[ExI] Uploads are self

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Mar 24, 2026, 9:50 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 24/03/2026 12:08, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.
>
>
> I agree with John here.
> Functionalism says that you can expect the experiences in your own mind to
> belong to you, and nobody else (even if other people have very similar, or
> even identical, experiences, which of course we can't actually verify).
>

That makes no sense to me. If "identical experiences" are found in two
different minds, how can it be that this experience belongs to "you and
nobody else"?

Jason


> On Tuesday, 24 March 2026 at 11:23, John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> On 21/03/2026 21:19, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> * > Functionalism is a theory in the philosophy of mind. If one accepts
>> functionalism, then that is enough to establish the uploaded mind will be
>> conscious.*
>>
>
> *Yes. And an implicit belief in functionalism is the reason you feel
> certain that solipsism is untrue and your fellow human beings are
> conscious, except when they are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead. *
>
> * > But functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences
>> instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.*
>>
>
> *No, and when discussing this topic great care is needed in the use of
> personal pronouns. According to functionalism the "you" of yesterday is the
> "you" who says he remembers being the "you" of yesterday. And yes, if two
> beings are able to do that then they are both the "you" of yesterday. Using
> this procedure one can always look back through time and see a continuous
> chain of "yous", but trying to do this into the future does not work, it
> would be like pushing on a string. As Hugh Everett said in his original PhD
> thesis that introduced the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics,
> it would be like asking which one was the real original amoeba after it
> reproduced by dividing in two. *
>
> *And if you reject functionalism then you'd need to take the idea that
> you're the only conscious being in the universe seriously. Do you really
> want to do that? *
>
> * John K Clark*
>
>>
>>
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