<html><body><div>I don't think a universe would exist that contained a version of you along with three legged dogs as we share common ancestry and we have four limbs. The probability of such a thing is about equal to the probability that a tennis ball thrown by a child will pass through a 3 foot thick concrete wall. Although such anamolous universes have probabilities greater than zero, I would still consider them irrelevant. </div>
<div><BR> </div>
<div ><BR><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE style="PADDING-LEFT: 8px; MARGIN-LEFT: 8px; BORDER-LEFT: blue 2px solid" webmail="1">-------- Original Message --------<BR>Subject: Re: [ExI] Next moment, everything around you will probably<BR>change<BR>From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <stathisp@gmail.com><BR>Date: Fri, June 15, 2007 4:41 am<BR>To: auto404677@hushmail.com, "ExI chat list"<BR><extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><BR><BR><BR><BR>
<DIV><SPAN class=gmail_quote>On 15/06/07, <B class=gmail_sendername>TheMan</B> <<A onclick="Popup.composeWindow('pcompose.php?sendto=mabranu%40yahoo.com');; return false;" href="mailto:mabranu@yahoo.com" target=_blank>mabranu@yahoo.com</A>> wrote:<BR><BR></SPAN>
<BLOCKQUOTE class=gmail_quote style="PADDING-LEFT: 1ex; MARGIN: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; BORDER-LEFT: rgb(204,204,204) 1px solid">In that case, it still doesn't mean that it is<BR>rational to assume that we will continue having the<BR>same environment in the next moment, and the next,<BR>etc. It still doesn't justify the belief that we will<BR>still live on the same planet tomorrow. Just because<BR>we have had an incredibly unchanging environment so<BR>far, doesn't mean that we will in the coming moments.<BR>The normal thing should be to be through around from <BR>place to place in universe at every new moment,<BR>shouln't it?</BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR>You have discovered what has been called the "failure of induction" problem with ensemble (or multiverse) theories. One solution is to consider this as evidence against ensemble theories. The other solution is to show that the measure of universes similar to the ones we experience from moment to moment is greater than the measure of anomalous universes (we use "measure" when discussing probabilities in relation to subsets of infinite sets). For example, it seems reasonable to assume that if some other version of me in the multiverse is sufficiently similar to me to count as my subjective successor, then most likely that version of me arrived at his position as a result of a local physical universe very similar to my own which continues evolving in the time-honoured manner. The version of me that is the same except living in a world where dogs have three legs would far more likely have been born in a world where dogs always had three legs, and thus would *not* count as a successor who remembers that dogs used to have four legs. The version of me who lives in a world where canine anatomy is apparently miraculously transformed is of much lower measure so much less likely to be experienced as my successor. <BR></DIV><BR></DIV>Further references:<BR><BR><A href="http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node3.html" target=_blank>http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks/docs/occam/node3.html</A><BR><BR><A href="http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm" target=_blank>http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm</A><BR><BR><BR clear=all><BR>-- <BR>Stathis Papaioannou
<HR>
<PRE>_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
<A onclick="Popup.composeWindow('pcompose.php?sendto=extropy-chat%40lists.extropy.org'); return false;" href="http://email.secureserver.net/pcompose.php?aEmlPart=0&type=reply&folder=INBOX&uid=47740#Compose">extropy-chat<B></B>@lists.extropy.org</A>
<A href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat" target=_blank>http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</A>
</PRE></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV></body></html>