[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Wed, Mar 18, 2026, 6:06 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
> On 18/03/2026 04:03, Jason Resch wrote:
> Ben wrote:
> >
> >>     Even just the phrase 'my mind' is wrong, and reinforces dualistic
> thinking, because if 'I' HAVE a mind, then I and my mind are separate
> things. So then what am I?
> >
> >
> > I think there is still utility in differentiating the word "I" to refer
> to that universal property common to all minds. In the same sense that
> every place is (to itself) a here, and every time is (to itself) a now,
> every mind is (to itself) an I.
> > Laying it out this way also dissolves the powerful impression that there
> is something special or unique about any particular mind feeling like a
> privileged I. All mind states are experienced as I.
> > This can lead to the open-individualist/universalist realization: if all
> conscious moments are experieced by as I (in a direct, immediate,
> first-person way), then all experiences have everything they need to be
> considered "mine." There is nothing else about experience that makes it
> "yours" aside from the fact that it feels as if it is experienced in this
> direct, immediate, first-person way.
> >
>
>
> OK, in /what/ sense is every place a 'here', exactly?
>

In the indexical sense: to itself.



> This is an abstraction, or a classification, that we create and use. It's
> not something that exists in itself, it's a mental construct that we use to
> help us make sense of the world. You can say that it doesn't 'really'
> exist, in the same way that boredom doesn't really exist, or red doesn't
> really exist, etc. These kinds of things are part of our minds, so only
> exist in our minds, and not external to them.
>


True, but I would note that existing as a high-level concept doesn't make
something unreal, nor devoid of utility.



> Just as the concept of 'here' doesn't exist outside a mind that creates
> and uses it, neither does this 'universal property common to all minds'
> version of 'I' exist, outside a mind that creates and uses it. It's a
> concept, not a thing.
>

I agree.


> If you claim that there is nothing special or unique about any particular
> individual mind, you also have to claim that there is nothing special or
> unique about any particular piece of music, any particular mathematical
> equation or any other particular pattern of information. That line of
> thinking leads to the conclusion that all information is the same thing.
> Not a particularly useful viewpoint.
>


I think you misread what I was saying. I was not saying there's nothing
unique or special about any mind, I was saying there's nothing unique or
special about a mind in the sense of it being a "privileged I". This is
because every mind, from its own perspective, feels it is privileged in
this way, just as contemporaries in every point in time, consider their
"now" to be the special (only existing) point in time.

But the more scientifically valid "block time" view of the universe
dissolves the idea of a privileged now, just as open individualism
dissolves the notion of a privileged I.



>
> >>
> >>     Hopefully, you can see that this is a red herring. If our minds are
> information patterns, then 'I' don't HAVE a mind, I AM a mind. The mind
> that my brain is producing is actually what 'I' am. I am information. A
> complex, dynamic pattern of information. It necessarily follows that if
> that information is read and then instantiated somewhere else, so that the
> information processing goes on in the same way as in my original brain,
> then that is me. I am now somewhere else.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>     The logical consequence of this is that if the same information is
> instantiated in more than one place, there is now more than one me. Weird,
> yes, but necessarily true. And if my original brain is destroyed, but the
> mind that it used to produce is running in a different processing
> substrate, I'm not dead, I'm in that different processing substrate. Not a
> 'copy', but the actual real me.
> >
> >
> > Yes.
> >
> >
> >>     Once you realise that minds are information, the confusion goes
> away. As John K Clark has said, science tells us that there are only 3
> things: Matter, Energy and Information. (I'd modify that, and say there are
> only 3 things: Space-time, Matter-energy, and Information, but it doesn't
> really matter). Minds can only be one of these things. Once you fully
> accept that, dualism can be dispensed with, and things like uploading and
> branching identity easily make sense.
> >
> >
> >
> >     > What things do you be believe are necessary for one to survive?
> Would every synaptic weight have to be determined exactly, or is there some
> factor of "close enough" (say if it is as similar to how you were two weeks
> ago, that is sufficient)?
> >
> >
> >>     The recent fruit-fly upload seems to suggest that individual
> synaptic weights are not actually necessary to record (which surprised me.
> Apparently it's the number of synaptic connections between neurons that's
> important. Maybe this won't be the same with human brains, but we'll see).
> >>
> >>
> >>     My suspicion is that as long as you get the detailed connectome
> right (plus things like the type of neurons), this will establish
> 'attractor states' that are fairly tolerant to minor differences, so
> inaccuracies in things like connection strengths will not be so important,
> and maybe you would wake up feeling a bit strange, but that would soon fade
> as things settle down to their normal states. But that's just speculation,
> really. Or maybe wishful thinking, but I'd guess that uploading could
> actually turn out to be a lot easier than we think, given a certain level
> of technology (mainly for the scanning, I'm pretty confident that that will
> always be the hardest thing).
> >
> >
> > I think there is possibly one extra step you could take, one final
> dualism to dispense with, which is the idea that you are defined by a
> particular/exact information pattern.
>
>
> That's not dualism, that is the exact opposite of dualism.
> My whole point is that each mind does consist of a particular, exact
> information pattern, and nothing else. That this is what a 'soul' (if you
> should insist on using the word) actually is, that this is the only thing
> that a mind can be.
>

