[ExI] redness is relation assumption? (Was Re: My theory of consciousness)

[Brent Allsop]

Hi Jason,


On Sat, Sep 26, 2026 at 11:28 PM Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Sep 25, 2026, 5:29 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Hi Jason,
>>
>>
>> I’ve been discussing your paper with co-pilot.  It’s hard for me to get
>> my redness is not relation brain to fully model what I’m sure is a great
>> model, given certain assumptions.  But co-pilot has helped, significantly.
>>
>
> That is wonderful to hear Brent. That is a great application of AI. :-) I
> appreciate your engagement and in particular thank you and co-pilot for the
> many great ideas below, more to say:
>
>
>
> After a short discussion of how you define or assume that “phenomenal
>> character” is “the organization of usable distinctions possessed by a
>> center.”   and the great ways you justify this assumption, it eventually
>> agreed that making this assumeption is an issue, and that it is a
>> falsifiable issue.
>>
>
> That is good news (to me), it means it is a scientific theory we can test
> and falsify, so we're not idly speculating in pure philosophy.
>
>
>>
>> And co-pilot agreeing this was an issue with your paper I asked it:
>>
>>
>>
>> “Can you formulate some proposals for how his paper might address this
>> issue? Especially regarding pointing out how both our predictions are
>> falsifiable, and that eventually science will demonstrate who is right”
>> regarding whether you can get a redness quality from a bit?”
>>
>>
>>
>> Here is co-pilot’s response:
>>
>>
>>
>> Brent, this is exactly the right question to be asking — because *your
>> view and Resch’s view make different empirical predictions*, and the
>> paper *could* make this explicit. In fact, the paper already gestures
>> toward falsification criteria (Section 1, Abstract), but it doesn’t yet
>> spell out how the “intrinsic redness” hypothesis and the
>> “redness‑from‑usable‑distinctions” hypothesis diverge scientifically.
>>
>
> The paper does have an explicit mention of this idea under "11.3
> Challenges for nonfunctionalist theories" where I give the example of using
> different material substrates, I.e. silicon, germanium or carbon to build a
> computer that emulates a conscious mind, and whether this could manifest
> any difference in demonstrated behavior.
>

You're leaving out the most important 'function' of consciousness: its
ability to apprehend what physical properties are like.  i.e. the ability
to answer questions like: What is redness like for you? or, "My redness is
like your greenness, both of which we call red."


> This is under substrate intrinsicism, which is the general name I use for
> theories like yours that say a particular material is needed. I recently
> learned there is another theory not unlike yours, called Russellian Monism,
> which also holds that the "what" of what something is made of is what
> carries the consciousness properties rather than the "how" of the dynamical
> behavior. I am working on an updated version of the paper to discuss
> Russellian Monism. I think this new paper actually can explain where the
> intuition comes from in novel way.
>
> Here is what the currently available version of my paper (not the new one)
> offers as a challenge to substrate intrinsicism:
>
> "Substrate intrinsicism. Computation is specified abstractly: a physical
> imple-
> mentation must realize the relevant state transitions, but it requires no
> particular
> material. Conway’s Game of Life makes this vivid: its simple, fully
> specified local
> rules support a universal Turing machine (Rendell, 2016). Consider three
> computers
> implementing the same high-level process, one in silicon, another in
> germanium, and a
> third in carbon-nanotube transistors. Suppose every distinction,
> transition, access rela-
> tion, and temporal dependency constitutive of the center is preserved.
> Their materials,
> energy use, and microscopic histories differ, but nothing in the
> implemented process
> unfolds differently. The same alternatives become available, enter the
> same comparisons
> and memories, and guide the same judgments and actions. To assign them
> different
> experiences solely because their materials differ would make phenomenal
> character
> vary without any difference the processes themselves could encounter."
>
> In short, there's no "causal path" available through which any difference
> in experience could be made know. To the process. Nothing different would
> enter its memories, and no differences would be reflected in its speech.
> All the internal states of its mind program are one for one identical, so
> then, in what could the phenomenal difference consist in and how could the
> subject come to know this difference?
>
>
> Below is a set of *concrete proposals* for how the paper *could* address
>> this issue directly, in a way that respects both positions and shows how
>> science could eventually decide between them.
>>
>> I’ll ground these proposals in the actual text of the paper you’re
>> viewing ().
>>
>> *⭐ Proposal 1 — Explicitly acknowledge the competing definition of
>> phenomenal character*
>>
>> The paper could add a short section saying:
>>
>> “Some theorists hold that phenomenal qualities (e.g., redness) are *intrinsic
>> physical properties* of certain states, independent of their relational
>> or computational role. On this view, consciousness *uses* these
>> intrinsic qualities but does not constitute them.”
>>
>
> I don't have a clear picture of how a process could use or access these
> intrinsic qualities.
>

