a thing or substance".
3) The subjective experience (the quale) of 'seeing a colour'. You could call this "the perceived colour".
The first two are physical phenomena that can be measured. The third is not, and can only be experienced by a mind, specifically the mind that creates it.
The third definition is what I first think of when the word is used, and, importantly, does not necessarily correlate exactly with the other two definitions (as illustrated by Magenta). This is the important and seemingly contentious one. Neuroscience tells us that it's one of the many subjective experiences created by our brains as a result of the processing of sensory signals from our eyes via our visual cortex, combined with information from various other parts of our brains (memories, expectations, emotions, etc.). While the other two are physical phenomena, this one is a pattern of information in a mind that, while it could theoretically be measured and recorded, can only be /experienced/ by the mind that is creating it.
I suspect that, in Brent's terminology, the first two could be called 'red', etc., and the third, 'redness', etc.
In the particular case of Magenta, there is only 'magentaness', because 'magenta' doesn't actually exist (as a wavelength of light), it's an 'invented' colour that can only be experienced.
That's as clear and unambiguous as I can make it.
What is unclear to me, is what "the physical properties of our subjective knowledge of red things" means. This seems to be a contradictory phrase, as subjective things, by definition, cannot have physical (and therefore measurable) properties. A phenomenon is either objective or subjective, it can't be both.
Unless it refers to the physical patterns of neural activation that embody the information that forms the subjective experience. If so, fair enough, but it's not much use. We can't distinguish which patterns of neural activity embody which subjective experiences, and even if we could in one individual, there's no guarantee that the same pattern would invoke the same experience in another brain. In fact I'd be extremely surprised if it would, as everyone's brain is different in the fine details of the wiring.
Maybe one day, after uploading has been perfected and we can go into much finer detail on how minds work, we will be able to study this kind of thing, but I'm still doubtful that we'll ever be able to say "This pattern of activation results in this specific subjective experience" in a general way that applies to all minds.
Of course, it would be brilliant if we could, because it would open up a lot of things such as merging minds together, transferring memories and skills between individuals, etc. Time will tell, I suppose.
--
Ben
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