On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 5:47 AM, Lee Corbin <<a href="mailto:lcorbin@rawbw.com">lcorbin@rawbw.com</a>> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_quote"><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
I don't have time to digress on modal reality, and the way that I think that<br>
it's subsumed by the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics.<br>
In short, MWI so far as I can tell, provides a complete model for modal<br>
reality.</blockquote><div><br>### As usual, we agree more than might be expected from the initial statements. Here I would however say that modal realism subsumes MWI. Tegmark posits four levels of parallelism, and I would see modal realism as relevant to the fourth level - the ensemble of all mathematical structures, while MWI pertains to the current mathematical description of our direct neighborhood (60 billion light years diameter).<br>
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</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"><div class="Ih2E3d"><br>
> Like a GLUT (Giant Look-Up Table) of you? And this is the only<br>
> you, the one and unique representation and the time/place of your<br>
> consciousness?<br>
<br>
</div>Of course, as you know, this is at extreme variance with our<br>
normal usages of the words "you" and the time/places of your<br>
consciousness. For example, either under modal realism or the<br>
MWI, something extremely similar to me (under the conventional<br>
meanings of words) actually received a phone call a few minutes<br>
ago, and so is not typing this. It's a "possible world" under<br>
modal realism, and equally real under the MWI. Below, you use<br>
"versions of you" to talk about, for example, those Rafals who<br>
get to live forever, or those Lees who got a phone call.</blockquote><div><br>### Yes, this is indeed a bit different way of looking at oneself - trying to do away with time as something that passes, and instead seeing it as a part of yourself, one of the dimensions that differentiate various parts of me from each other. The "Rafals who get to live forever" are more like thin lines connecting a larger mass at the base of the tree (corresponding to the majority of my versions that die before or during the singularity) to the wider branching parts corresponding to the versions of me successfully surviving the singularity, getting uploaded and having the chance to do all things that a being can do and still be recognizably similar to the me-now-here.<br>
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(Now I am actually very sympathetic to a definition of "you" that<br>
states that "you are a fuzzy sphere in the space of all algorithms",<br>
and that (a version of) you traces out some particular path over<br>
time. This moving point may leave the sphere so far behind that<br>
"you become someone else".)</blockquote><div><br>### Yes! <br><br>-----------------------------------<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<br>
Now on your usage of words, he and I and all the Lee's who<br>
were/are fighting in the Second World War, are simply a part<br>
of the great Tree of Me. An immediate difficulty you might want<br>
to address is, "Does the tree of Lee overlap with the tree of<br>
Rafal?" If not, why not? My own "fuzzy spheres" do allow<br>
for overlap at their extreme edges.</blockquote><div><br>### Well, yes, I think that some overlap exists. Some of the Rafal-parts and the Lee-parts that make it through the singularity may one day live in the same piece of computronium, perhaps sharing some basic resources, perhaps even buying and selling memories and various utilities - but in general my definition of self does not permit strong overlap with other minds.<br>
<br>BTW, Lee - are you *that* old? :)<br><br>-----------------------------------------------<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<div class="Ih2E3d"><br>
> Causation is nothing but correlation...if you know what I mean.<br>
<br>
</div>Actually, I don't. Many years ago John Clark made an excellent<br>
case that for A to cause B reduces simply to "A always comes<br>
before B". Maybe the current branch of the JC tree is doubtful<br>
of that now, but after lengthy debate he convinced me.<br>
<br>
Also, the study of "Causality" conducted by Judea Pearl in the<br>
book of that name makes me highly suspicious of trying to<br>
reduce causality to correlation.<br>
<div class="Ih2E3d"></div></blockquote><div><br>### This is indeed a very thorny issue. I agree that in some sense, describing causality is more complex than simply pointing to a correlation. One could even claim that causation can act backwards in time - when you predict a supernova explosion, and act accordingly, it is like a message from the future having an impact on the present. But in the present context I still think it is fair to say that causation is a form of correlation. My thoughts correlate with my actions, i.e. the omniscient observer would be able to calculate the shape of parts of my tree of life (what is the measure of me that goes to bed in an hour), by observing other parts of me (the neurons in my hypothalamus now). Correlation is the glue that keeps time together. Correlation is the only connection between the world states that comprise me. Correlation is the connection between each moment of my conscious existence. So to say that my thoughts cause my actions, is to say that my present thoughts correlate with my actions. Not all correlation is causation, but all causation is correlation.<br>
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</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"><div class="Ih2E3d"><br>
> Thus I am the many-dimensional sculptor of my past, present<br>
> and future. I do care about the size of my tree of life, which<br>
> translated into time-speak means, I want to live longer.<br>
<br>
</div>You mean "this version of you wants to live longer", right?</blockquote><div><br>### Well, actually, wanting to live longer (assuming no severe pain) is one of the key characteristics of all parts of me. If a mind with my memories and inclinations is made but it has no built-in desire to live longer (in the sense of identifying with the branches of me that extend as far as possible), then that mind is not a part of me. It is its own little tree of life.<br>
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</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;"><div class="Ih2E3d"><br>
> If some of my versions in at least some possible universes<br>
> escape aging and live for thousands of years, it is like saying<br>
> that my tree of life is tall. And those who would resolutely<br>
> refuse life extension? Their trees are stunted, mere bushes,<br>
> since in every possible universe they choose death.<br>
<br>
</div>Well yes, but I doubt that they choose death in *every*<br>
possible universe. Without recourse to "possible worlds", one<br>
may simply point out that at 75 years of age one of them<br>
happened to make a friend who was the world's most<br>
persuasive cryonics advocate.</blockquote><div><br>### There may be people who would simply refuse to call a survivor a part of their tree of life. They define themselves as mortal, and since the definition is all there is to a mathematical structure, they are mortal.<br>
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<br>
By "copies" in these and similar threads, we always meant copies<br>
of a version-of-you in a tiny branch of the overall multiverse.</blockquote><div><br>### Yeah, here we agree. I agree that "copies" that are not ideally identical are indeed separate branches of me, as long as they don't diverge beyond recognition.<br>
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* Action Item: Do I benefit from the replication of copies that<br>
become a tiny bit different almost at once, and<br>
then have different thoughts as they explore<br>
many different planets? Should I pay for that?<br>
Analysis: Either on Rafal's analysis or mine,<br>
the answer is "YES". He'd say your tree of life<br>
is enriched, I'd say you get more runtime.</blockquote><div><br>### Yes, we agree here. <br><br>------------------------ <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Left unanalyzed for now: *Action Item: Do I benefit by the<br>
multiplication over space of absolutely quantum-<br>
mechanically equivalent copies. Analysis: later.<br>
<br>
SO I think we agree that it's better for one to get more<br>
runtime---or as you would say---have more and higher<br>
branches in the Tree-of-You. I'd favor leaving the<br>
"absolutely quantum-mechanically equivalent copies<br>
case" until after we're seeing a little more eye-to-eye<br>
on the above (or making sure we do) Even though your<br>
subject line directly implied runtime to be taken merely<br>
as summed over absolutely identical copies! Grrr. :-)<br>
</blockquote><div><br>### Yes, this quantum mechanical shtick is tough. But I still don't like the term "runtime" - it seems to imply that running and re-running the same calculations is important. I want new calculations to be performed, so I would spawn teleporter quality copies to explore, preferably with some feedback mechanism to prolong cohesion among copies as they learn new things. I would not rent computronium just to run the same moment over and over again, like Egan's climber.<br>
<br>Rafal</div></div><br>