[ExI] Uploads are self

[Ben Zaiboc]

On 23/03/2026 11:12, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2026, 6:07 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
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>     On 22/03/2026 22:35, Jason Resch  wrote:
>     > On Sun, Mar 22, 2026, 2:05 PM Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
>     >
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>     >     I agree that empty-individualism is more consistent than closed-individualism. It avoids most of the problems closed-individualism gets into. The primary advantage then that open-individualism has over empty- is the probability arguments.
>
>
>     Who are you agreeing with here? Certainly not me. I think that all of these 'individualisms' are daft, to various degrees, and none of them are consistent with reality.
>
>
> As I define them they're exhaustive. So at least one must [be] consistent with reality. This is an especially important point. If you still disagree that logically one must be true you need to show why the three together do not span the realm of all logic[al] possibilities.
>
> Think of it like this:
> Given at least one universe exists, then either:
> 1. A single universe exists.
> 2. 2-10 universes exist.
> 3. More than 10 universes exist.
>
> Without doing a single experiment, we can know a priori that one of these 3 theories of how many universes there are, must be true.
>
> Do you agree?


Hmm, what if 1.5 universes exist?
What if a complex number of universes exist?

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> This is why I setup theories of person identity in an analogous way. Given a person is an entity with at least one consciousness experience, then either:
> 1. A person has only a single conscious experience.
> 2. A person has multiple, but not all, conscious experiences.
> 3. A person has all conscious experiences.
>
> So again, we know one of these must be true.
>
> If you still think otherwise you should explain why the list is not exhaustive of all possibilities, or why you don't think being exhaustive provides sufficient reason to conclude the correct theory lies with the exhaustive set of theories.


I'm not arguing that in your self-defined space, the things that you say aren't logically consistent. I'm saying What has this got to do with the real world?

You keep using unusual terms without defining them. For instance, what is anyone supposed to understand by your use of "all conscious experiences"? Does that mean all experiences that all humans could possibly have, all experiences that all humans have ever had, all experiences that any human could have, all experiences that are possible to any kind of system capable of having experiences, all experiences that a single human (or non-human system) has had/could have, some other meaning that I can't think of at the moment??

Without knowing this, I can't evaluate statements like 2 or 3 above (1 is obviously silly (unless you mean something unusual by 'a single conscious experience')).
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>
>     >
>     >
>     > Correction: I misread what you said above, I thought you said you would have put yourself in empty-individualism, but I noticed you said closed-individualism.
>     >
>     > The reason I said you might fit best with open, rather than closed, is that you acknowledge material bodies don't matter for survival, duplicates (fission) doesn't matter for survival, and on a few occasions, you acknowledged perfect pattern preservation is not required for survival.
>
>
>     I shouldn't have said anything, it gives the mistaken impression that I take any of these categories seriously.


However, I have never said that material bodies don't matter for survival. If your current material body is destroyed, I don't think you are going to survive, no matter how you define the word.

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>     >
>     > To me, this leads to what I call, a permissive survival theory. That is, the view that you could survive in all of the following situations:
>     >
>     > Invasive brain surgery
>     Depends on the nature and extent of the surgery
>     > Partial and even total memory loss (amnesia)
>     Depends on the extent of the loss
>     > Personality changes
>     Depends on the degree of change
>     > Morphing into a completely different person
>     You're the one who's saying 'different person' here.
>     > A long term coma during which your body is metabolically replaced
>     > A teleportation to another location
>     > Destructive mind uploads into a robot brain and body
>     > Having your body assembled from a different pile of atoms
>     These would all result in the same person
>     >
>     > When neither perfect bodily or psychological continuity criteria are necessary to survival, this opens the door to survive as *similar but not identical instances*. And those similar but not identical instances are similar to still other, more distant instances. And so on, leading to possible survival via any mind across the total spectrum of possible instances of conscious minds.
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>     By this logic, if you take a banjo and make various incremental changes to it so as to turn it into a tambourine, it's still a banjo.
>
>
> You've changed substantially since you were a three year old. Do you think the three year old still lives on as you? Or do you think the three year old died somewhere along the way because too much information was added to his brain?


