<html><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF"><div><br></div><div><br>On 29/12/2009, at 5:30 AM, Stefano Vaj <<a href="mailto:stefano.vaj@gmail.com">stefano.vaj@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div class="gmail_quote">2009/12/28 Stathis Papaioannou <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com"><a href="mailto:stathisp@gmail.com">stathisp@gmail.com</a></a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
So my question is, Will I still have<br>
consciousness in this sense if my brain is replaced with an electronic<br>
one that results in the same behaviour? And the answer is, Yes. That's<br>
what the thought experiment I've described demonstrates.<br>
<br clear="all"></blockquote></div><br>Yes. <br><br>Or you might already be a philosophical zombie, in which case neither you (by definition, not being "conscious") nor I (because we are restricted to dealing with *phenomena*, any hypothetical Ding-an-sich being unattainable anyway) would know anything about that. <br>
<br>This is another way to say that philosophical zombies, either "natural" or electronic, cannot be part of anybody's reality.<br></div></blockquote><br><div>I wouldn't know it if I were or suddenly became a zombie, but I would know it if, not currently being a zombie, part of my brain were replaced with zombie components.</div><div><br></div><div>--</div><div>Stathis Papaioannou</div></body></html>