<br><div><span class="gmail_quote">On 1/12/07, <b class="gmail_sendername">Damien Broderick</b> <<a href="mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org">email@example.com</a>> wrote:</span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
6. me (although not yet dead, I think)<br>Damien Broderick</blockquote><div><br>7. Nor me. Though I would like to see what the future looks like I have yet to see a probable future I would actually like to live in.<br><br>
Damien's problem is I think different from mine. I think Damien is stuck on the identity problem (feel free to correct if I am misinterpreting loose interpretations). I on the other hand, though it may have taken me a while to get there, accept that "me" is "me" is "me" no matter what the instantiation. I have real questions about wanting to project "me" into a reality that "I" find totally unacceptable. Odds IMO would currently dictate multiple probable future realities that "I" would object to or view as pointless.
<br><br>So here is a question, how many cryonics suspendees would choose to be brought back into reality with a lion about to rip out their throat? How do you guarantee that that is a low probability reanimation reality?