I think that I have developed into the person I am now, from the person that I was at the age of 3. I don't know how to express this in your rather stilted language.
The example of an acorn growing into an oak tree comes to mind. Can it be said that the acorn has been destroyed? That the oak tree IS the acorn? That the acorn was an oak tree all along?
These are just words. The reality is the same, no matter how you express it.

>
>
>     If you make lots of small changes, they become equivalent to one big change. I think the word 'survival' is causing problems here. You need to define what you want it to mean, as it's being used to mean several things, from 'the same as' to different degrees of 'derived from'.
>
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> I've defined it many times. Subjective survival, as I define it, refers to any situation where after some process, you emerge with the subjective feeling that you have survived the process.

You might want to read again what you wrote there.
You are defining "subjective survival" as "the feeling that you have survived". Great. Accurate, but useless. As I said before, the word could mean several things, from 'exactly the same as' to 'derived from', or even 'vaguely related to'. It would help if, every time you want to use the word, you instead explain what you mean by it. This is not Alice in Wonderland.

Alternatively, how about if we pick one definition of the word and stick to it?
Maybe "exactly the same as".
According to that, then the 3-year-old me has not survived.
But if we pick "derived from", then the 3-year-old me has survived.

Hmm, tricky.
How about we accept all the possible definitions of the word?
Then a lot of questions are going to have the answer "Yes and No".

That feels, to me, appropriate to this discussion. We are, after all, talking about philosophy.

>
> In my view you need not be the same after the process as before. You survive trips by train, you survive invasive brain surgery that leave you needing to relearn how to walk, etc.
>
>     I think we'd get much greater clarity from ditching the word altogether, and in each case using a more exact term.
>     To see what I mean, consider the question "If you become a different person, do you survive?".
>
>
> If you become a different person do you "emerge with the subjective feeling that you have survived"?


That's just a rewording of the question. It doesn't make any more sense.
But I suppose, given the above, we can say "Yes and No".

>
> You've become a different person since you were 3. Do you have now the feeling that you have survived those intervening years?

Am I exactly the same? No.
Am I derived from that person? Yes.
Is that 3-year-old person dead? Depends what you mean by 'dead'.
Does that 3-year-old person 'live on' in me now? Depends what you mean by 'live on'. There are aspects of him that are still present, and aspects that aren't. At least I presume so. Don't ask me to identify them.

This is why I'm suggesting that the word 'survive' is more of a hindrance than a help.

(in summary: Yes and No).

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>
>     >
>     > So we thereby reveal, that the contents of a conscious experience are a mere contingency, one of no more relevance to the question of your survival than the color of the shirt you are wearing. You can change it, and get you would still be there.
>
>     "Reveal"??
>     Telling language, there.
>
>
> If you follow the logic and reason as I've laid out, I don't see how the conclusion can be avoided.


And that's the problem. You're 'laying out' a completely abstract world that has very little to do with the real world we live in. The rules of your world may well be self-consistent, but don't intersect much with the real world that real people actually live in.

>  You have managed to avoid the conclusion by giving inconsistent answers to questions which should have the same answer.


That's on you, not me. You're viewing my answers in such a way as to make them inconsistent with your interpretations.

>
>
>     You are not 'revealing' anything, you are drawing a conclusion. A confusing one. We were talking about minds, not isolated conscious experiences, and the word 'survive' can mean many different things.
>
>
> Do you have a better definition for subjective survival than the one I have offered?
>
>     Taken literally, that sentence seems to be saying nothing more than that someone can have different thoughts or experiences without them ceasing to exist, but I'm pretty sure that's not what you mean to say.
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>
>
> Yes that is what I am saying there. That there's no limit to the range of experiences that you can have.

You need to be more exact for that to be meaningful. (but at face value, these are two different things).

For the last statement, though, I think it's false. For example, there must be experiences that the human mind is incapable of experiencing.
Of course, this depends on your definition of 'experience'!

-- 
Ben