[ExI] Uploads are self

Jason Resch jasonresch at gmail.com
Tue Mar 24 16:14:36 UTC 2026


On Tue, Mar 24, 2026, 10:53 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 24/03/2026 14:10, Jason Resch  wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 24, 2026, 9:50 AM Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> >
> >     On 24/03/2026 12:08, Jason Resch wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>     functionalism is silent on the question of which experiences
> instantiated in which places are experience[s] you can expect to be yours.
> >
> >
> >     I agree with John here.
> >
> >     Functionalism says that you can expect the experiences in your own
> mind to belong to you, and nobody else (even if other people have very
> similar, or even identical, experiences, which of course we can't actually
> verify).
> >
> >
> > That makes no sense to me. If "identical experiences" are found in two
> different minds, how can it be that this experience belongs to "you and
> nobody else"?
>
>
> Ok, I see what you mean. Maybe I phrased it badly.
>
> What I'm trying to say is that your own experiences have no link to other
> people's, even if they are identical. They may be the same (although nobody
> could tell), but they are in different places (different minds), so it
> doesn't matter. In fact, we can dispense with the concept of similarity or
> sameness altogether, it's irrelevant. What happens in your mind stays in
> your mind, and that's all that needs to be said.
>

But that position is inconsistent with surviving as an upload. For why
isn't that upload merely another mind (in a different place) having the
same experience?

Jason
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