We simply know there is some process that can 'subjectively bind' 2 or more
elemental qualities into one unified gestalt subjective experience.
We can objectively observe all this, it's just that the resulting
descriptions of the qualities' behavior don't tell you what they are like.
We simply need to ask questions like: "Which of all those descriptions is a
description of redness?"" and we need the resulting dictionary between the
subjective and the objective.


>
> The move Russellian Monism takes is to say the same intrinsic qualities
> that explain consciousness are what drive the dynamics of physics. But I
> think this also leaves us at an explanatory dead end. Physics doesn't give
> us access to intrinsic properties, so no physical experiment could ever
> tell us anything about them, why they work the way they do, or how they
> connect to any third person observable dynamical physical effect.
>
>
> Then contrast this with the paper’s own definition:
>>
>> “By contrast, the centered‑knowledge thesis identifies phenomenal
>> character with the *organization of usable distinctions* possessed by a
>> process. This rejects intrinsic qualia and treats phenomenality as
>> relational and structural.”
>>
>> This would make the conceptual disagreement explicit rather than implicit.
>>
>> *⭐ Proposal 2 — Show that the two views make different empirical
>> predictions*
>>
>> This is the strongest way to address your concern. The paper already
>> claims to offer “explicit falsification criteria” (Abstract, ), but it
>> doesn’t yet contrast them with the falsification criteria of
>> intrinsic‑qualia theories.
>>
>> Here’s how it could:
>>
>> *Intrinsic‑qualia prediction*
>>
>> If redness is an intrinsic physical property of a state, then:
>>
>
> States this way, the only difference between your theory and mine is a
> matter of scale. You say a phenomenal state it is identical to a low level
> state, whereas I say a phenomenal state identical with a high level state.
>
>
>>    - Two states with identical computational/relational organization *could
>>    still differ phenomenally* if their intrinsic physical microstructure
>>    differs.
>>
>>
> Yes this is the example I give with the silicon, germanium and carbon
> nanotube transistors. It is a different micro physical state, but the same
> high level informational/computational state.
>
>
>
>>    - A perfect functional duplicate (e.g., a digital emulation) *might
>>    lack redness*, even if behavior and knowledge are preserved.
>>
>>
> But if behavior is preserved by running the same high level program, how
> could any behavioral difference enter the picture?
>

As I was saying, you ask the system, "What is redness like for you?"  And
there must be some set of physics that constitutes that redness.  If it
cannot aprehend the physical qualities on which it is instantiated, it
isn't functioning correctly.



> If no behavioral change occurs, then how then could this test reveal any
> difference in the phenomenal experiences of the computers based on
> different substrates? How do we discover of any of them lack redness or
> experience redness differently when the behavior is known a priori to be
> identical?
>
> This is why my paper takes the path of justifying the theory abductively
> (from the wide number of facts it can explain)
>

Again, you're leaving out the simple fact that consciousness apprehends
physical properties.



