[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, Mar 21, 2026, 5:32 PM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 21/03/2026 19:16, Jason Resch wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar 21, 2026 at 3:05 PM Keith Henson <hkeithhenson at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >     This issue I have muddled by proposing being able to move to and from
> >     the uploaded state.  If you can do this, continuous memory across
> both
> >     states, it is hard to deny that a person exists in the uploaded
> state.
> >
> >
> > I think certainly "a person" exists in the uploaded state. But is it the
> "same person" as existed in the biological state?
>
>
> Who else could it be?
> It literally could not be anyone else.


Objectively it's the same. But to conclude it is also subjectively the same
requires further assumptions. See the response from the AI I provided in
Bill's thread.


The mind is the same mind. Has to be. I don't even know why I have to keep
> saying these things.
>

Consider the case where you upload your mind to 5 different computers at
once.

Subject each of the 5 instances to gradual modifications (via different
experiences) so that you end up in the end with 5 very distinct persons
with different memories and even personalities.

Have you have become these 5 different people?

If so what principle makes them them all you (when they're run on different
computers and have different psychologies)?

If, on the other hand, you say that you have not become them or survived
through them, then at what point did your original self die?


Jason
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