<html><head><style type="text/css"><!-- DIV {margin:0px;} --></style></head><body><div style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:8pt"><div><br></div><div style="font-family: verdana,helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 8pt;"><br><div style="font-family: arial,helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 10pt;"><font face="Tahoma" size="2"><hr size="1"><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj@gmail.com><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> ExI chat list <extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Wed, January 6, 2010 2:39:10 PM<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> Re: [ExI] atheism<br></font><br>
2010/1/6 Samantha Atkins <<a ymailto="mailto:sjatkins@mac.com" href="mailto:sjatkins@mac.com">sjatkins@mac.com</a>>:<br>> On Dec 28, 2009, at 5:03 AM, Stefano Vaj wrote:<br>>> This has something to do with the theist objection that positively believing<br>>> that Allah does not "exist" would be a "faith" on an equally basis as their<br>>> own.<br>><br>> That is poor reasoning. It is not a "positive" believe at all. It is not<br>> even a belief at all. It is not believing in a positive belief for which<br>> there is no evidence. Now, if the formulation of "Allah" is actually<br>> contradictory then we can go to a stronger logical position of pointing out<br>> that such is impossible.<br><br>This is exactly my point. A belief in the non-existence of Allah is<br>perfectly plausible, and is on an entirely different level from a<br>belief in its existence<br>i) because it is perfectly
normal and legitimate not just avoiding to<br>believe in the existence of unproven things, but also actually<br>believing in their non-existence;<br>ii) in addition, Spiderman, Thor or Sherlock Holmes may (have)<br>exist(ed) somewhere, someplace, Allah, Jahvé etc. have some peculiar<br>existential and definitory problems which affect any entity allegedly<br>being distinct from the world, and located out of the time...<br><br>>> Now, I may well be persuaded that my cat is sleeping in the other room even<br>>> though no final evidence of the truth of my opinion thereupon is (still)<br>>> there, and to form thousand of such provisional or ungrounded - and often<br>>> wrong - beliefs is probably inevitable. But would I claim that such<br>>> circumstances are a philosophical necessity or of ethical relevance?<br>>> Obviously not...<br>><br>> Poor analogy. We know that cats exist and that states such as
sleeping<br>> exist. We know no such things about gods or that putative states.<br><br>What I mean there is that while it is perfectly normal in everyday<br>life to believe things without any material evidence thereof (the<br>existence of cats and sleep does not tell me anything about the<br>current state of my cat any more than the existence of number 27 on<br>the roulette does not provide any ground for my belief that this is<br>the number which is going to win, and therefore on which I should bet,<br>at the next throw of the ball), what is abnormal is to claim that such<br>assumptions are a philosophical necessity or of ethical relevance.<br><br>-- <br>Stefano Vaj<br>_______________________________________________<br>extropy-chat mailing list<br><a ymailto="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org" href="mailto:extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org">extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org</a><br><span><a target="_blank"
href="http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat">http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat</a></span><br><br><br><br><br>It is quite different to say "I am convinced there is no God" than it is to say "I am not convinced there is a God"<br>There is no evidence disproving the existence of God so to believe there is no god is indeed a faith in itself.<br></div></div>
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