[ExI] Uploads are self

[Keith Henson]

When the technology supports uploading, it should be able to store
bodies and reverse the process.  No matter if you settle in the meat
or uploaded state, you should be able to freely move between them.
Continuous memory, not even a loss of consciousness during moves.

How many of you would buy a car without a test drive?

Keith

On Sun, Mar 15, 2026 at 6:35 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat
<extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
> I recently met one of the leading researchers involved in the fruit fly brain scanning effort. He, and others mentioned two common objections people have to the idea of brain preservation (with the eventual goal of uploading):
>
> The first is the idea that silicon computers can't host human consciousness.
> The second is the idea that even if my upload were conscious, "it wouldn't be me."
>
>
> I told him I would prepare a brief essay that uses the latest philosophical arguments to serve as a counter to these objections (written to be understandable to laypersons).
>
> So if there are people in your life who resist your choice to pursue brain/cryro preservation, this document can help them understand the various reasons for we can expect uploads not only to be conscious, but also capable of extending one's very own subjective self and identity.
>
> Here is the document:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/103wDTRC7-AA6mHVzRj1JptqeulBRXinzvIdfC1Z50t8/edit?usp=sharing
>
> Jason
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