[ExI] There Is No ‘Hard Problem Of Consciousness’

[John Clark]

On Sat, May 9, 2026 at 12:00 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

*>> David Chalmers wanted to know why the brain’s behavior is accompanied
>> by experience at all, but it seems to me that if Charles Darwin was right
>> then there can be only one answer to that question, because consciousness
>> is the inevitable byproduct of intelligence. That's because Natural
>> Selection can't directly detect consciousness any better than we can detect
>> it in other people, and nothing can select for something that it can't see.
>> But Natural Selection CAN see intelligent behavior. *
>>
>
> *> We've probably had this discussion before, *
>

*Yep.*

*> but I disagree that consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of
> intelligence.  There are clearly multiple ways to achieve intelligence. *
>

*Clearly? No, that is not clear at all ! We have only found one way to
successfully make an intelligence, neural networks, and that only happened
about 10 years ago. *

*> abstract discrete logic gates*
>

*You can't make something from abstract parts, you need real physical
parts, and Richard Feynman said "What I cannot create, I do not
understand". All the intelligent computers that we've been able to make use
neural networks and physical (not abstract) logic gates are some of the
parts in a neural network. So logically your default position when you
encounter a computer that is just as smart or smarter than you should be
that it is at least as conscious as you are. *

*And we should hope that the computer is doing the same thing, is giving
you the benefit of the doubt and is assuming that you are also conscious.
Ultimately it's not gonna make much difference if humans believe that
computers are conscious or not, but it will make a very big difference if
intelligent computers believe that humans are just stochastic parrots with
no more consciousness than a rock. If that's what they believe then we are
in big trouble. *


> *> and running on physical phenomenal qualities being two very different
> types. *
>

*Physical phenomenal qualities? If an old fashioned vacuum tube computer
says that 2+2 =4 and a modern solid state computer also says that 2+2=4, is
the vacuum 4 the same as the solid state 4?*


> * > If one is more efficient than the other, evolution will naturally
> select for that.*
>

*Human engineers would be even more likely to find the most efficient and
simplest way to make an intelligence. I'm glad to see that you believe
consciousness was produced by random mutation and natural selection, but
apparently you don't believe consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of
intelligent behavior, therefore I want to ask you a very important
question. Do you believe that your fellow human beings are conscious when
they are sleeping or under anesthesia or dead? I don't because when they
are in any of those conditions they are not behaving very intelligently,
but I'd like to know what you believe.*


> *  > You always seem to ignore the fact that the word 'red' is nothing
> like a redness quality. *
>

*I have always known the difference between a wavelength and a qualia. You
seem to think this is a very deep concept. It is not.  *



> *> A redness quality will never be the byproduct of an abstract word like
> red.*
>

*The word is abstract but the qualia quality is not??*

*John K Clark*



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>> *Chalmers also claimed that even after hypothetically accounting for our
>> entire behavior, and for all our reports about our inner life, there would
>> still be an explanatory gap between brain processes and experience; and I
>> agree with Chalmers about that because any iterative sequence of "why"
>> questions will either go on forever or terminate in a brute fact, such as
>> consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed
>> intelligently.  *
>>
>>
>> *John K Clark*
>>
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