But you said you could survive as an imprecise upload (giving the fruit fly
as an example). For this to be true, a person must be more than an "exact
information pattern." You've already loosened that definition to an
approximate information pattern.

If one steps into a teletransporter, and emerges on the other side having
lost a single long term memory that they hadn't recalled in the past 10
years, is such a memory loss fatal to that transported persons subjective
survival? I think not, but am curious to know what you think.

Then repeat the consideration with more and more memories being lost in the
process. At what point do these changes flip from the person surviving to
the person dying?


>
> >  Certainly, throughout our lives, the information pattern we identify
> with
>
>
> No, I have to stop you there. This is dualistic thinking. Or at least
> language that reinforces dualistic thinking. Who is the 'we' you refer to,
> if you are separating it from the information pattern? It would be better
> to say "the information patterns that we consist of"
>

Okay you can use that wording. The patterns one consists of change
drastically throughout one's life.


>
> >  changes drastically. Are there any limits to how much that conscious
> pattern could change before it ceases being an "I"
>
>
> I hope that this question now answers itself.


It answers it for me, but I am still not sure if our answers are aligned.

Unless you are asking how simple can a mind be, which we don't currently
> know the answer to.
>

No, I am asking what must be preserves in the pattern for survival (e.g. of
an upload process). If you said it must be 100% identical, then I am afraid
perfect uploading will never be realized. If you said some good enough
approximation is all that is needed, then we can in theory survive an
upload, but then you have broken the need for perfect identity of an
information pattern. This raises the question: just what exactly is
required to subjectively survive.

You abandoned the notion that a specific group of atoms was necessary to
survival.

Now I ask to take the next step, which is to abandon the notion that a
specific pattern of information is necessary to survival.

Certainly getting the pattern close is important for preserving what is
important to each of us: one's memories, personality, and goals. But my
argument is it is of absolutely no importance when it comes to the question
of subjective survival. The person who emerges on the other side of the
upload will consider themselves to have survived the process even if they
lose memories in the process.


>
> > , before it would stop feeling as though you are still there, vividly
> having that experience? I think this too, is a last vestige of dualism, in
> defining some "similarity function" which when satisified, you live, and
> when not satisfied, you die. Note that in any case where your personality,
> or memories are altered, that perspective will still feel 100% certain that
> they are alive and have survived (despite the loss of memories or
> personality change). So my challenge is to push back, and say similarity
> (like bodily continuity) is another red herring, as far as subjective
> survival is concerned and as far as defining "What am I?"
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by 'similarity'. Similarity to what? To a past
> state? People change. I'm not sure that it's actually that useful to ask
> things like "am I the same person that I was at the age of 7?". You could
> equally answer Yes or No, they are both valid. It's basically asking "if
> something changes, is it still the same thing?".
>
> I expect there are certain features, which we don't yet know, that will
> determine whether an information pattern can be regarded as a mind, or that
> will give rise to subjective experience. If you're asking what those
> features are, the only answer anyone can give at present is "We don't
> know". I suspect we'll find out eventually.
>

These are exactly the sort of questions one must ask to break through to
seeing the unimportance of particular details in the pattern as being
necessary to subjective survival.

Jason
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