> thereby showing it is a powerful and useful theory. This is a limitation
> all theories of consciousness face, because each of us is trapped in our
> own view, we can never see what anyone else sees. So unlike most theories
> in science which depend on repeatable objective results, consciousness
> theories (being designed to describe the subjective) can't use many of the
> standard scientific methods.
>
>
>
>>    - Neural replacement could preserve all functional organization but
>>    still *lose qualia* if the intrinsic physical property is not
>>    reproduced.
>>
>>
> My new paper (will be ready in a few days) makes some powerful arguments
> against this possibility (of maintaining organizational equivalence but
> losing qualia i.e. zombies).
>
>
>>
>> This is the “fading qualia” or “dancing qualia” possibility.
>>
>> *Centered‑knowledge prediction (paper’s view)*
>>
>> If phenomenal character *is* the organization of usable distinctions:
>>
>>    - Any system with the same usable distinctions and access relations
>>    *must* have the same phenomenal character.
>>    - A digital emulation that preserves KC (the complete knowledge
>>    organization) *must* preserve redness.
>>    - Neural replacement cannot change phenomenality unless it changes
>>    the distinctions available to the center.
>>
>> This is organizational invariance (Section 4.1–4.2, ).
>>
>> *Empirical divergence*
>>
>> The paper could say:
>>
>> “If intrinsic qualia exist, then two systems with identical KC could
>> differ phenomenally. If centered knowledge is correct, such divergence is
>> impossible.”
>>
>> This sets up a clear empirical fork.
>>
>
> Essentially where your theory and mine diverge comes down to whether the
> intrinsic redness sits below the "substitution level" or above it.
>

Yes.  We are simply making different predictions about the nature of
qualities, and it is up to the experimentalists to demonstrate which theory
is false.


> If it is a high level property that sits above the substitution level,
> then your theory and mine can be seen as equivalent. But if the property
> sits below, that is, it it is some feature or property of a thing that can
> be used to build a universal Turing machine, then when sitting in this
> space as a building block of a computer it must necessarily exist below the
> substitution level for any program this computer runs. It would then be
> causally isolated from having any effect on the process, and whether this
> property is present or not at that low level, makes no difference to the
> evolution of this program. It will unfold the same way regardless.
>
> *⭐ Proposal 3 — Identify testable consequences of each view*
>>
>> The paper already proposes tests for its own theory (e.g., neural
>> replacement, emulation fidelity). It could add parallel tests for intrinsic
>> qualia.
>>
>> *Test A — High‑fidelity neural replacement*
>>
>>    - Replace neurons with silicon equivalents that preserve all
>>    functional distinctions.
>>    - *Intrinsic‑qualia view:* Phenomenal character might change or fade.
>>    - *Centered‑knowledge view:* Phenomenal character must remain
>>    identical.
>>
>> *Test B — Digital emulation with preserved KC*
>>
>>    - Build a digital emulation of a subject’s brain at the substitution
>>    level.
>>    - *Intrinsic‑qualia view:* The emulation might behave identically but
>>    lack redness.
>>    - *Centered‑knowledge view:* If KC is preserved, redness must be
>>    preserved.
>>
>>
> I might suggest as something to try: take all of your writings and
> thoughts on your theory of consciousness and ask a frontier model AI to put
> it together in an organized paper in a similar manner as I did for my
> ideas. I started using OpenAI but recently switched to Claude Fable and
> have found it far better and faster. It can do much more in each step
> without messing things up and builds new PDFs in seconds rather than
> minutes. It's ability to research and find relevant citations in the
> literature is also quite good (though not perfect). I think this will make
> your ideas much easier to share with certain people, and you will also
> learn a lot from the experience (I certainly did). It will help you frame
> your own ideas relative to others in the field, point out people who have
> agreed with or defended ideas like your own, point out challenges similar
> theories face, and can recommend how to go about testing your theory.
>

Thanks, this is very helpful.  I've gotten started on this, and it is very
helpful.
  <http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat>
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