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<P>From <A
href="http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=03/11/25/213206&mode=thread&tid=103&tid=126&tid=172&tid=99">Slashdot</A>:
The cryptographer <A href="http://www.chaum.com/">David Chaum</A>, through
discussion with top cryptographers such as Ron Rivest, has designed a secure and
verifiable voting system. One of the goals of his design is that anyone can
verify that votes were tabulated correctly. It's good to see real
security/crypto people working on this problem. Their website <A
href="http://www.vreceipt.com/">vreceipt.com</A> has a <A
href="http://www.vreceipt.com/article.pdf">whitepaper</A> and a <A
href="http://www.vreceipt.com/">press release</A>. <BR>The new type of receipt
is printed in two layers by a modified version of familiar receipt printers. You
can read it clearly in the booth, but before leaving, you must separate the
layers and choose which one to keep. Either one you take has the vote
information you saw coded in it, but it cannot be read (except with numeric keys
divided among computers run by election officials). The half you take is
supplied digitally by the voting machine for publication on an official election
website. These posted receipts are the input to the process of making the final
tally. A lotto-like draw selects points in the process that must be decrypted
for inspection, but not so many points as to compromise privacy. Anyone with a
PC can then use simple software to check all such decryptions published on the
website and thereby verify that the final tally must be correct. Such audit
cannot be fooled, no matter how many voting machines or other election computers
are compromised or how clever or well-resourced the attack.</P></BODY></HTML>