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<P><FONT size=2>Russell Wallace wrote on the perennial topic of personal
identity:</FONT></P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P><FONT size=2>I saw this when rummaging through the archives, and didn't see
a reply, and it's been gnawing at me as the one such paradox I don't have a
satisfactory answer for. I'm going to rephrase it in more vivid terms that I
find help make it clearer:</FONT></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><FONT size=2><snip></FONT></P>
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<P><FONT size=2>So, here are your options:</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>A: I turn you into a frog.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>B: I run off a copy of you. In case you're a threadist, I'll
do it atom by atom, neuron by neuron, symmetrically, with thread of
consciousness unbroken throughout, such that there will be two of you at the
end and neither objectively nor subjectively will it be possible to tell which
is the original and which is the copy (and in case you're a substratist, all
copies will continue to be made of carbon compounds in water just like before,
no uploading into silicon chips), so you should equally expect to be either.
Then I will let one copy go free, but similarly multiply the other into 999.
And then I will take all 999 to hell and make them write essays on
postmodernist literature! Muhahaha!</FONT></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><FONT size=2>(Option A is ruled out since being a frog doesn't do much for
one<SPAN class=906543615-10102006>'</SPAN>s future.)</FONT></P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P><FONT size=2>"But," you continue to muse, "let's look at the situation
tomorrow in that event. There will be 1 copy of me free, and 999 undergoing
horrible torture. There will be no objective fact of the matter as to what the
copying sequence was. The only objective fact will be that 0.1% of my
instances will be free and 99.9% will be tortured. Therefore I should estimate
a 99.9% probability that I'll be tortured. Compared to that, being turned into
a frog doesn't sound so bad after all."</FONT></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><SPAN class=906543615-10102006></SPAN><FONT size=2>Here's where the confusion
becomes apparent. It's the usual confusion between objective and subjective
points of view, reinforced by culture, language, and personal experience. It's
Descartes'' error in not so subtle disguise, the assumption within "cogito, ergo
sum" that *I* am experiencing, rather than the more defensible assertion that
*some process* seems to be reporting on an experience<SPAN
class=906543615-10102006>.</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT></P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P><FONT size=2>I'm assuming for the sake of the thought experiment that
you're Homo economicus, only concerned about what you personally will
experience,</FONT></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><FONT size=2>What is this "you" that is spoken of, Human? The "Self" which is
held so dearly is only a conceptual locus, not an intrinsic property of
matter.</FONT></P>
<BLOCKQUOTE dir=ltr style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
<P><FONT size=2>that you don't value maximizing copies for its own sake etc;
the question is whether in case B you should estimate the probability that you
will be forced to write essays on postmodernist literature versus being
allowed to go free at 50/50 or 99.9/0.1.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>Now to a threadist the first line of reasoning seems correct,
the thread of consciousness splits 50/50 and after that who cares what happens
to the other thread that isn't you? So I'll understand perfectly if threadists
reply "fetchez la vache!".</FONT></P></BLOCKQUOTE>
<P><FONT size=2>Thread of consciousness is a useful concept, but it's misused
here. Earlier it was clearly stated that there would be no way to distinguish
among the copies, so the (often useful) concept of Self can't apply here. Or if
it were to apply, it would have to apply equally to all copies and therefore be
equally meaningless. Self is not something intrinsic, it is only the point of
view of an agent, and since an agent, by definition, must be able to
intentionally affect its environment, the concept of agent (and by extension,
Self) does not apply to independent copies.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>So, the logically consistent way to look at the above situation
must be from the third party point of view: That the future scenario would
contain one individual indistinguishable from you, and 99 new individuals being
tortured.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>So the question (which must remain in the third person POV)is
whether you would prefer a future with (A) your agency contained within the body
of a frog, or (B) the creation of 99 individuals (who happen to be very similar
to you) who are being tortured.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>Makes sense?</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>Paradox is always a matter of insufficient context. In the
bigger picture, all the pieces must fit.</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2>- Jef</FONT></P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT> </P>
<P><FONT size=2></FONT> </P>
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