<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><br><div><div>On Oct 27, 2010, at 12:53 PM, Damien Broderick wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 10/27/2010 5:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:<br><br><blockquote type="cite">As I understand your position this is impossible: you think you will end up as the original with probability 1 and as a copy with probability 0.</blockquote><br>Of course--in the situation you first proposed. Say I walk into a scanning station, lie down, get scanned, stand up and the team wave me off after a nice cup of tea. </div></blockquote><div><br></div>AFTER you walk out of the scanning station then of course you have every right to identify with the man who walked out of the scanning station, and no other. Then is the time to feel sorry for that other fellow and be glad it wasn't you; but you haven't done that yet, and there is a 100% chance you will never have that happy subjective experience but instead will walk into the scanning station and find yourself on the rack being prodded with red hot irons. But you're not entirely wrong as you also have a 100% chance of getting off scot free. </div><div><br></div><div>Until the duplication process is complete you do have justification for identifying with your future self walking out of the scanning station whistling a happy tune, but you have equal justification for identifying with your future self screaming in the torture chamber. And the fellow in the chamber would not feel like he was an abstract offshoot of you, he would feel that you, the lucky bastard who gets to live a cushy pain free life, is an abstract offshoot of him.</div><div><br></div><div> John K Clark</div><div><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br></body></html>